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Management review
In 2014, all Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to their 
surrounding environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were 
yet again historically low and the radioactive releases into the environment very small. 
The low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual outages and improve-
ments implemented by the NPPs. Radioactive waste generated in the operational processes 
of the NPPs accumulated as anticipated. Its processing and final disposal in underground 
facilities took place in a controlled manner. An emergency preparedness drill was arranged 
at the Loviisa NPP in November to practice, for the first time in Finland, a simultaneous 
emergency at two plant units.
In 2014, six events warranting a special report were reported by Loviisa NPP. These events 
did not influence the safety of the employees or the area surrounding the plant. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy (hereinafter referred to as “Fortum”) has several pending long-term 
nuclear safety development projects that involve development of the management system, 
processing of operational events, as well as maintenance of the operational limits and con-
ditions. STUK will monitor their progress and assess effectiveness of the measures. As part 
of the oversight of the organisation, STUK ordered a study to assess the nuclear safety 
culture of Fortum and the functionality of related procedures. The report states that safety 
is appreciated at Loviisa NPP and the safety culture in general is at an acceptable level. 
However, the NPP must continue active development of the safety culture.
In 2014, three events warranting a special report were reported by the operating units at 
Olkiluoto. These events did not influence the safety of the employees or the area surround-
ing the plant. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the inspec-
tion programme during the annual outage. Good operations and examples of continuous 
improvement were observed during the inspection. During inservice inspections carried out 
during the annual outage, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (hereinafter “TVO”) detected cracks in 
the feedwater lines of both plant units. The cracked mixing points will be replaced during 
the next annual outage. In 2014, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on the plant’s man-
agement, modification and procurement processes. A reformed modification work process 
was introduced in 2014.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued re-
garding plant systems, structures and components as well as operating procedures. An ex-
pansion project of the interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto proceeded 
as planned in 2014. System modifications have been completed. A decision on an applica-
tion to increase the capacity of the interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel is being 
processed by STUK. An upgrade project regarding the reactor coolant pumps, their control 
and the frequency converters needed to supply power to the pumps has been started at 
Olkiluoto. STUK approved the project’s conceptual design plans in 2014. As a result of the 
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Fukushima accident, Olkiluoto will improve, for example, systems used to cool the reactor 
and add whole new systems for pumping water into the reactor in case of a complete loss of 
AC power. In 2014, a modification of an auxiliary feedwater system recirculation line was 
implemented at Olkiluoto 1. It reduces the system’s dependence on seawater cooling.
The purpose of an I&C renewal project launched at Loviisa NPP in 2005 was to digitalise 
almost the entire I&C system of the plant. In 2014, Fortum announced that the supplier of 
the modernisation had been changed and the scope of the renewal project had been signifi-
cantly cut back, which is why the project would not be completed until by the end of 2018. 
Modifications implemented in 2014 included improving reliability of the reactor coolant 
system’s pressure control system at Loviisa 2 and installing qualified safety valves for the 
secondary side water and water/steam flow. As a result of the Fukushima accident, four air-
cooled heat exchangers have been installed that will ensure cooling of the fuel in the reac-
tor and the fuel pools in case heat transfer to the sea is lost. Furthermore, separate flood 
protection components have been installed in some systems important to safety. The protec-
tion elements take into account exceptionally high seawater levels during a storm.
Most of the detailed design of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit has been approved by STUK, and 
the volumes of construction work and component manufacture have decreased. Installation 
activity at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site has also slowed down starting in early 2014. 
Manufacture and installation of the emergency diesel generator auxiliary system pipe-
lines were almost the only works still ongoing in 2014. Pressure and leak tightness tests 
of the containment took place at the nuclear island in February. STUK inspected the plant 
site before testing and oversaw the testing. Results of the tests clearly met the accept-
ance criteria. The most important open issue regarding plant design at Olkiluoto 3 is the 
I&C systems. In 2014, the licensing of I&C proceeded well as STUK approved the overall 
I&C plan, i.e. architecture, and found that the analysis of I&C active failures were accept-
able. Next, STUK started reviewing the technical I&C materials. In 2014, STUK ordered a 
preliminary report on the safety culture during commissioning of Olkiluoto 3. Challenges 
highlighted in the report included the highly complex stage during the lifecycle of the plant 
and the fact that open items and deviations from the construction stage tend to cumulate. 
Issues that were deemed especially challenging included potential slow processing of un-
expected events and people focusing only on their own work in a very narrow sector. The 
results will assist STUK in targeting its regulatory oversight to the key issues and chal-
lenges during the commissioning stage.
In 2014, STUK drafted preliminary safety assessments on supplementary applications 
for the decisions-in-principle on Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 and TVO’s Olkiluoto 4. In its 
preliminary safety assessment on Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 plant unit, STUK stated that 
an AES-2006 nuclear power plant of Rosatom can be constructed in a manner that meets 
the Finnish safety requirements. However, STUK raised some issues where meeting of the 
Finnish safety requirements would require changing of the NPP design, such as provisions 
for an airplane crash, internal floods, fires and severe accidents. STUK also stated that 
Fennovoima must improve its expertise and develop its management system in order to be 
capable to assess and ensure the safety of a new NPP, as well as to draft the construction 
license materials to be submitted to STUK. In its supplementary application, TVO applied 
for an extension of five years to the deadline for submitting a construction license applica-
tion for the new nuclear power plant unit at Olkiluoto in compliance with the 2010 deci-
sion-in-principle. STUK stated that there are no nuclear safety issues that would prevent 
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the extending of the deadline. The Government approved Fennovoima’s supplementary 
application for the decision-in-principle and the Parliament ratified it. The Government 
refused TVO’s application on an extension to the deadline for the construction license ap-
plication. In 2014, STUK continued its preparations for the processing of the construction 
license applications.
The processing and storage of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel, as well as the nuclear 
fuel repository project, proceeded safely, and no problems were detected at Loviisa or Olki-
luoto. Due to the successful planning of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less 
nuclear waste than NPPs on average. At Loviisa NPP, STUK supervised the commissioning 
of a liquid waste solidification facility. Damage was observed in concrete containers used in 
solidification at the end of 2013. Trial runs were discontinued to study their cause. STUK 
deemed the conclusions made based on reports correct. Loviisa NPP continued its activities 
and studies pertaining to the commissioning of the solidification facility, and the trial runs 
should be completed by the end of 2015. STUK reviewed and approved a periodic safety as-
sessment of the Loviisa low- and intermediate-level operational waste repository and stat-
ed that the safety level of the repository is good and its operation can be safely continued. 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland is preparing the decommissioning of a research 
reactor at Otaniemi. STUK issued statements on the environmental impact assessment 
program for the decommissioning and a related report.
The project by Posiva Oy (hereinafter referred to as “Posiva”) on final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel has proceeded: Posiva submitted a construction license application for the en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility to the Government in late 2012. Posiva submitted to 
STUK the safety documentation required by the Nuclear Energy Decree and STUK started 
reviewing the materials in early 2013. The fact that some of the application materials were 
submitted to STUK late and the need for additional information to some documents was 
postponed the review process, which was completed in late 2014. A statement by the Advi-
sory Committee on Nuclear Safety on the Posiva construction license application and the 
preliminary safety assessment by STUK, as well as STUK’s statement, could not be sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy until in early 2015. The process 
was very demanding because it was the first preliminary safety assessment for a repository 
of this type in the world. STUK used a team of Finnish and international experts from a 
variety of technical sectors as an aid in its review. In addition to reviewing the documents, 
STUK conducted inspections of Posiva’s management system and organisation. STUK was 
able to determine that the encapsulation plant and disposal facility can be constructed in 
such a manner that it will be safe. In separate decisions on documents by virtue of sec-
tion 35 of the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK presented specific requirements regarding the 
construction stage. The requirements included supplementing the system design of the 
encapsulation plant in compliance with the construction stages, further studies on the per-
formance of the barriers of the repository and development of the long-term safety case for 
the operating license application.
The construction of the underground research facility (Onkalo) was completed for the most 
part by the end of 2012. In 2014, Posiva excavated facilities to be used to test the final dis-
posal method, as well as the last of the shafts and tunnels, and completed structural engi-
neering works. STUK supervised the construction of the underground research facility, the 
operations of Posiva’s organisation and the research carried out at Onkalo.
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The safeguards of nuclear materials in Finland was implemented in compliance with the 
international agreements. Annual verifications of design information were implemented for 
the nuclear power plant units under construction and the physical inventories of nuclear 
materials of the operating NPPs were verified. STUK verified the correctness of stored 
fuel data by means of spent fuel measurements. Furthermore, STUK inspected the opera-
tions of other nuclear material holders and physical inventory results. As a summary of 
the inspections and oversight in 2014, STUK could state that nuclear energy was used in 
compliance with the reports and no unannounced activities took place. Inspection results 
submitted by the IAEA and the European Commission as well as conclusions made based 
on the inspection activities also support STUK’s observations. In 2014, the IAEA and the 
Commission started electronic transfer of surveillance data from Loviisa NPP directly to 
the Commission and further to the IAEA. Enabling the electronic transfer of monitoring 
data is an obligation laid down in the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement 
between Finland and the IAEA. STUK’s duty was to support the NPPs and international 
organisations when they ensure that the electronic data transfer complies with all require-
ments pertaining to nuclear security and information security. In 2014, STUK participated 
in a laser scanning campaign of the Onkalo facility carried out by the Commission and the 
IAEA where it was verified that Onkalo has been constructed as reported. The results of 
the campaign can be used as reference data in future inspections of Onkalo.
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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory control in the field of nuclear energy which 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once a year 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy pursuant to section 121 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Environment, the Finnish 
Environment Institute and the regional environmental authorities of the localities in which 
a nuclear facility is located.
The regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2014 included the engineering, construction and 
operation of nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear waste management and nuclear materi-
als. The control of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management, as well as nuclear 
non-proliferation, concern two STUK departments: nuclear reactor regulation and nuclear 
waste and material regulation.
The first parts of the report explain the fundamentals of nuclear safety regulation as part 
of STUK’s duties, as well as the objectives of the operations, and briefly introduce the ob-
jects of regulation. The chapter concerning the development and implementation of legis-
lation and regulations describes changes in nuclear legislation, as well as the progress of 
STUK’s YVL Guide reform work.
The section concerning the regulation of nuclear facilities contains an overall safety assess-
ment of the nuclear facilities currently in operation or under construction. For the nu-
clear facilities currently in operation, the section describes plant operation, events during 
operation, annual maintenance and observations made during regulatory activities. Data 
and observations gained during regulatory activities are reviewed with a focus on ensur-
ing the safety functions of nuclear facilities and the integrity of structures and compo-
nents. The chapters describing the development of the plants and their safety also include 
summaries of the development targets established after the Fukushima accident. For the 
existing NPPs, the report describes the regulation and inspections of the interim storage 
of spent nuclear fuel, management of operating waste, and the provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management. The report also includes a description of the oversight of the 
operations and quality management of organisations, oversight of operational experience 
feedback activities, and the results of these oversight activities. The radiation safety of 
nuclear facilities is examined on the basis of employees’ individual doses, collective doses, 
radioactive releases and the results of environmental radiation monitoring. The report also 
includes summaries on STUK’s regulatory oversight concerning nuclear security, emer-
gency preparedness and safeguards of nuclear materials at the nuclear power plants. For 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit currently under construction, the report includes descriptions 
of the regulation of design, construction, manufacturing, installation, and commissioning 
preparations, as well as regulation of the operations of the licensee and the organisations 
participating in the construction project. At the end of the chapter on the regulation of nu-
clear facilities there is a summary of new plant projects and the regulation of the research 
reactor.
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The chapter concerning the regulation of the final disposal project for spent nuclear fuel de-
scribes the preparations for the final disposal project and the related regulatory activities. 
In addition, the oversight of the design and construction of the research facilities (Onkalo) 
currently under construction in Olkiluoto, as well as the assessment and oversight of the 
research, development and design work being carried out to specify further the safety case 
for final disposal are included in the report.
In addition to actual safety regulation, the report describes safety research, regulatory in-
dicators and the development of regulatory operations, as well as emergency preparedness, 
communication and STUK’s participation in international nuclear safety cooperation.
Appendix 1 presents a detailed study of the safety performance of the nuclear power 
plants by means of an indicator system. Appendix 2 includes a summary of employees’ 
doses at the nuclear power plants. Appendix 3 describes exceptional operational events at 
the nuclear power plants. Appendix 4 lists the licenses granted by STUK pursuant to the 
Nuclear Energy Act in 2014. Summaries of inspections included in the periodic inspection 
programme of nuclear power plants are presented in Appendix 5, and the Olkiluoto 3 con-
struction inspection programme is in Appendix 6. Inspections included in the construction 
period inspection programme for Onkalo are listed in a table in Appendix 7 and the inspec-
tion programme for the construction license application period of the spent fuel repository 
are listed in Appendix 8. A table in Appendix 9 lists the amount of nuclear materials in 
Finland. Appendix 10 lists the most important assignments funded by STUK concerning 
the safety of nuclear power plants and final disposal of nuclear waste in 2014. Appendix 11 
contains definitions of terms and abbreviations used in the report.
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1 Fundamentals of nuclear 
safety regulation
Regulatory control by STUK is based 
on the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) is responsible for the regulatory control 
of nuclear safety in Finland. Its responsibilities 
include the control of nuclear security and emer-
gency response, as well as the safeguards for nu-
clear materials necessary to prevent nuclear pro-
liferation.
Figure 1. Oversight of nuclear facilities; from strategy to implementation.
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STUK functions for the oversight of nuclear power plants 
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STUK lays down detailed requirements 
concerning nuclear safety.
STUK contributes to the processing of applications 
for licenses under the Nuclear Energy Act, con-
trols compliance with the license conditions, and 
formulates the detailed requirements. STUK also 
lays down qualification requirements for personnel 
involved in the use of nuclear energy and controls 
compliance with these requirements. In addition, 
STUK submits proposals for legislative amend-
ments and issues general guidelines concerning 
radiation and nuclear safety. 
The aim is to ensure safety and maintain 
the confidence of the general public.
The general objective of STUK’s regulatory 
activities is to ensure the safety of nuclear 
14
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facilities, so that plant operation does not cause 
radiation hazards that could endanger the safety of 
workers or the population in the vicinity or cause 
other harm to the environment or property. The 
most important objective is to prevent a reactor 
accident that would cause a release of radioactive 
substances, or the threat of a release. Another ob-
jective is to maintain public confidence in regula-
tory activities.
STUK ensures the adequacy of 
safety regulations and compliance 
with their requirements.
It is STUK’s task to ensure in its regulatory acti-
vities that safety regulations contain adequate re-
quirements for the use of nuclear energy and that 
nuclear energy is used in compliance with these 
requirements.
Regulation by STUK ensures the 
attainment of safety objectives.
STUK ensures, by means of inspections and cont-
rols, that the operational preconditions and ope-
rations of the licensee and its subcontractors and 
the systems, structures and components of nuclear 
facilities are in compliance with regulatory requi-
rements. STUK’s operations are guided by annual 
follow-up plans, presenting the key items and acti-
vities for inspection and review. STUK carries out 
inspections of plans for nuclear facilities and other 
documents that the licensee is obliged to request 
STUK to do. The compliance of activities with the 
plans is verified through inspections carried out 
at the plant site or at subcontractors’ premises. In 
Defence in depth
The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by 
preventing the harmful effects of reactor damage 
and radiation through successive and mutually-
redundant functional and structural levels. This 
approach is called the “defence in depth” principle. 
Safety-ensuring functions may be divided into pre-
ventive, protective and mitigating levels.
The aim of the preventive level is to prevent 
any deviations from the plant’s normal opera-
tional state. Accordingly, high quality standards 
apply to component design, manufacture, installa-
tion and maintenance, as well as plant operation.
The protective level refers to providing for oper-
ational transients and accidents through systems 
aimed at detecting disturbances and preventing 
their development into an accident.
If the first or second level functions fail to stop 
the progress of an accident, its consequences must 
be mitigated. In such a case, the main thing is to 
ensure the integrity of reactor containment and the 
operation of its associated systems.
In addition to the functional levels, the defence 
in depth approach includes the principle of mul-
tiple successive barriers to potential radioactive 
releases, and a number of good design and quality 
management principles.
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the prelimi-
nary preparation of matters related to the safe use 
of nuclear energy is vested with the Advisory 
Commission on Nuclear Safety. It is appointed 
by the Government and functions in conjunction 
with STUK. Its term of office is three years. The 
Commission was appointed on 1 October 2012 and 
will remain in office until 30 September 2015.
In 2014, the Chairman of the Commission 
was Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Seppo Vuori, and the Vice-
Chairman was senior specialist Miliza Malmelin 
(Ministry of the Environment). Members of the 
Commission were professor Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki 
(LTY), customer director Rauno Rintamaa (VTT), 
chief commercial officer Timo Okkonen (Inspecta 
Oy), customer manager Ilona Lindholm (VTT) and 
Dr. Sc. (Tech.) Antero Tamminen. Petteri Tiippana, 
Director General of STUK, was a permanent ex-
pert to the Commission.
The Commission has two committees, the 
Reactor Safety Committee and the Nuclear Waste 
Safety Committee. Foreign and Finnish experts 
have been invited to join the committees. English is 
the working language in the committees, and more 
extensive questions of principle will be brought 
to them for preparation. Nuclear industry ex-
perts from the UK, France, Sweden, Germany, 
Switzerland, Hungary and the United States have 
been invited to join the committees. Both of the 
Committees convened twice in 2014. The members 
of the actual Commission also participate in the 
work of the committees
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addition to these inspections and reviews, STUK 
has separate inspection programmes for periodic 
inspections of operating plants and inspections 
during construction. STUK also employs resident 
inspectors at the plants, who supervise and wit-
ness the construction, operation and condition of 
the plant and the operations of the organisation 
on a daily basis and report their observations. An 
overall safety assessment is conducted annually on 
each nuclear facility, dealing with the attainment 
of radiation protection objectives, the development 
of defence in depth, and the operation of organisa-
tions constructing or operating nuclear facilities 
and providing services to them.
STUK evaluates the safety of nuclear 
facilities starting from the application 
for a decision-in-principle
The construction of a nuclear power plant, inter-
mediate storage for spent fuel and a final disposal 
facility require a Government decision-in-principle 
that the project is in line with the overall good of 
society. The task of giving a statement on and pre-
paring a preliminary safety assessment of the ap-
plication for the decision-in-principle is vested with 
STUK. The safety assessment will state, in particu-
lar, whether any issues have been discovered that 
would indicate that the necessary prerequisites for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant in com-
pliance with the Nuclear Energy Act do not exist. 
In connection with the application for the decision-
in-principle, the applicant also presents a report on 
the environmental impact assessment. When an 
application for a construction or operating license 
for a nuclear facility has been submitted to the 
Government, STUK issues a statement on it and 
includes its safety assessment. 
STUK regulates the different nuclear 
facility design and construction stages
The principles and detailed approach of STUK’s in-
spection activities are described in the YVL Guides 
issued by STUK. Guide YVL 1.1 describes the 
oversight and inspection procedures at a general 
level, while the detailed procedures are described 
in other YVL Guides. The purpose of oversight and 
inspection activities regarding plant projects is to 
allow STUK to verify that the prerequisites for 
operations of a high standard exist, that the plans 
are acceptable before the implementation begins 
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Liability Act prescribes that the users 
of nuclear energy must have a liability insurance 
policy, or other financial guarantee, for a possible 
accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population or property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
(TVO) have prepared for damage from a nuclear 
accident as prescribed by law by taking out an 
insurance policy for this purpose, mainly with the 
Nordic Nuclear Insurance Pool.
International negotiations concerning the 
renewal of the Paris/Brussels nuclear liability 
agreements were completed in 2004. It was agreed 
that the funds available for compensation were 
to be increased, and plant owners were to have 
unlimited liability. However, the entry into force 
of these international agreements has been repeat-
edly postponed. Consequently, the decision was 
taken in Finland to legislate nationally regard-
ing a higher amount of insurance and impose an 
unlimited liability on license holders. A temporary 
amendment of the Nuclear Liability Act entered 
into force at the beginning of 2012. The legislative 
amendment will be revoked once the agreements 
discussed above will become valid. 
In case of an accident, the funds available 
for compensation come from three sources: the 
licensee, the country of location of the facility and 
the international liability community. In 2014, 
a total of 600,000,000 SDR was available for 
compensation from these sources. SDR refers to 
Special Drawing Right, an international reserve 
asset defined by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), whose value is based on a basket of key 
international currencies. In 2014, the value of the 
SDR was about EUR 1.18.
In Finland, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority is responsible for ascertaining the con-
tents and conditions of the licensee’s insurance ar-
rangements. The Financial Supervisory Authority 
has approved both Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance, 
and STUK has verified the existence of the policies 
as required by the Nuclear Energy Act.
The Nuclear Liability Act also covers the trans-
port of nuclear materials. STUK ascertains that 
all nuclear material transport has had liabil-
ity insurance either approved by the Financial 
Supervisory Authority or by the authorities of 
the sending state in accordance with the Paris 
Convention.
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and that the implementation is compliant with 
regulations before the operating license is granted. 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, the licensee 
must ensure safety. Through its oversight, STUK 
ensures that the licensee meets its responsibilities. 
STUK oversees and inspects the implementation 
of the plant and the organisations participating in 
its implementation and operation. STUK does not 
monitor and inspect every detail; instead, the over-
sight and inspections are targeted on the basis of 
the safety implications of each subject. To this end, 
the plant is divided into systems, structures and 
equipment, which are further classified according to 
their importance to plant safety. The safety classifi-
cation of the plant is reviewed by STUK at the stage 
of applying for the construction license. STUK in-
spects and monitors the design and manufacture of 
the equipment and structures that are most critical 
from the point of view of safety. Inspection organisa-
tions approved by STUK have been trusted with the 
inspection of equipment and structures with lesser 
safety implications. STUK oversees the operations 
of these inspection organisations.
In plant projects, STUK ensures with its over-
sight and inspections, the bulk of which are sched-
uled to take place in advance, that the power 
company planning to build the plant and the plant 
supplier responsible for its implementation, and its 
main sub-contractor, have the necessary capabili-
ties for a high-quality implementation. 
During the construction license stage, the plant 
design work and quality assurance of implemen-
tation are evaluated in order to make sure that 
the plant can be implemented in compliance with 
high quality standards and Finnish safety require-
ments. During construction, inspections and over-
sight are deployed in order to ensure that the plant 
is implemented in compliance with the principles 
approved at the construction license stage. The 
inspections are based on detailed documentation 
delivered to STUK and onsite inspections at the 
suppliers’ premises. Before the manufacture of 
equipment and structures may commence, STUK 
inspects both the respective detailed plans and the 
capabilities of the manufacturing organisations to 
produce high-quality results. During manufacture 
and building, STUK carries out inspections in 
order to verify that the equipment and structures 
are manufactured in compliance with the plans 
approved by STUK. Regarding the installation of 
equipment and structures, STUK carries out in-
spections in order to verify that the installations 
are made in compliance with the approved plans 
and that the requirements set out for installations 
are fulfilled. Approval by STUK after inspection is 
a prerequisite for trial operation of the equipment. 
After that, STUK inspects the results of the trial 
operation before the actual commissioning.
Before operating the plant, STUK must be pro-
vided with documentation proving that the plant 
was designed and implemented in compliance with 
Finnish safety requirements. In addition, STUK 
has to be provided with evidence verifying that 
the prerequisites exist for safe operation of the 
plant. These include personnel that have been 
trained and verified to be competent, the instruc-
tions required for operating the plant, safety and 
preparedness arrangements, maintenance sched-
ule and staff, as well as radiation protection staff. 
Having verified that the implementation is safe 
and the organisation has the required capabilities, 
STUK prepares the safety assessment and report 
required for the operating license. Obtaining the 
operating license is a prerequisite for loading the 
reactor with fuel. 
Comprehensive safety assessment 
is a prerequisite for extending 
the operating license
In Finland, operating licenses are granted for a fi-
xed term, typically 10 to 20 years. A comprehensive 
safety assessment is required to renew the ope-
rating license. If the operating license is granted 
for a period exceeding 10 years, an interim safety 
assessment is carried out during the license peri-
od. The scope of the interim assessment is similar 
to that carried out in conjunction with renewing 
the operating license. During the assessments, the 
state of the plant is investigated, paying particular 
attention to the effects of ageing on the plant and 
its equipment and structures. In addition, the ca-
pabilities of the operating personnel for continued 
safe operation of the plant are assessed. 
Regulation of operating plants includes 
continuous safety assessment.
STUK’s regulation of operating nuclear facilities 
ensures that the condition of the facilities is and 
will be in compliance with the requirements, the 
facilities function as planned and are operated in 
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compliance with the regulations. The regulatory 
activities cover the operation of the facility, its sys-
tems, components and structures, as well as the 
operations of the organisation. In this work, STUK 
employs regular and topical reports submitted by 
the licensees, on the basis of which it assesses the 
operation of the facility and the plant operator’s 
activities. In addition, STUK assesses the safety of 
nuclear power plants by carrying out inspections 
on plant sites and at component manufacturers’ 
premises, and based on operational experience 
feedback and safety research. On the basis of the 
safety assessment during operation, both the licen-
see and STUK evaluate the need and potential for 
safety improvements.
Safety analyses provide tools for assessing 
the safety of nuclear facilities
Safety analyses ensure that the nuclear facility 
is designed to be safe and that it can be operated 
safely. Deterministic and probabilistic approaches 
complement each other. 
Deterministic safety analyses 
For the purpose of STUK’s regulatory YVL Guides, 
deterministic safety analyses are analyses of 
transients and accidents required for justifying 
the technical solutions employed by nuclear po-
wer plants. The licensees update these analyses in 
connection with the renewal of operating licenses, 
periodic safety reviews and any significant modifi-
cations carried out at the plant. 
Probabilistic risk analyses 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) refers to quanti-
tative estimates of the threats affecting the safety 
of a nuclear power plant and the probabilities of 
chains of events and any detrimental effects. PRA 
makes it possible to identify the plant’s key risk 
factors, and can contribute to the design of nuclear 
power plants and the development of plant opera-
tion and technical solutions. The licensees employ 
PRA for the maintenance and continuous impro-
vement of the technical safety of nuclear facilities.
STUK reviews the deterministic safety analyses 
and probabilistic risk analyses related to construc-
tion and operating licenses and the operation of a 
nuclear power plant. When required, STUK has 
its own independent comparison analyses made in 
order to verify the reliability of results. 
STUK oversees modifications from 
planning to implementation
Various modifications are carried out at nuclear 
facilities to improve safety, replace aged systems 
or components, facilitate plant operation or main-
tenance, or improve the efficiency of energy gene-
ration. STUK inspects the plans for extensive or 
safety-significant plant modifications and oversees 
the modification work by reviewing the documents 
submitted by the licensee and carrying out inspec-
tions on site or at manufacturers’ premises. 
As a consequence of modifications implemented 
at the plant, several documents that describe 
the plant’s operation and structure – such as the 
Operating Limits and Conditions, the Final Safety 
Analysis Report and the operating and mainte-
nance procedures – have changed. STUK oversees 
the document revisions and generally follows the 
updating of plant documentation after the modifi-
cations.
Operability of the plant is overseen during 
operation and annual maintenance
The technical operability of nuclear facilities is 
overseen by assessing the operation of the facility 
in compliance with the requirements laid down in 
the operational limits and conditions, and over-
seeing annual maintenance outages, plant mainte-
nance and ageing management, fire safety, radia-
tion safety, nuclear security and emergency prepa-
redness.
Operational limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC)
of nuclear facilities lay down the detailed tech-
nical and administrative requirements and re-
strictions concerning the plant and its various 
systems, equipment and structures. The licensee 
is responsible for keeping the operational limits 
and conditions up-to-date and ensuring compli-
ance with them. STUK controls compliance with 
the plants’ operational conditions and limits by 
witnessing operations on site. Special attention is 
paid to the testing and fault repairs of components 
subject to the operational limits and conditions.
When annual maintenance outages end, STUK 
ascertains the plant unit’s state in compliance 
with the operational limits and conditions prior to 
start-up. Any changes to and planned deviations 
from the operational limits and conditions must 
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power plants. These include refuelling, preventive 
equipment maintenance, periodic inspections and 
tests, as well as failure repairs. These actions ensu-
re the preconditions for operating the power plant 
safely during the following operating cycles. 
STUK is responsible for controlling and ensu-
ring that the nuclear power plant is safe during the 
annual maintenance and future operating cycles, 
and that the annual maintenance does not cause a 
radiation hazard to the workers, the population or 
the environment. STUK ensures this by reviewing 
the documents required by the regulations, such as 
outage plans and modification documentation, and 
by performing on-site inspections during annual 
maintenance. 
Plant maintenance and ageing management
In its regulatory activities concerning the ageing 
management of operating nuclear facilities, STUK 
controls the plants’ ageing management strategy 
be submitted to STUK for approval in advance. In 
addition, the licensee is responsible for reporting to 
STUK without delay all situations deviating from 
the requirements under the operational limits and 
conditions. In the report, the power company pre-
sents its corrective action for approval by STUK. 
STUK oversees the implementation of corrective 
action. 
Oversight of operation, incidents 
during operation and reporting 
the operation to STUK
STUK oversees the safe operation of plants 
through regular inspections and reports submitted 
by the power companies. In addition, STUK’s local 
inspectors working on plant sites oversee the ope-
ration on a daily basis. The local inspectors assess 
faults and oversee their repairs, as well as tests 
of safety-critical equipment. The inspections of 
the periodic inspection programme focus on major 
faults, incidents and progress made in corrective 
actions, as well as on operating procedures. The 
inspections are based on the regular reports sub-
mitted by power companies and inspections and 
walkdown inspections conducted on site.
The power companies are obliged to report any 
operational transients and any matters that may 
compromise safety. STUK assesses the safety imp-
lications of the incidents and the power company’s 
ability to detect safety deficiencies, take action and 
carry out corrective actions.
The licensees submit event reports to STUK on 
operational events at nuclear facilities, comprising 
special reports, operational transient reports and 
scram reports. In addition to event reports, the fa-
cilities submit daily reports, quarterly reports, an-
nual reports, outage reports, annual environmental 
safety reports, monthly individual radiation dose 
reports, annual experience operational feedback 
reports and safeguard reports to STUK.
Internal processing and reporting is also required 
for events or near-misses not subject to a special 
or operational transient report. Reports on such 
events are submitted to STUK for information if 
the event is or may be relevant to nuclear or ra-
diation safety or STUK’s communication activities.
Annual maintenance
Work that cannot be done during plant operation is 
carried out during annual maintenance of nuclear 
The majority of radioactive substances cre-
ated during the operation of a nuclear re-
actor are contained in the nuclear fuel. In addi-
tion, radioactive substances are contained in the 
reactor cooling system, as well as in the related 
purification and waste systems. The liquid and 
atmospheric effluents from the plant are purified 
and delayed so that their radiation impact on the 
environment is very low compared with the im-
pact of radioactive substances normally existing 
in nature. The emissions are carefully measured 
to ensure that they remain clearly below the pre-
scribed limits.
Radioactive emissions from a nuclear 
power plant into the air and sea are veri-
fied through comprehensive radiation monitoring. 
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
power plant comprises radiation measurements 
and determination of radioactive substances, con-
ducted to analyse the radioactive substances ex-
isting in the environment. In case of potential 
accident situations, continuously-operating radia-
tion measurement stations monitoring the external 
radiation dose rate are installed in the vicinity of 
nuclear power plants at distances of a few kilome-
tres. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plant and to the na-
tional radiation-monitoring network.
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and its implementation ensures the maintenance 
of sufficient safety margins for safety-significant 
systems, components and structures throughout 
their lifetime. The organisation of the licensee’s 
operations, the prerequisites for the organisation 
to carry out the necessary actions, and the conditi-
on of components and structures important to safe-
ty are subject to inspection and review. Regulatory 
control and inspections ensure that the power com-
panies have the lifetime management programmes 
in place that enable them to detect potential prob-
lems in time. In addition, corrective action must be 
carried out in a way that ensures the integrity and 
operability of safety-significant components and 
structures so that safety functions can be activated 
at any time.
STUK monitors ageing management through 
the inspections of the periodic inspection program-
me and inspections related to modifications and 
annual maintenance. The key issue in operation 
license renewal and periodic safety assessments is 
the management of plant ageing.
Every year, the power companies provide STUK 
with reports on the ageing of electrical and I&C 
equipment, mechanical structures and equipment, 
as well as buildings. These reports describe the 
most salient ageing phenomena to be monitored, 
observations related to the ageing process and 
actions required for extending the service life of 
equipment and structures.
The licensee must carry out periodic inspec-
tions of safety-critical equipment and structures 
(such as the reactor pressure vessel and reactor 
coolant system). STUK approves the inspection 
programmes prior to the inspections and monitors 
the inspections and their results on site. The final 
result reports will be submitted to STUK for ap-
proval after the annual maintenance. 
Radiation safety
STUK oversees occupational radiation safety by 
inspecting and reviewing dosimetry, radiation 
measurements, radiation protection procedures, 
radiation conditions and radiation protection ar-
rangements for work processes at each facility. The 
dosimeters used for measuring the occupational ra-
diation doses undergo annual tests carried out by 
STUK. The test comprises irradiating a sample of 
dosimeters at STUK’s measurement standard lab-
oratory and reading the doses at the power plant. 
In addition, STUK oversees the meteorological dis-
persion measurements of radioactive substances, 
release measurements and environmental radia-
tion monitoring, and also reviews the relevant re-
sult reports.
Emergency preparedness
Besides the periodic inspections of other opera-
tions, STUK controls the readiness of the organi-
sations operating nuclear power plants to act in 
abnormal situations. The inspection focuses on 
training in emergency response organisation, ar-
rangement of rooms, securing the connections used 
for the transfer of meteorological measurement 
data during an emergency situation and radia-
tion monitoring of the surrounding environment, 
as well as the development of internal alarm proce-
dures at the power plant. Emergency exercises test 
the operation of the emergency response organisa-
tion, the functionality of the emergency response 
guidelines and the usability of the alert areas in 
practice, which are developed on the basis of the 
feedback received for the exercises. STUK moni-
tors the actions of power companies during these 
emergency drills.
Oversight of the operation of organisations 
is part of the process of ensuring plant safety
STUK oversees the operation of organisations by 
reviewing safety management, the management 
and quality systems, the competence and training 
of the staff of nuclear facilities and operational 
experience feedback activities. The aim is to ensure 
that the organisations of the power company as a 
whole and its key suppliers operate in a manner 
that ensures the safety of the plant at all levels 
and in connection with safety-related actions.
Training and qualifications of personnel
STUK monitors the training and qualifications of 
personnel through inspections included in the peri-
odic inspection programme, by assessing the suit-
ability and approving the appointment of certain 
key personnel and by assessing the ability of the 
power company to ensure safety in conjunction 
with incidents and annual maintenance opera-
tions. The key persons whose appointment must be 
approved by STUK are the director in charge of 
the construction and safe operation of the nuclear 
facility, the operators working in the plant control 
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rooms and the persons in charge of materials re-
lated to preparedness, safety and nuclear technol-
ogy. In addition, STUK’s approval is required for 
personnel carrying out certain integrity checks on 
materials. In case events reveal flaws in the op-
eration of the organisation, number of personnel 
or their competence, STUK will require the power 
company to take rectifying action as required.
Operational experience feedback
According to Government Decision VNA 733/2008, 
the advancement of science and technology and 
operating experience must be taken into account 
for the further enhancement of the safety of 
nuclear power plants. This principle is not limited 
to operational experience from Finnish nuclear po-
wer plants, but feedback from abroad must also 
be analysed systematically, and action must be ta-
ken to improve safety as necessary. STUK controls 
and ensures that the power companies’ operational 
experience feedback activities effectively prevent 
the reoccurrence of problematic events. STUK pays 
particular attention to the power companies’ abi-
lity to detect and identify the causes of the events 
and to remedy the underlying operational weak-
nesses. In addition, STUK analyses Finnish and 
foreign operational experience data and, as neces-
sary, lays down requirements to enhance safety.
STUK controls the operational experience feed-
back activities by reviewing the event reports sub-
mitted by the licensee and the annual summary of 
operational feedback activities. During inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme, the 
operational experience feedback activities of the 
plant and utilisation of international experience 
are monitored.
Event investigations
An event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as plan-
ned during an event or when it is estimated that the 
event will lead to significant modifications to the 
plant’s technical layout or procedures. A STUK in-
vestigation team is also set up if the licensee has not 
adequately clarified the root causes of an event. 
Pressure equipment critical to nuclear 
safety is monitored by STUK
In addition to regulating the design and manufac-
turing of pressure equipment, STUK oversees the 
operational safety of pressure equipment included 
in the most important safety classes and performs 
periodic inspections of such equipment. Pressure 
equipment in other safety classes is inspected by 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK. 
STUK oversees the operation of the manufacturers 
and testing and inspection organisations autho-
rised by it in connection with its own inspection 
activities, and by reviewing documents and making 
follow-up visits.
Regulatory oversight of nuclear non-
proliferation is a basic requirement 
for using nuclear energy
Oversight of nuclear non-proliferation ensures that 
nuclear materials and other nuclear commodities 
remain in peaceful use in compliance with the rel-
evant licenses and notifications, and that nuclear 
facilities and the related technologies are only uti-
lised for peaceful purposes. Another objective of 
the oversight of non-proliferation is to ensure that 
appropriate security arrangements are in place for 
nuclear items.
The operator is responsible for managing the 
nuclear items in its possession, accounting for 
them and reporting on plant sites and its activities 
relating to the nuclear fuel cycle to STUK and sub-
mitting their reports on nuclear materials to the 
European Commission. STUK maintains a nation-
al control system the purpose of which is to carry 
out the safeguards for the use of nuclear energy 
that are necessary for the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. In compliance with the Safeguards 
Agreement and its additional protocol, STUK for-
wards data on activities relating to the nuclear 
fuel cycle in Finland to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). STUK verifies the correct-
ness of the notifications, accounting and reporting 
through on-site inspections and participates in 
all inspections carried out by the IAEA and the 
European Commission. 
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The National Data Centre (NDC), which is 
based on the CTBT, contributed to the work of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in 
establishing a cost-effective NDC organisation that 
is functional from the Finnish perspective.
Oversight of nuclear waste management 
extends from planning to final disposal
The aim of the regulation of nuclear waste manage-
ment is to ensure that nuclear waste is processed, 
stored and disposed of safely. The control of nuclear 
waste processed at plant sites is part of the regulatory 
control of operating plants mentioned above. STUK 
oversees the nuclear waste management of nuclear 
power plants through document reviews and inspec-
tions within the periodic inspection programme. In ad-
dition, STUK approves the clearing of waste from con-
trol and reviews plants’ nuclear waste management 
and decommissioning plans, on the basis of which the 
licensees’ nuclear waste management fees are deter-
mined. 
The final disposal project for spent fuel requires 
special attention. STUK inspects and reviews 
Posiva Oy’s plans and research work for project im-
plementation and is overseeing the construction of 
an underground research tunnel called Onkalo at 
Olkiluoto. Onkalo is also being used to test suitable 
working methods for the final disposal facility and 
mapping the underground premises. The plan is to 
later convert the research tunnel into an entrance 
for the repository.
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2 Objects of regulation
Loviisa NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 520/496 PWR, 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto NPP
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 910/880 BWR,
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted about 1,600 (net) PWR,
 17.2.2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and the  
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
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Onkalo
Posiva Oy is constructing an 
underground research facility 
(Onkalo) in Olkiluoto, where 
bedrock volumes suitable for 
final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel can be investigated in 
more detail. Bedrock research 
at the planned final disposal 
depth is a requirement for 
granting a construction license 
for the final disposal facility. 
Posiva has designed Onkalo to 
function as one of the entrance 
routes to the planned final 
disposal facility, so STUK is 
applying the same regulatory 
procedures to the construction of Onkalo as those 
of a nuclear facility. 
The underground research facility consists of a 
drive tunnel, three shafts and a research gallery 
quarried to a depth of 437 m. Posiva started con-
structing Onkalo in 2004. By the end of 2011, the 
excavation of the drive tunnel had reached a depth 
of 455 m, and the length of the tunnel was 4913 m. 
In addition, intake air and personnel shafts had 
been quarried using raise boring techniques to a 
depth of 290 m and exhaust air shaft to a depth of 
437 m.
Research reactor
In addition to nuclear power plants, STUK regu-
lates the FiR 1 research reactor operated by VTT 
Figure 3. FiR 1 research reactor and the BNCT station.
•	 TRIGA	Mark	II	research	reactor 
Thermal power 250 kW
•	 Fuel	of	the	core: 
80 fuel rods with 15 kg uranium 
TRIGA	reactors	have	a	unique	fuel	type;	 
uranium–zirconium hybrid combination 
8% uranium 
91% zirconium 
1% hydrogen
Technical Research Centre of Finland. The reactor 
is located in Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maximum 
thermal power is 250 kW. It was started in March 
1962, and its current operating license will expire 
at the end of 2023. The reactor is used to manufac-
ture radioactive tracers, perform activation analy-
ses and train students. The reactor was also used 
to treat cancer with the boron neutron capture 
therapy (BNCT), but this operation was stopped in 
January 2012.
Other uses of nuclear energy
The regulation also applies to mining and mill-
ing of ore aiming at obtaining uranium or tho-
rium. Such operations are practiced at the produc-
tion plants of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy and 
Freepoint Cobalt Oy. A planned uranium extrac-
tion plant at Talvivaara is also part of this regula-
tory group. There are small amounts of regulated 
materials at some laboratories. The regulation also 
applies to nuclear equipment, systems and data as 
well as nuclear sector research and development 
activities and the transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste. 
Figure 2. Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
(Posiva Oy).
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3 Development of regulations
No amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) or any related Decrees were implement-
ed in 2014. STUK prepared in cooperation with 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy an 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act, based on 
the results of the international IRRS evaluation 
on STUK’s regulatory work in 2012, that would 
change the monitoring of the surroundings of nu-
clear power plants and mines into one of STUK’s 
regulatory duties and also implement other chang-
es that would emphasise STUK’s independent posi-
tion in the regulation of nuclear safety. The bill in-
cluded, for instance, a proposal on giving STUK the 
authorisation to issue binding regulations. The bill 
proposes that most of the technical requirements 
that are currently issued as Government Decrees 
would be changed into STUK’s regulations starting 
from the beginning of 2016. The Government bill 
also involves a proposal on increasing the funding 
to ensure nuclear safety expertise. The increased 
funding would ensure retention of an up-to-date 
Finnish nuclear safety research infrastructure. 
The Government bill was issued in December 2014.
One new YVL Guide was added to the YVL 
Guides published in 2013. This means that there 
are now 45 YVL Guides in total. The Guide on en-
vironmental radiation monitoring was divided into 
two separate instructions, one on assessing popula-
tion radiation doses and the other on regulatory 
oversight of the environment. This enabled the 
finalising of requirements on environmental radia-
tion monitoring before the processing of the above-
mentioned Government bill. Two YVL Guides, YVL 
A.9, Regular reporting on the operation of a nu-
clear facility, and YVL E.10, Emergency power sup-
plies of a nuclear facility, were published in 2014. It 
was noted that some of the requirements in the al-
ready published Guides need to be supplemented. 
As a result of an assessment of modification needs, 
seven Guides were updated and new versions were 
published. These were Guides about management 
systems, competence of personnel, construction 
of a NPP, occupational radiation protection, non-
destructive testing and testing facilities. Four old 
YVL Guides are still valid. These Guides are about 
environmental radiation monitoring.
Translations into English of forty YVL Guides 
were published in 2014.
Systematic training on application of new YVL 
Guides has been provided for STUK’s personnel in-
volved in nuclear safety regulation. Furthermore, 
three courses in English, meant for stakeholders, 
were arranged in 2014.
The new YVL Guides are applied as such to new 
NPPs. In the case of NPPs under construction and 
operating NPPs, the YVL Guides will be brought 
into effect by means of a separate implementation 
decision by the end of 2015. Related requests for 
supplementary information were sent to the NPPs 
currently in operation, the NPP under construc-
tion and the research reactor in early 2014. STUK 
requested from the licensees an assessment on 
compliance of the operating NPPs and the research 
reactor with the requirements as well as any de-
velopment plans by the end of 2014. Assessment 
of the compliance of the NPP under construction 
will be completed in connection with the operating 
license process.
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Structure of the new YVL-guides
A Safety management of 
a nuclear facility
B Plant and system 
design
C Radiation safety of a 
nuclear facility and 
environment
D Nuclear materials 
and waste
E Structures and equipment 
of a nuclear facility
A.1
 
 
A.2
 
A.3
 
A.4
 
 
A.5
 
 
A.6
 
 
A.7
 
 
 
A.8
 
A.9
 
 
A.10
 
 
A.11
 
A.12
Regulatory oversight 
of safety in the use of 
nuclear energy
Site for a nuclear 
facility
Management system 
for a nuclear facility
Organisation and 
personnel of a nuclear 
facility
Construction and com-
missioning of a nuclear 
facility
Conduct of operations 
at a nuclear power 
plant
Probabilistic risk 
assessment and risk 
management of a 
nuclear power plant
Ageing management 
of a nuclear facility
Regular reporting on 
the operation of a 
nuclear facility
Operating experience 
feedback of a nuclear 
facility
Security of a nuclear 
facility
Information security 
management of  
a nuclear facility
B.1
 
 
B.2
 
 
 
 
B.3
 
 
 
B.4
 
B.5
 
 
 
B.6
 
 
B.7
 
 
 
 
B.8
Safety design of 
a nuclear power 
plant
Classification 
of systems, 
structures and 
components of a 
nuclear facility
Deterministic 
safety analyses 
for a nuclear 
power plant
Nuclear fuel and 
reactor
Reactor coolant 
circuit of a 
nuclear power 
plant
Containment of 
a nuclear power 
plant
Provisions for 
internal and 
external hazards 
at a nuclear 
facility
Fire protection at 
a nuclear facility
C.1
 
 
C.2
 
 
 
C.3
 
 
 
C.4
 
 
 
 
C.5
 
 
C.6
 
C.7
Structural radiation 
safety at a nuclear 
facility
Radiation protection 
and exposure moni-
toring of nuclear 
facility workers
Limitation and moni-
toring of radioactive 
releases from a 
nuclear facility
Assessment of 
radiation doses to 
the public in the 
vicinity of a nuclear 
facility
Emergency arrange-
ments of a nuclear 
power plant
Radiation monitoring 
at a nuclear facility
Radiological 
monitoring of the 
environment of a 
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at either of the plant units nor had ageing phe-
nomena compromised structural integrity of the 
reactor coolant system components. Based on tests 
and inspections, the reactor coolant system and 
containment have remained in the condition laid 
down in the design specifications.
In 2014, the NPP reported six events warrant-
ing a special report. The number of events and the 
observed defects in procedures clearly require fur-
ther measures of the licensee. The licensee has sev-
eral pending long-term nuclear safety development 
projects that involve development of the manage-
ment system, processing of operational events and 
maintenance of the operational limits and condi-
tions. STUK will monitor their progress and assess 
effectiveness of the measures. According to STUK’s 
assessment, the risk caused by operational ac-
tivities at Loviisa NPP in 2014 remained at around 
the same level as in the past years. STUK is of the 
opinion that plant operation has been systematic 
and safe.
A large number of maintenance measures and 
modifications are carried out at the NPP each year 
to ensure safe and reliable operation of the plant. 
The purpose of an I&C renewal project that was 
launched at Loviisa NPP in 2005 was to digitalise 
almost the entire I&C system of the NPP. In 2014 
Loviisa NPP announced that the supplier of the 
modernisation had been changed and the scope of 
the renewal project had been significantly cut back, 
which is why the project would not be completed 
until by the end of 2018. The safety significance 
of the updated modernisation project will be com-
prehensively assessed the next time in connection 
with the periodic safety review of Loviisa NPP in 
2015. In addition to this major modification pro-
ject, a watertight ceiling was constructed to protect 
the main control room of Loviisa 1 from any leaks 
at the feedwater tank level, ventilation units of 
the Loviisa 1 main control room were replaced, 
4.1 Loviisa NPP
4.1.1 Overall safety assessment of Loviisa NPP
STUK oversaw safety of Loviisa NPP and assessed 
its organisation in different areas by means of re-
viewing materials provided by the licensee, car-
rying out inspections in line with the periodic in-
spection programme, and by overseeing operations 
onsite.
Radiation doses of the employees were low in 
2014 partly because of the brief annual outages but 
also because of improvements in radiation protec-
tion procedures and modifications implemented in 
order to decrease the number of materials causing 
the radiation dose. Radioactive releases into the 
environment were also low; they remained clearly 
below the set limits. Thus, they did not influence 
the radiation exposure of the environment or peo-
ple. An emergency preparedness drill was arranged 
at the Loviisa NPP in November to practice, for the 
first time in Finland, a simultaneous emergency at 
two plant units. On the basis of inspections carried 
out and the drill, the emergency preparedness of 
Loviisa NPP complies with the requirements. The 
NPP introduced a new environmental monitoring 
system that includes more measurement stations 
than the previous system and a new weather ob-
servation system. On the basis of this regulatory 
oversight, STUK can state that plant operations 
did not cause a radiation hazard to the employees, 
population or the environment.
If necessary, the release of radioactive materials 
to the environment will be limited by the reactor 
coolant system and the containment. Based on 
tests completed, the leaktightness requirements 
for the outer containment isolation valves at Lovi-
isa NPP were met. Furthermore, leaks from con-
tainment penetrations and openings, such as per-
sonnel airlocks, have remained low at both plant 
units. No leaking fuel assemblies were observed 
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reliability of the reactor coolant system’s pressure 
control system at Loviisa 2 was improved, it was 
ensured that there will be no defects like hydrogen 
flaking in the structural materials of the Loviisa 2 
reactor pressure vessel, and qualified safety valves 
were installed for the secondary side water and 
water/steam flow.
Several upgrade projects that will improve 
plant safety and which have been designed based 
on assessments of the Fukushima accident are also 
ongoing at the NPP. In 2014, Fortum installed four 
air-cooled heat exchangers that will ensure residu-
al heat removal from the fuel in the reactor and the 
fuel pools in case heat transfer to the sea is lost. 
Furthermore, separate flood protection components 
have been installed in some systems important to 
safety. The protection elements take into account 
exceptionally high seawater levels during a storm. 
The calculated core damage frequency of Loviisa 1 
was around 8% lower than at the end of 2013. The 
reduction of the risk is due to several system and 
software modifications and an update of reliability 
information. The annual probability of a severe 
reactor accident calculated for Loviisa 2 was some-
what lower than that for Loviisa 1.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy implemented an 
organisational reform in the spring of 2014. The 
reform boosted the licensee’s role in the manage-
ment and monitoring of Loviisa NPP. The organi-
sational reform included the establishment of a 
new unit at Loviisa NPP. The new unit is in charge 
of the development of the NPP’s processes, qual-
ity management, operating experience feedback, 
safety culture and actions as a notified body. Based 
on the inspections implemented over the course of 
the year, STUK required improvements regarding 
functionality of the licensee’s processes, the man-
agement of non-conformances and the competence 
of personnel. As part of the oversight of the organi-
sation, STUK ordered a study to assess the nuclear 
safety culture of Fortum and the functionality of 
related procedures. The report states that safety is 
appreciated at Loviisa NPP and the safety culture 
in general is at an acceptable level. However, the 
NPP must continue active development of their 
safety culture. Fortum Power and Heat Oy and 
the Loviisa NPP organisation have operated in a 
systematic and development-oriented way to en-
sure safety of the plant. On the other hand, STUK 
has required, based on its oversight, that the NPP 
develop more explicit procedures for monitoring of 
a variety of development measures and verifying 
their effectiveness.
Final disposal of the low- and intermediate-level 
operational waste generated during the operation 
of Loviisa NPP is arranged at a repository located 
in the plant area. Based on a periodic safety review 
implemented in 2014 as a prerequisite for the operat-
ing license of Loviisa NPP, STUK stated that safety 
level of the repository is good in terms of operational 
safety and long-term safety, and that the licensee has 
implemented the procedures needed to continue safe 
operation.
Table 1. Events at the Loviisa units warranting the power company's special report or root cause analysis. All 
events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).	Appendix	3	describes	events	warranting	
a special report in more detail.
Event Non-complianc-
es with the OLC
Erikoisraportti INES-luokka
Inoperability of the noble gas measuring system that participates in the 
monitoring of radioactive material releases at Loviisa 1 due to a human error
Special report INES rating
Out of date operational limits and conditions of Loviisa 2 with respect to thermal 
load of the spent fuel storage pool
• • 0
Non-compliance with the operational limits and conditions during shutdown 
stage of Loviisa 1 annual outage
• • 0
Brief malfunction of Loviisa 2 containment ventilation system during annual 
outage
• • 0
Safety injection system valve erroneously closed at Loviisa 2 • • 0
Some inservice inspections of Loviisa weather mast not performed • 0
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4.1.2 Plant operation, events during operation 
and prerequisites of safe operation
Compliance with operational 
limits and conditions
The operational limits and conditions (OLC) list 
the values within which nuclear power plant units 
must remain during operation. The OLC must be 
kept up-to-date at all times, i.e. the licensee must 
assess the need to update the OLC when plan-
ning modifications, for example. The licensee must 
comply with the OLC. Deviations from the OLC 
are only allowed based on a safety analysis, pro-
vided that the deviation will not compromise plant 
safety or radiation safety and that STUK has ap-
proved the deviation. A deviation may be justified 
to ensure, for instance, occupational safety or to 
implement a modification that will improve safety. 
STUK assesses the OLC and verifies that they are 
up to date both when inspecting modifications and 
reviewing analyses, and in connection with over-
sight at the plant site.
Fortum applied for permission from STUK for 
six planned deviations from the operational limits 
Figure 7. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa plant in 2014.
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and conditions. Three of the applications concerned 
modifications and three concerned the enabling of 
the plant unit’s startup after the annual outage. As 
the planned deviations had no significant safety 
implications, STUK approved the applications. The 
number of applications for exemptions from the 
OLC is included in indicator A.I.2, included in Ap-
pendix 1 to this report.
In 2014, Loviisa NPP reported six events to 
STUK where the plant was non-compliant with 
the OLC without an advance safety analysis and 
STUK’s permission. Three of the events occurred 
during the annual outage, and these events con-
cerned planning and management of work: two of 
the events involved simultaneous performance of 
different types of jobs even though the necessary 
prerequisites had not been met. In the third event, 
a valve was erroneously left in the closed position 
after a leak test. Two of the events concerned oper-
ability of measuring instruments used to monitor 
releases of radioactive materials and predict their 
spreading. One of the events concerned mainte-
nance of the OLC and compliance with the OLC. 
Fortum analysed all six OLC deviations and deter-
mined corrective measures to prevent the events 
Figure 5. INES	classified	events	at	the	Loviisa	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
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from recurring. The events are described briefly 
below in the section on operational events and in 
more detail in Appendix 3.
The number of events non-compliant with the 
OLC is included in indicator A.I.2, included in Ap-
pendix 1 to this report. Chapter 4.1.2 in STUK’s 
annual reports for 2012 and 2013 describe six OLC 
deviations involving changing of the operating 
mode and the root cause analysis initiated based 
on them. Fortum implemented the analysis at the 
turn of the year 2013/2014. In the analysis, Fortum 
studied why the events have recurred and deter-
mined measures to prevent their recurrence. All of 
the measures will be implemented by the 2015 an-
nual outages. Effect of the measures can be verified 
during future annual outages and repair outages 
(if any). One similar event occurred during the an-
nual outage of 2014.
Fortum maintained the operational limits and 
conditions in 2014 by submitting a total of 17 
proposed amendments to the OLC to STUK for 
approval. Most of the amendments were necessary 
because of modifications implemented at the NPP 
and changes to operating methods. STUK approved 
eleven of the proposals as such. No justification 
was given for some of the proposed changes in four 
of the proposals, which is why STUK was unable 
to assess whether these changes were acceptable 
and thus decided to accept these changes only in 
part. STUK requested supplements to two propos-
als that were submitted at the end of the year in 
order to continue their processing. The processing 
of these proposals will be continued in 2015.
In 2013, STUK requested Fortum to supply an 
action plan on studying whether the OLC are up 
to date and on developing the OLC maintenance 
procedures (see Chapter 4.1.2 of the STUK an-
nual report for 2013). STUK verified the status 
of the actions proposed in the plan by conducting 
an unannounced inspection at the plant site in 
December 2014. The results of the inspection are 
described in Appendix 5 to this report.
Operation and operational events
One of the Loviisa 1 vent stack emission monitors 
(noble gas monitoring) was inoperable in March 
for several hours because the pump regulating the 
sample flow was inadvertently not restarted after a 
sample filter had been replaced. The operating per-
sonnel detected the deviation from the measurement 
results and started the pump.
In March 2014, it was observed that the Loviisa 
NPP operational limits and conditions (OLC) 
were not up to date in all respects. Some of the 
requirements pertaining to the spent fuel storage fa-
cility had not been updated in connection with modi-
fications made years ago. Thus, the OLC and the work 
performance instructions were not fully consistent, 
which led to non-compliance with the OLC in Decem-
ber 2013: the thermal load of one of the storage pools 
exceeded the maximum thermal load laid down in the 
OLC by approximately 1%.
The administrative procedures used during the 
shutdown of the NPP unit Loviisa 1 in preparation 
for the annual outage 2014 were not successful in all 
respects. The shutdown of the unit was continued 
even though the preconditions for transferring 
to the next stage had not been met; some isolating 
valve leak tests were still being performed.
Negative pressurisation of the Loviisa 2 con-
tainment did not meet the OLC requirements 
when the reactor pressure vessel internals were 
being lifted back into place after refueling during 
the 2014 annual outage. This event was caused by 
another simultaneous task: control valves of the con-
tainment ventilation system closed because of mainte-
nance work carried out on a switchboard.
During an onsite inspection in November, the 
operating personnel of Loviisa 2 noticed that one of 
the safety injection system valves had been left 
closed after a leak test performed during the an-
nual outage even though the valve should have been 
open. The valve is located in a pressurizer spray line 
that would be used after an accident.
During one of the inspections carried out in 
compliance with the periodic inspection programme, 
STUK observed that the Loviisa NPP had not com-
pleted all of the meteorological measuring sys-
tem inspections in compliance with the OLC; the 
calibration of four temperature transmitters was not 
completed in 2013. Meteorological measuring is used 
to assess the spreading of any radioactive materials 
released from the NPP into the atmosphere.
The events are described in more detail in Appen-
dix 3.
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Annual outage of Loviisa 1
The annual outage of Loviisa 1 took approximately 
21 days. The outage was around 1.5 days longer 
than planned. The delay was caused by several 
repairs and leak tests related to the leaktightness 
of one of the containment isolation valves.
One quarter of the fuel was replaced with 
fresh fuel during the annual outage. Furthermore, 
inspections, maintenance, repairs and testing of 
systems, equipment and structures were carried 
out. No extensive modifications or repairs were 
implemented, since the 2014 outage was a short 
annual outage.
Annual outage of Loviisa 2 
(16 August – 20 September 2014)
The annual outage of Loviisa  2 took around 
35 days. The outage was four days longer than 
planned. The delay was caused by observations 
made during the commissioning tests of new main 
steam line safety valves and the study of these 
observations.
It was a more extensive annual outage that is 
implemented every four years. In addition to the 
normal annual outage work, major modifications 
were implemented, such as modernisation of the 
reactor coolant system pressure control system, 
replacement of the main steam line safety valves 
and an upgrade of the circulating water piping. 
One quarter of the fuel was replaced with fresh 
fuel also in Loviisa 2.
an annual outage always requires a permit from 
STUK. Prior to issuing the permit, STUK will ver-
ify that the reactor core has been designed in such 
a manner that it is safe, and check that the work 
on all equipment and structures important to plant 
safety has been completed and all malfunctions 
have been properly studied.
During the annual outages, some events were 
observed at the Loviisa NPP. These events were 
documented and decisions on further studies and 
corrective measures were made. Two of the events 
were identified as the most significant events, and 
special reports were drafted for these events.
According to the observations made by STUK, 
operation during the 2014 annual outage was 
mostly fine. Some issues where further studies are 
needed and some potential improvement objects in 
terms of compliance with instructions and plans, 
Operation and operational events
STUK oversaw the operation at the plant site on a 
daily basis by reviewing regular reports on operat-
ing activities and event reports, and by conduct-
ing one operational inspection. The results of the 
reviews and inspections are described in Appendix 
5 to this report.
No events leading to a reactor trip occurred at 
Loviisa NPP. Four events classified as operational 
transients occurred: one of the isolating valves in a 
steam line at Loviisa 2 was closed due to a fault in 
a relay card and one of the reactor coolant pumps 
of Loviisa 2 stopped due to a bearing tempera-
ture measurement fault in April and December. A 
turbine trip occurred at Loviisa 1 when the plant 
unit was being prepared for the annual outage; 
the chain of events started when an air hose of a 
level control valve for the condensate drains col-
lecting tank ruptured. The number of operational 
transients and changes therein are studied in more 
detail in Appendix 1 (indicator A.II.1).
Loviisa NPP drafted special reports for other 
significant events. Six events warranting a special 
report were detected in 2014 (see the enclosed list). 
The events are described in more detail in Appen-
dix 3.
In 2014, the risks caused by component mal-
functions, preventive maintenance and other 
events causing unavailability of equipment were 
3.2% (Loviisa 1) and 0.5% (Loviisa 2) of the ex-
pected value of the annual accident risk calculated 
using the plant’s risk model. The result is in line 
with those of previous years.
Annual maintenance outages
Some of the nuclear fuel is replaced with fresh fuel 
during an annual outage. Other measures imple-
mented during an annual outage include inspect-
ing, maintaining, replacing or modifying equip-
ment and structures important to plant safety. 
These measures ensure the preconditions for op-
erating the NPP safely during the following fuel 
cycles.
STUK is obligated to verify that the licensee 
properly handles radiation and nuclear safety. 
STUK oversees the planning, implementation and 
assessment of annual outages, in practice by re-
viewing documents pertaining to the planning 
and implementation, as well as by conducting in-
spections onsite. The startup of a plant unit after 
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orientation, instructions, work supervision and 
documentation were observed.
4.1.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive assessment of the transient and ac-
cident analyses (deterministic safety analyses) car-
ried out to verify the safety functions of Loviisa 
NPP was performed in connection with the re-
newal of the plant’s operating license in 2007. The 
licensee has later supplemented the deterministic 
safety analyses with an extension of postulated ac-
cidents and in connection with plant modifications. 
The licensee did not submit any updated analyses 
to STUK in 2014.
Probabilistic risk assessments
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evalu-
ated on the basis of a probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA). As a rule, PRA calculations utilise regularly 
updated information on the occurrences of initiat-
ing events and the unavailability of equipment 
together with a logical model of the plant’s systems 
and their interdependencies. The model is used to 
assess, for example, the annual risk of severe reac-
tor fuel failures, which is also called the core dam-
age frequency.
In 2014, Fortum reassessed the frequency of 
seawater flooding at Loviisa NPP in cooperation 
with the Finnish Meteorological Institute. Accord-
ing to the preliminary updated reports, the fre-
quency of flooding that exceeds the flooding limit 
of +3.0 metres in the NPP facilities 10-5/year) is 
clearly higher than that determined in a pre-
vious assessment (approximately 5 × 10-7/year). 
The change caused an increase of around 25% to 
the core damage frequency assessment. However, 
Fortum has improved the plant’s flood protection 
during power operation in 2014 and 2015 in such 
a manner that one of the cooling systems will re-
main operational until the seawater level reaches 
the height of approximately +4.0 m. The risk as-
sessment for seawater flood still remains slightly 
higher than before when the improvements are 
taken into account. The impact on the total risk 
remains low, however.
The PRA model for Loviisa NPP used to describe 
the plant unit Loviisa 1. In 2014, Fortum completed 
a separate PRA model for Loviisa 2. There are some 
relatively minor technical differences between the 
units in the ventilation system for the safety system 
equipment rooms, for instance. These differences 
influence the core damage frequency assessments. 
In 2014, Fortum used the preliminary results of the 
new PRA model to improve its instructions on venti-
lation system malfunctions at Loviisa 2.
At the end of the year the calculated core dam-
age frequency for Loviisa 1 (prior to the flood 
protection improvements) was around 3.1 × 10-5/
year, which is around 25% higher than in 2014 (2.5 
× 10-5/year). The core damage frequency after the 
flood protection improvements is 2.3 × 10-5, which 
is around 8% lower than at the end of 2013. The 
reduction of the risk is due to several fairly minor 
system and software modifications and an update 
of reliability information. The estimated probabil-
ity of a severe reactor accident for Loviisa 2 at the 
turn of the year was around 2.5 × 10-5/year.
The accident risk at Loviisa NPP and its chang-
es are discussed in more detail in Section A.II.4 of 
Appendix 1, Accident risk of nuclear power plants.
4.1.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
Reduction in the frequency of internal 
reactor pressure vessel inspections
STUK approved a proposal to reduce the frequency 
of visual inspections of the internals in the reactor 
pressure vessels at Loviisa NPP from every four 
years to every eight years. Fortum justified the 
new inspection frequency by stating that the risk 
of falling heavy loads would be lower and the col-
lective occupational dose would be smaller if the 
internals were no longer dismantled every four 
years. A prerequisite determined for the change 
was that the visual internal inspection would have 
to be replaced with a qualified external ultrasound 
inspection that would have to cover the entire pres-
sure vessel core area and critical welds. The core 
area has been identified as the most important 
part of a pressure vessel in terms of safety, and the 
new procedure will increase the effectiveness of its 
inspections. The inspection technique to be used 
will also allow detection of planar faults parallel to 
the surfaces throughout the entire wall thickness. 
The technique can be used to overrule the possibil-
ity of hydrogen flaking in the structural material 
of reactor pressure vessels. Such defects have been 
detected at the Belgian NPPs, for example. Such a 
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verification inspection was performed at Loviisa 2 
during the 2014 annual outage. Nothing to report 
was observed during the inspection. The pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 1 will undergo a similar inspec-
tion during the 2016 annual outage.
Reactor coolant system 
pressure control valve
A new reactor coolant system pressure control valve 
(PORV) that was installed during a pressure control 
system modification at Loviisa 1 in 2012 allowed 
steam from the reactor coolant system to leak into 
the drain system because the seats of the main 
valve and its control valve were not fully leak tight. 
The leak was minor when compared to the limit 
set for unidentified leaks in the OLC (0.2 m³/h). 
Planned operation of the valves was not compro-
mised. Fortum has stated that the leaks are an 
availability problem and will cause extra mainte-
nance work during annual outages. Fortum has 
studied the cause of the leaks with the valve manu-
facturer and ordered a damage report from VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland. Attempts to 
improve the valve’s leaktightness have been made 
by replacing components and repairing a machining 
fault observed during the studies in the sealing face 
of the control valve.
Leak in spray valve bonnet
Pressurizer spray valves were replaced with a new 
type during the reactor coolant system pressure 
control system modification at Loviisa 1. The modi-
fication was implemented during the 2012 annual 
outage. A similar modification was carried out at 
Loviisa 2 during the 2014 annual outage. The new 
valves are solenoid-operated bevel-fit valves.
When replacing the valves, Fortum wanted to 
develop the valve type, which is why Fortum or-
dered valves equipped with continuous bonnet leak 
detection. The leak detection was implemented 
by adding a second seal in the bonnet and adding 
pressure measuring in the space between the seals. 
This means that the control room will be notified of 
any minor leaks in the inner seal while the outer 
seal is still keeping the bonnet leak tight. Such 
a leakage indication concerning one of the spray 
valves at Loviisa 1 was received during the fuel 
cycle preceding the annual outage.
The sealing solution had already been improved 
once in 2013. At that time, the inner graphite seal 
was replaced with a seal whose density is better 
suited for the application. The desired results were 
not achieved, however. The clearance in between 
the bonnet and sleeve of the valve for which a leak-
age indication had been issued was increased by 
means of abrasion during the 2014 annual outage. 
Based on the operating experience obtained so far, 
this modification was successful. If the valves in 
both units continue to operate as planned, Fortum 
will discontinue extra monitoring of the valves. 
The extra monitoring has included onsite inspec-
tion visits as well as temporary humidity and tem-
perature measuring in the area.
Fuel
The fuel elements closest to the reactor pressure 
vessel wall were replaced with protective elements 
manufactured from steel in both units of Loviisa 
NPP during the early stages of operation in order 
to slow down the radiation embrittlement process 
of the wall. The top tie plates of these protective el-
ements include springs that prevent the elements 
from moving upwards during operation. Fortum 
ordered new spring packs for the protective ele-
ments. The plan was to commission the new spring 
packs during the annual outage of Loviisa 2 in Au-
gust and September 2014. Since their delivery was 
not completed on time, however, Fortum decided to 
reassess the usability of the backup spring packs 
that were rejected during an acceptance inspection 
in 2005. After the reassessment, 207 spring packs 
for the protective elements were accepted. During 
the autumn, Fortum conducted several manufac-
turing control inspections of the 2014 delivery and 
accepted the new spring packs as well.
During the 2014 annual outage, wear and defor-
mation measurements conducted according to plan 
on six control rods at Loviisa 2 and results of visual 
inspections showed that there are no foreseeable 
obstacles for extending the control rods’ service life 
to 30 years.
During fuel inspections conducted with the 
pool inspection equipment according to the 2014 
research plan, no deviations were detected in an 
assembly equipped with unanodised fuel cladding, 
a condition monitoring assembly that is subject to 
long-term monitoring or a test assembly without 
fuel and equipped with a mixing spacer grid. One 
leaking rod was observed in an assembly where a 
leak was observed in 2009. Inspections to deter-
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mine the cause of a leak in an assembly where a 
leak was observed in 2008 were postponed to 2015. 
A fuel assembly that started to leak in December 
2012 was removed from the reactor of Loviisa 2 
during the 2013 annual outage. It has not been 
studied yet to determine the cause of the leak.
Maintenance, ageing management, 
spare parts management
The Ageing Management Committee plans and co-
ordinates STUK’s regulatory duties pertaining to 
the management of ageing of nuclear power plants. 
The regulatory activities at the Finnish NPPs fo-
cus on any cases where faults or increased repair 
needs have been observed in structures or compo-
nents important to safety. The committee address-
es such cases and demands corrective measures by 
the licensee if it deems that condition monitoring 
or maintenance has been defective. The committee 
also assesses events at NPPs outside of Finland 
and any links between them and the monitoring 
of the ageing of the Finnish NPPs. The Ageing 
Management Committee has monitored at Loviisa, 
for instance, stator blades of the reactor coolant 
pumps, operability of the emergency diesel gen-
erators, indications in steam generator tubes and 
– because of cracks observed in other VVER plants 
– bimetal welds in steam generator collectors.
Loviisa NPP assessed the spare parts manage-
ment of plant components important to safety. 
Procurement, reception, storage and handover for 
operation of spare parts and supplies were studied 
during the inspection. Warehouses may contain 
very old products, even ones dating back to the 
commissioning of the NPP. Fortum is currently 
drafting instructions on ensuring operability of 
spare parts and reviewing the spare part stock, 
consumption and the fault histories of components 
in order to assess adequacy of spare parts, their 
quantities and the correct times to place orders for 
new spare parts.
Inservice inspections
The inservice inspections of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 
were implemented in compliance with an inservice 
inspection programme approved by STUK. The 
programme included video inspections of reactor 
pressure vessel internals, as well as inspections of 
steam generator tubes and dissimilar metal welds. 
Pipelines were subjected to inservice inspections 
and erosion measurements. The tubes of two steam 
generators were inspected at both units. Nothing 
to report was observed during the inspection of dis-
similar metal welds in steam generators.
Emergency diesel generators
The diesel engines of the emergency diesel gen-
erators date back to their installation year, and 
Loviisa NPP no longer plans to replace them. 
Spare parts are still available, and operability of 
the engines is ensured by means of maintenance 
and inspection programmes. They are subjected 
to mechanical stress, particularly during sequence 
tests that are annually implemented at each unit. 
There are plans to arrange these tests less often 
or to simulate them. Their mechanical components 
have required more repairs in the past few years, 
but reduced operability has never been determined 
as the cause for a failure of the unit to start during 
testing. There are bearings at the bottom ends of 
the connecting rods in the diesel engines that are 
currently in use at the Loviisa units. They were 
replaced with new ones in an overhauled diesel 
engine in 2012 because the previously used bear-
ings had worn out faster than expected. The new 
bearings were tested and approved by the engine 
manufacturer. At that time, STUK required that 
the new bearings are monitored and the results 
reported to STUK. No wear that was out of the 
ordinary was observed in a visual inspection of a 
bearing during the 2013 annual outage. No devia-
tions were detected in the lubricating oil analyses, 
either. New bearings have now been replaced also 
in the other diesel engines. A bearing that was 
taken into use in 2012 was visually inspected dur-
ing the 2014 annual outage. Based on the inspec-
tions, the new bearings are well suited for such an 
application.
Containment
The containments at Loviisa meet the design re-
quirements. Based on leak tests implemented in 
2014, two valves were repaired at Loviisa 1 and 
one valve and one containment penetration were 
repaired at Loviisa 2. Furthermore, STUK de-
manded that one of the valves repaired at Loviisa 
1 be replaced with a valve that meets the detection 
limit requirements during the 2015 annual outage.
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4.1.5 Development of the plant and its safety
I&C renewal at Loviisa NPP
A continuation project for the Loviisa NPP I&C re-
newal, ELSA, was launched in June 2014. The pro-
ject is a continuation for the discontinued LARA 
project, which was concluded based on a mutual 
agreement of the equipment supplier and the li-
censee. The ELSA project will modernise a large 
part of the I&C system of the plant, switching it to 
a digital equipment platform. ELSA’s scope is not 
as comprehensive as that of LARA. For example, 
no major modifications will be implemented in the 
control room and the diesel I&C system will not be 
changed either. The plan is to install the first stage 
of the renewal in 2016. In 2014, STUK’s oversight 
and inspection activities focused on quality assur-
ance procedures and instructions used in the plan-
ning processes of the new project.
Replacement of main control 
room ventilation units
A watertight ceiling will be constructed to protect 
the control room of Loviisa NPP from any leaks 
at the feedwater tank level. The ventilation ducts 
and the control room ventilation units will be re-
placed in connection with this modification. The 
ducts and ventilation units maintain the predeter-
mined environmental conditions. In a modification 
implemented at Loviisa 1, the main control room 
ventilation units were moved to a room next to the 
control room and cooling water pipes were moved 
to above the watertight ceiling. The system’s oper-
ating principle was not changed. Functionality of 
the new units has been tested. The trial runs will 
continue in 2015. STUK inspected the modifica-
tion plans, oversaw the construction and trial runs, 
and implemented commissioning inspections. The 
remaining modifications, tests and inspections will 
be implemented in 2015. A similar modification 
will be started at Loviisa 2 in 2015.
Reactor coolant system pressure 
control system upgrade
Modernisation of the Loviisa 2 reactor coolant sys-
tem pressure control was carried out according to 
plan during the annual outage. The modification 
aimed at improving the usability and reliability 
of the pressure control system. The modification 
included replacing of the pressurizer spray valves 
and relief valve. The modification also involved 
changes to the I&C systems, electricity systems 
and pipelines required in the implementation of 
the new pressure control system. STUK inspected 
the modification plans, oversaw the manufacture of 
the mechanical components and carried out a con-
struction inspection on the components. When the 
installation work was complete, STUK performed 
the necessary construction inspections and system 
commissioning inspections onsite.
A similar modification was implemented at 
Loviisa 1 in 2012. Fortum assessed the problems 
encountered in planning, implementation and com-
missioning during the modification at Loviisa 1 
and developed its procedures for the Loviisa 2 
modification.  The operating methods and organi-
sation were changed, and sufficient resources for 
the project were reserved. The modification was 
implemented according to plan and on schedule 
without any major deficiencies.
Replacement of safety valves
Each of the Loviisa NPP secondary circuit main 
steam lines has two safety valves (with staggered 
set pressures). These have been qualified for steam 
flow only. The safety valves with the lower set pres-
sure at Loviisa 2 (six valves) were replaced during 
the 2014 annual outage. The plan is to implement 
a similar modification at Loviisa 1 in 2016.
The new valves are qualified for steam, water 
and a mixture of the two. Fortum received the 
new valves for Loviisa 2 in June 2014, approxi-
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations
STUK approved, pursuant to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, six manufacturers of nuclear pressure vessels 
for the Loviisa power plant on application by the 
Loviisa power plant of Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy. In addition, STUK approved, on application 
by the Loviisa power plant of  Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy and pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act, 
four testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures. Testing operators from three testing 
organisations were approved for carrying out peri-
odic tests of mechanical equipment and structures 
in accordance with YVL Guide 3.8.
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mately six months behind the original schedule. 
The valves were being installed and tested for 
the entire five-week annual outage. The first ma-
jor deviation during the implementation of this 
modification occurred when a subcontractor failed 
to follow the qualified welding instructions when 
welding the first valve nozzle of the pipeline. For-
tum detected the problem early on in an inspec-
tion and the technical deviation was corrected by 
dismantling the already started weld. After some 
rearrangement, the faulty weld could be replaced 
with a new one that was welded in compliance with 
the qualified welding instructions, which were ap-
proved in connection with the construction plan.
Another deviation occurred during the commis-
sioning testing of the valves: it was noted that the 
forced control of the valves did not work at such 
a low system pressure as originally planned. The 
lowest opening pressure in the plan was around 
3 bar. During testing, it was observed that the 
valves opened at 10 bar, and the manufacturer 
verified that the lowest possible opening pressure 
is 7.5 bar. The purpose of the forced control of the 
valves is to cool the reactor coolant system in case 
of a highly exceptional accident where none of 
the other reactor coolant system cooling methods 
from the secondary side are available. Fortum has 
submitted to STUK for processing supplementary 
information on the impact of the modification on 
accident management. At the end of 2014, STUK 
was still processing the report.
Development targets determined when 
renewing the operating license
The last periodic safety review of Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2 took place during the operating license 
renewal project in 2006 and 2007. Development tar-
gets and projects were determined in connection 
with the review. STUK has monitored their status 
as part of its regulatory oversight. Most, but not all 
of the monitored projects and tasks have been com-
pleted, mainly because some large projects of For-
tum have been delayed. Such projects include the 
renewal of the plant’s I&C systems, modernisation 
of a polar crane and modernisation of the refueling 
machine. The processing and assessment of the out-
standing issues will continue in connection with the 
currently ongoing periodic safety review (PSR2015), 
for example.
Development targets based 
on Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima accident in 2011, STUK sent 
a decision to the licensees concerning provisions 
and plans to be made by the power companies 
for natural phenomena and power supply disrup-
tions. In 2014, Fortum installed, in compliance 
with plans approved by STUK, four air-cooled heat 
exchangers that will ensure residual heat removal 
from the fuel in the reactor and the fuel pools in 
case heat transfer to the sea is lost. Two towers 
were constructed at both units, one for residual 
heat removal from the reactor and the other for 
residual heat removal from the fuel pools.
To improve flood protection during power op-
eration, Fortum decided to use a technical concept 
that involves sealing rooms in limited areas. The 
plan is to focus on protecting the backup emergency 
feedwater pump room from flooding. According to 
a preliminary schedule, the improvements will be 
implemented in the next two years. Flood protection 
during outages will be ensured by using stop-log 
gates that will prevent seawater from flooding the 
plant facilities. Fortum raised the structures of one 
of the stop-log gates at each unit in 2014. Deviat-
ing from the original plan, Fortum has proposed 
an extension on raising the second stop-log gates. 
STUK has accepted the extension, provided that 
Fortum submits an assessment of the risks caused 
by the new implementation schedule. According to 
the new schedule, the stop-log gates of Loviisa 1 will 
be raised in 2016 and the gates of Loviisa 2 in 2018.
At the end of 2014, Fortum submitted to STUK 
updated conceptual design plans on ensuring 
emergency cooling of the refueling pools and spent 
fuel storage pools in the containment. According 
to the plans, a redundant system for ensuring the 
cooling of the fuel pools in the reactor building will 
be built, and new connections will be added for the 
spent fuel storage pools to supply make-up water 
to the pools. STUK will continue the review of the 
materials in 2015.
Loviisa weather observation system upgrade
A new 115-metre mast for weather observation was 
built close to the Loviisa NPP in 2014. Weather ob-
servation system components were installed both 
in the mast and on the ground, but system trial run 
stage could not be started yet. The plan is to start 
the commissioning of the new weather observation 
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system after final testing by the end of 2015. The 
new weather observation system will allow Loviisa 
NPP to obtain more specific data about weather con-
ditions in the immediate vicinity of the plant. This 
data will be used when calculating the spreading of 
radioactive releases during normal operation of the 
plant and in case of an accident.
Loviisa environmental radiation 
measuring system upgrade
Loviisa NPP commissioned a new environmental 
monitoring system in 2014. The upgrade increased 
the number of measuring stations in the vicinity of 
the plant from 17 to 28. There are radiation meas-
uring system stations at the plant site, two kilo-
metres from the plant and five kilometres from the 
plant. Five new stations were installed in the plant 
site. The other new stations are farther away, most 
of them in the archipelago. The new environmental 
monitoring system stations are more accurate than 
the old ones and their integrated batteries ensure 
that they can remain in operation without any in-
tervention for up to several years.
Main steam activity measuring 
system upgrade
Fortum is about to start an upgrade of a radiation 
measuring system that was commissioned in the 
1990s. The system is used to measure the activity 
concentration of main steam. The radiation meas-
uring system will detect any leaks between the 
primary coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
Spare parts are no longer available for the old radi-
ation measuring instruments. When upgrading the 
system, Fortum plans to implement structural im-
provements based on operating experience. STUK 
approved a conceptual design plan on the system 
modification in 2014.
4.1.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and 
NPP operational waste
The processing, storage and final disposal of low and 
intermediate level waste (NPP operational waste) 
at Loviisa NPP were carried out as planned. The 
volume and activity of operational waste in relation 
to reactor power remained low compared with most 
other countries. The contributing factors include the 
high quality requirements for nuclear waste manage-
ment and nuclear fuel, the planning of maintenance 
and repair operations, decontamination as well as 
component and process modifications. In addition, 
the NPP employs efficient procedures for reducing 
the volume of waste destined for final disposal. Be-
cause of waste monitoring and sorting, some waste 
types that contain very little radioactive materials 
can be released from control. Waste released from 
control included operational waste, scrap metal for 
recycling and non-radioactive hazardous waste to be 
further processed, such as waste oil and waste chemi-
cals. STUK has approved the licensee’s procedures 
on releasing waste from control. STUK will monitor 
the activities, the amount of waste exempted from 
control and its activity concentrations.
In 2014, STUK oversaw operational waste man-
agement and final disposal of operational waste 
as well as the concrete and rock structures of the 
repository. STUK reviews and approves reports 
and other documents submitted to it, as well as 
performed regulatory inspections and inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme. No 
significant deficiencies or development needs were 
observed during the inspections carried out in 2014.
Construction and commissioning 
of solidification facility for 
liquid radioactive waste
In 2014, commissioning of the solidification facility 
for liquid radioactive waste at Loviisa NPP pro-
ceeded to a stage where the systems were handed 
over to the NPP’s operating organisation. However, 
the trial run of the facility was interrupted in early 
2014 to study the cause of leaks observed in con-
crete waste containers. The leaks were observed 
during solidification tests in late 2013.
In 2014, Loviisa NPP launched a project that 
aims at ensuring the start of the facility’s produc-
tion operation and studying the underlying causes 
of the cracks in the waste containers. The project 
Quantities of spent fuel and low-and 
intermediate-level waste in Loviisa
The volume of spent nuclear fuel stored on-site 
at the Loviisa power plant at the end of 2014 
was 4,831 assemblies (582 tU), an increase of 
174 assemblies (21 tU). The volume of low- and 
intermediate-level waste finally disposed of was 
1,927 m³ at the end of 2014. The total increase of 
volume from 2013 is 40 m³. Approximately 57% of 
the waste has been finally disposed of.
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also includes reassessing the ingredients of the con-
crete used and drafting proper storage instructions 
for cast concrete containers. Furthermore, Loviisa 
NPP will plan and implement modifications of the 
solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste to 
improve availability of systems and components.
Loviisa NPP discovered two underlying reasons 
for the cracks in the waste containers. The aggre-
gate had separated from the concrete in one corner 
of the container, which is why there were very few 
large stone particles in the area. The second reason 
was that the interior form had been detached with 
a pneumatic percussion tool, which had caused a 
crack in the inner corner of the container. The pneu-
matic percussion tool and the separated aggregate 
combined caused cracks to form in the container 
wall. These conclusions are supported by observa-
tions made when removing test containers from 
their forms with wedges instead of a pneumatic 
percussion tool: no similar cracks were detected in 
these containers. STUK has assessed the studies 
implemented by Loviisa NPP and deemed them 
adequate.
In 2014, Loviisa NPP performed preliminary 
testing of concrete containers with an updated 
list of concrete ingredients. STUK approved the 
concrete casting plans, reviewed the new concrete 
work instructions and the preliminary testing pro-
gramme, and oversaw the casting of the containers.
Loviisa NPP drafted a report on the prelimi-
nary testing of the new concrete ingredients and 
its results. In addition, the NPP drafted a project 
plan and will update the commissioning plan to 
complete the commissioning of the solidification 
facility. STUK will continue the assessment by re-
viewing the above-mentioned materials.
According to the plans drafted by Loviisa NPP, 
the solidification facility commissioning tests will 
be completed by the end of 2015. When the com-
missioning tests are complete, the NPP will submit 
an application to STUK on starting production 
operation of the solidification facility.
Periodic safety review of Loviisa repository
Final disposal of the low- and intermediate-level 
operational waste generated during the operation 
of Loviisa NPP is disposed at a repository located 
in the immediate vicinity of the plant. With its de-
cision dated 2 April 1998, the Government granted 
Fortum permission to use the repository until 31 
December 2055. According to permit condition no. 2 
of the operating license, the licensee must draft the 
first periodic safety review by the end of 2013 and 
then repeat the review every 15 years.
Fortum submitted a periodic safety review for 
the low- and intermediate-level operational waste 
repository on 16 December 2013 to STUK for ap-
proval. STUK drafted its own safety review, which 
is a summary of review of the licensee’s periodic 
safety review, related issues and reviews of related 
documents, as well as results of STUK’s continuous 
regulatory activities.
STUK’s safety review and decision dated 15 
December 2014 states that the safety level of the 
Loviisa low- and intermediate-level operational 
waste repository is good in terms of operational 
safety and long-term safety, and that the licensee 
has implemented the procedures needed to con-
tinue safe operation. STUK approved the periodic 
safety review of the Loviisa low- and intermediate-
level operational waste repository carried out by 
Fortum. Schedules of the plans and reports on the 
Loviisa low- and intermediate-level operational 
waste repository, as well as their reconciliation 
will be determined once Fortum has submitted a 
justification on the long-term safety of the low- and 
intermediate-level operational waste repository 
and an update of the NPP’s final decommissioning 
plan. These reports are due by the end of 2018.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, Fortum submitted to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy revised 
and supplemented waste management schemes as 
well as information on costs and prices of nuclear 
waste management measures. A supplemented 
waste management scheme includes an updated 
cost estimate of the remaining waste management 
costs.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the Min-
istry of Employment and the Economy. In its state-
ment, STUK assessed the cost estimates on which 
the financial provisions are based, considered them 
acceptable and stated that they can be used as the 
basis for the cost provisions. Fortum’s extent of li-
ability was €1,083.9 million at the end of 2014.
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According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for techni-
cal and financial plans, as well as related calcula-
tions, must be prepared every three years. The next 
revision will take place in 2016.
4.1.7 Organisational operations 
and quality assurance
Based on STUK’s oversight, it can be stated that 
Fortum organisation has operated in a systematic 
and development-oriented way when it comes to 
ensuring safety. The licensee organisation of Lovi-
isa NPP is Fortum Power and Heat Oy. An organi-
sational reform of Fortum Power and Heat Oy was 
implemented in the spring of 2014. The reform 
boosted the licensee organisation’s role in the man-
agement and monitoring of Loviisa NPP. A new 
unit, Nuclear Power Quality and Sustainability, 
was established during the reform for Loviisa NPP. 
It is in charge of developing processes at the plant 
level, quality assurance, operating experience feed-
back, safety culture and actions as a notified body. 
The unit also includes a function called Design Au-
thority, which aims at ensuring compliance of the 
organisation with nuclear power legislation, offi-
cial regulations and guidelines as well as retention 
of the NPP in the state required by the operating 
license. Instructions for this function will be sup-
plemented by the end of 2015.
In connection with the safety assessment of its 
organisational reform, Fortum submitted to STUK 
a plan on a reform of its management system. The 
licensee’s NSA unit (Nuclear Safety Assurance) 
will be in charge of the reform project. Over the 
course of the year, it has been independently moni-
toring the management and management system 
development measures at Loviisa NPP. STUK has 
monitored the progress of the reform during its 
regulatory activities and found that the reform 
proceeds in a systematic manner. Loviisa NPP has 
updated its administrative rules due to the organi-
sational reform.
Over the course of the year, STUK paid spe-
cial attention in functionality of the plant pro-
cesses, management of deviations and personnel 
competence, as well as resources. The process 
descriptions are still unfinished and they will be 
supplemented when instructions are updated, for 
instance. Based on its oversight, STUK determined 
that the management of the NPP has not suffi-
ciently monitored and ensured refresher training 
of employees who are important to safety. Based on 
its oversight, STUK demanded that proper train-
ing must be arranged and implementation of train-
ing must be monitored.
In its inspection, STUK verified that the NPP 
has improved the updating of instructions for the 
operating and maintenance units, and will contin-
ue to monitor the updating of the instructions for 
the operating and maintenance units. STUK found 
that the NPP has also developed its instructions on 
the management of deviations and the assessment 
of effectiveness, and will continue to assess the 
impact of the development of instructions on the 
NPP’s activities during its regulatory oversight in 
2015. Over the past few years, the NPP has devel-
oped its supplier audit process, related competence 
and related procedures. Based on its oversight, 
STUK determined that the procurement develop-
ment project that was launched in 2013 was con-
cluded in 2014.
Fortum currently has several ongoing long-term 
development projects on its management system 
for nuclear operations and management in gen-
eral. STUK will continue to monitor their progress 
as part of its regulatory oversight. The develop-
ment projects that are being monitored involve 
the safety culture, descriptions and development 
of management system processes, processing of 
operational events and maintenance of the OLC, 
for example.
In 2014, STUK observed some deficiencies in 
the scope of the development of the NPP’s docu-
ments, regulatory requirements and operations. 
STUK will continue to monitor these issues and 
any changes in the operations by means of target-
ed inspections, for example. During its oversight, 
STUK paid special attention in the monitoring of 
development measures and the manner in which 
their effectiveness is ensured, and required that 
the NPP implement more explicit procedures on 
managing these issues.
Based on an order from STUK, VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland conducted a study on 
the status of the safety culture of Fortum’s nuclear 
operations and functionality of assessment proce-
dures. The study report was submitted to STUK for 
information in early 2014. The observations made 
by VTT in its study are similar to the observations 
made by STUK during its oversight. The study by 
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VTT stated that the safety culture of Loviisa NPP 
is at an acceptable level in general. However, some 
characteristics the researchers did not deem part 
of good safety culture were also observed. Thus, 
active development of the safety culture at Loviisa 
NPP must be continued.
In 2014, STUK approved a person named by the 
licensee as the person in charge of the NPP’s safe-
guards of nuclear materials.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel at Loviisa NPP where the shift manag-
ers, operators and trainee operators prove that 
they are competent in all key issues related to 
plant operation and safety. In 2014, STUK granted 
16 licenses to shift managers and operators based 
on applications by the power company and follow-
ing a successful oral examination. All except one of 
the granted licenses were renewed licenses. One of 
the employees was applying for the shift manager 
license for the first time.
The results of the examinations were around 
the same level as in the previous years. All the par-
ticipants passed their examinations in 2014. The 
longest possible license, four years, was granted to 
ten people, a three-year license to five people and a 
two-year license to one person, i.e. the one who was 
applying for the license for the first time.
4.1.8 Fire safety
Fire safety at the Loviisa NPP was acceptable. No 
events classified as fires occurred at Loviisa NPP 
or in its immediate vicinity in 2014. In 2014, STUK 
oversaw the maintenance and upkeep of the fire 
protection systems that ensure fire safety of the 
plant by means of regulatory inspections and by 
reviewing reports submitted by Fortum. An inspec-
tion included in the periodic inspection programme 
and onsite inspections by the resident inspectors 
were performed onsite.
Fortum continuously develops fire safety at 
Loviisa NPP. Condition of the fire water supply 
system is being assessed as part of an intermedi-
ate assessment of the plant’s operating license. 
A manually triggered extinguishing system is to 
be installed in the reactor coolant pump room in 
the reactor building. Its construction started in 
2014. A new extinguishing system has also been 
installed in the waste management facilities in the 
controlled area. The NPP has an appropriate fire 
safety training programme.
4.1.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, regulatory inspections and inspections 
within the periodic inspection programme.
Over the course of the year 2014, a total of 51 
events for which operational event reports were 
drafted took place at Loviisa NPP. Loviisa NPP 
reported to STUK a total of 13 events, six of which 
were events warranting a special report. All of the 
events warranting a special report involved an 
event that was non-compliant with the OLC. The 
special reports were prepared and submitted to 
STUK in accordance with the requirements, but 
the power company’s investigation of some of the 
events remained superficial and incomplete. The 
events warranting a special report are described 
in more detail in Appendix 3. No events classified 
as Level 1 or higher on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES) took place in 2014.
Two root cause analyses were completed at 
Loviisa NPP in 2014. The root cause analyses 
concerned heavy lifting and changing of operating 
modes.
In an operating experience feedback inspec-
tion, STUK verified operating processes and the 
organisation, as well as related guidelines, proce-
dures and practices. An operating experience and 
safety culture committee has been established for 
Loviisa NPP. It is responsible for the maintenance 
and development of the plant’s operating experi-
ence feedback process. The operations have been 
continuously developed, procedures are currently 
being improved and some resource changes were 
implemented over the course of the year. The in-
spection included verification of the implementa-
tion of corrective measures at Loviisa and at other 
NPPs on the basis of example cases. STUK found 
that there was still room for improvement in the 
follow-up of corrective actions decided on the basis 
of operational events at the plant, as well as in reli-
able assessment of the effectiveness of corrective 
actions. Sufficiency of resources must be ensured 
also from the viewpoint that high-quality reporting 
and operation must be implemented at the right 
time. STUK also demanded changes in the format 
and content of the plant’s event reports and annual 
reports.
Regarding the latest events at the Loviisa units, 
STUK saved in the International Reporting System 
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for Operating Experience (IRS) maintained by the 
IAEA three new reports on lead blankets acciden-
tally left on top of reactor coolant system pipes dur-
ing the fuel cycle, problems with the movements of 
control rods that occurred during the startup after 
the 2013 annual outage of Loviisa 2 and relay faults 
in the control circuits of the Loviisa NPP emergency 
diesel generators.
Loviisa NPP uses methods to assess and utilise 
operating experiences from other plants. Event re-
ports and events at other plants outside of Finland 
are systematically and comprehensively reviewed. 
Fortum itself conducts pre-screening of the reports 
coming from various sources, mainly via the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the 
IRS database maintained by the IAEA. The plant 
is in direct contact with other VVER plants. All 
the information on events and malfunctions at the 
other plants is assessed to determine whether it 
applies to Loviisa.
4.1.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspection 
as part of the periodic inspection programme of 
Loviisa NPP, focusing on radiation measurements 
in particular. The scope of the inspection includ-
ed the environmental radiation monitoring pro-
gramme and the instruments intended for measur-
ing radiation at the plant. Special attention was 
paid to the representativeness of radiation meas-
urement and analyses, as well as the environmen-
tal monitoring programme. STUK required after 
the inspection that the power company update the 
radiation monitoring part of its final safety analy-
sis report and draft a summary of a report by the 
power company on the representativeness of the 
measuring data provided by the radiation measur-
ing system channels.
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Figure 9. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges 
have remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
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Figure 8. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses underwent annual tests. The 
tests comprised irradiating a sample of dosimeters 
at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory and 
reading the doses onsite. The test results showed 
that the plant’s dosimeters are in working order.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protection 
inspections during the annual outages. Radiation 
protection activities of the plant’s radiation protec-
tion personnel and employees within the controlled 
area were assessed during these inspections. Based 
on the inspection results, radiation protection at 
the NPP is good: no major defects were observed. 
Individual development targets were also observed 
in the inspections, concerning boundary arrange-
ments of radiation control areas requiring the use 
of additional personal protective equipment, the 
use of personal protective equipment, markings 
and management of the processing of circulating 
water. The plant’s radiation protection organisa-
tion has developed methods to improve the occupa-
tional radiation safety of employees doing specific 
jobs.
In order to reduce activity levels of the reactor 
coolant system, Loviisa NPP continued to replace 
pump seals with types that do not contain any an-
timony. The rest of the seals, three in total, were re-
placed at Loviisa 1 and two seals were replaced at 
Loviisa 2. This means that all of the twelve reactor 
coolant pump seals of the NPP are now antimony-
free. The dose rates are expected to decrease in the 
next few years, particularly in the steam generator 
room, since activated antimony (Sb-122 and Sb-
124) has been a major cause of radiation doses at 
the NPP. It was observed during the 2014 annual 
outage that the dose rates in the steam generator 
room had already somewhat decreased from the 
level of the past years.
Radiation doses
In 2014, a short annual outage took place at Lovi-
isa 1 and a four-year annual outage at Loviisa 2. 
The occupational radiation doses of nuclear power 
plant workers mostly accumulate during work car-
ried out during annual outages. The highest in-
dividual dose incurred during the annual outage 
at Loviisa 1 was 4.5 mSv, while the same dose at 
Loviisa 2 was 8.8 mSv. The highest individual dose 
incurred during the entire year was 9.2 mSv. This 
dose was caused by work on insulation materials.
The radiation doses for plant employees re-
mained below the individual dose limits. The effec-
tive dose for a worker from radiation work may not 
exceed the 20 manSv/year average over any period 
of five years, or 50 manSv during any single year.
The collective occupational radiation dose for 
the entire year was 0.32 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 
0.53 manSv at Loviisa 2. Due to improvements in 
radiation safety, the collective occupational dose of 
employees at Loviisa 1 was the lowest ever record-
ed and the collective occupational dose at Loviisa 2 
was also low even though a four-year annual out-
age was implemented. The collective occupational 
radiation dose caused by work carried out during 
the annual outage was 0.30 manSv at Loviisa 1 
and 0.51 manSv at Loviisa 2. The collective occupa-
tional radiation doses at Loviisa NPP were lower 
than the average dose of similar pressurized water 
reactors (VVER) in OECD countries.
According to the YVL Guide issued by STUK, 
the threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose av-
eraged over two successive years is 2.5 manSv per 
one gigawatt of net electrical power. This means a 
collective dose value of 1.24 manSv per each Lovi-
isa plant unit. This threshold was not exceeded at 
either of the units.
The individual radiation dose distribution of 
employees at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs in 
2014 is given in Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
Loviisa NPP remained well below the authorised 
annual limits in 2014. Releases of radioactive no-
ble gases into the air were approximately 5.8 TBq 
(as Kr-87-equivalent activity), which is approxi-
mately 0.04% of the set limit. The releases of radio-
active noble gases were dominated by argon-41, an 
activation product of argon-40 originating in the 
air space between the reactor pressure vessel and 
the main radiation shield. Releases of iodine into 
the air were approximately 4 MBq (as I-131-equiv-
alent activity), which is approximately 0.002 % of 
the set limit. Releases through the vent stack into 
the air also included radioactive particulate mat-
ter amounting to 32  MBq, tritium amounting to 
0.1 TBq and carbon-14 amounting to approximate-
ly 0.4 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
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into the sea was 13 TBq, which is approximately 
8% of the release limit. The total activity of other 
nuclides released into the sea was approximately 
0.1 GBq, which is 0.01% of the plant location-spe-
cific release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
around 0.07 µSv per year, i.e. less than 0.1% of the 
set limit (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). An average 
person living in Finland receives an equivalent ra-
diation dose from radiation sources in nature and 
in space in around 30 minutes.
A total of approximately 300 samples were 
collected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Loviisa power plant 
in 2014. External background radiation and the 
exposure to radioactivity of people in the vicinity of 
the NPP were also regularly measured. Extremely 
small amounts of radioactive materials originat-
ing from the NPP were observed in some of the 
analysed samples. The amounts were so small that 
they are insignificant in terms of the radiation ex-
posure of the environment or people.
4.1.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
preparedness organisations of nuclear power 
plants to act under abnormal conditions. No events 
requiring emergency response actions occurred at 
Loviisa NPP in 2014.
Emergency preparedness at Loviisa NPP com-
plies with the key requirements. The Loviisa NPP 
emergency preparedness organisation consists of 
the organisation of the Loviisa NPP and of For-
tum’s technical support organisation at Keilanie-
mi. STUK’s inspection of the emergency prepared-
ness arrangements, which is part of the periodic in-
spection programme, was implemented in 2014. It 
focused on the emergency preparedness organisa-
tion, drills, alarm arrangements, the environmen-
tal monitoring system, meteorological measure-
ments at the plant site and drafting of spreading 
forecasts. Based on the inspection, STUK demand-
ed improvements in the assessment of the support-
ing materials used in emergency preparedness ac-
tivities and testing of how well the alarms that are 
used to alert the general population can be heard 
indoors. A deviation from the OLC requirement on 
calibration intervals of the meteorological system 
was observed during the inspection. Modifications 
of the emergency preparedness operations based 
on the Fukushima accident have been completed. 
The amended Government Decree on Emergency 
Response Arrangements at Nuclear Power Plants 
(VNA 716/2013) entered into force in October 2013. 
Some of the new requirements of the Government 
Decree have been met, while the details of others 
will be specified in the implementation decision of 
YVL C.5 in 2015.
Emergency preparedness drill Loviisa-14 was 
arranged at Loviisa NPP in November. In addi-
tion to the plant itself, participants in the drill 
Table 2. NPP originated radioactive nuclides found in the environmental samples of  
the Loviisa power plant in 2014.
Sample types containing detected radionuclides. Figures indicate the number of positive samples in a sample group.  
Several different nuclides may be found in the same sample.
Radionuclide
Type of sample
H-3 Mn-
54
Co-
58
Co-
60
Nb-
95
Zr-
95
Ag-
108m
Ag-
110m
Te-
123m
Sb-
124
Sb-
125
I-131 Hf-
181
Total
Air 1 4 5
Fallout 1 13 13 1 4 32
Plants (reindeer lichen) 1 1
Seabed fauna 
(Saduria Entomon)
1 1 2
Aquatic plants 1 2 7 8 1 2 1 22
Perifyton 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 14
Sedimenting materials 9 1 8 1 19
Seawater 7 7
Sludge 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 13
Total 7 4 6 40 2 2 1 34 5 11 1 1 1 115
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included STUK, Eastern Uusimaa Fire and Rescue 
Services, Eastern Uusimaa Police Department and 
Kerava Emergency Response Centre. The Govern-
ment Decree VNA 716/2013 expanded the basis of 
emergency preparedness to cover a simultaneous 
emergency at all of the units of a NPP. Loviisa-14 
was the first drill in Finland where a simultaneous 
emergency at two plant units was being rehearsed.
4.1.12 Nuclear security
A new surveillance system for Loviisa NPP was 
mostly completed in 2014. The project included 
renovating the alarm control centre and backup 
alarm control centre. Both of them were equipped 
with new safety engineering components, servers 
and communication hardware. The access control 
system was completely renovated (zones, readers, 
ID cards, card manufacturing points, etc.). The re-
cording camera surveillance system was also reno-
vated and new key cabinets were added. Redun-
dant electricity systems that supply power to the 
above-mentioned safety systems and components 
were also renovated.
STUK implemented a comprehensive inspec-
tion of nuclear security in compliance with the 
inspection plan. An example of the issues studied 
is nuclear security of the repositories for low- and 
intermediate-level waste. No significant deviations 
were detected in the inspection. The measures re-
sulting from remarks made in the course of earlier 
inspections were also considered to be appropri-
ately implemented.
Furthermore, STUK studied how the security 
arrangements (both nuclear security and infor-
mation security) and the safeguards of nuclear 
materials are linked to the Loviisa NPP manage-
ment system and safety management. The inspec-
tion focused on descriptions of processes related 
to nuclear security and the safeguards of nuclear 
materials in the management system, how nuclear 
security and the safeguards of nuclear materials 
have been taken into account in the risk manage-
ment process and how these issues influence duties 
of the involved employees. Furthermore, discus-
sions on how nuclear security has been taken into 
account when assessing and developing the organi-
sation’s safety culture were conducted. In addition 
to management interviews, the inspection inter-
views focused on the employees’ knowledge of their 
responsibilities and obligations regarding nuclear 
security, communication channels used for issues 
pertaining to nuclear security, adequacy of infor-
mation and how the employees react to deviations.
4.1.13 Safeguards of nuclear materials
In 2014, a total of fourteen safeguard inspections 
were conducted at Loviisa NPP. The number of 
inspections increased because a fuel container was 
transferred from the reactor building during the 
annual outage while the reactor cover was open. 
STUK performed an inspection pertaining to the 
verification of the physical inventory of nuclear 
materials together with the IAEA and the Euro-
pean Commission both before and after the annual 
outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the loca-
tions of the reactor fuel assemblies prior to closing 
of the reactor cover at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
STUK performed two interim safeguards inspec-
tions and one interim safeguards inspection to-
gether with the Commission and the IAEA. A par-
tially empty fuel container was transferred three 
times from the reactor building while the reactor 
cover was open during the outage at Loviisa. Each 
of these transfers gave rise to the number of in-
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Figure 10. Amounts of uranium and plutonium at the Loviisa NPP.
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spections carried out by STUK, the IAEA and the 
Commission. In addition to these inspections and 
the regular inspections, one inspection on installa-
tion of components required for remote data trans-
mission was implemented. No remarks were made 
in the inspections.
In 2014, the IAEA and the Commission started 
to use remote data transmission in the safeguards 
of nuclear materials at Loviisa NPP. New cameras 
were installed in the reactor buildings before the 
annual outages in July and the required data con-
nections were installed in August and September 
in connection with the annual outages. In Septem-
ber, the first images were electronically transferred 
to the Commission in Luxemburg and further to 
the IAEA in Vienna. According to the new proce-
dure, Euratom and the IAEA receive images from 
the NPP once a day. 
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4.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units 1 and 2
4.2.1 Overall safety assessment of 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2
STUK oversaw the safety of Olkiluoto NPP and as-
sessed its organisation in different areas by means 
of reviewing materials provided by the licensee, 
carrying out inspections in line with the periodic 
inspection programme and overseeing operations 
at the plant. On the basis of this regulatory over-
sight, STUK can state that plant operations did 
not cause a radiation hazard to the employees, 
population or the environment. Radiation doses 
of the employees were lowest ever during the his-
tory of the NPP and clearly lower than the collec-
tive occupational doses of employees working at 
boiling water reactors in OECD countries, mostly 
because of plant modifications that reduced the 
humidity level of the steam drained to the turbine 
island. Radioactive releases into the environment 
were also low; they remained below the set limits. 
Emergency preparedness at Olkiluoto NPP com-
plies with the requirements. The processing, stor-
age and final disposal of low- and intermediate-
level waste (NPP operational waste) at the power 
plant have been arranged in compliance with the 
requirements.
Based on tests and inspections, condition of 
the containment, which prevents the release of 
radioactive materials into the environment, and 
the reactor coolant system comply with the re-
quirements. An indication of a possible fuel leak 
occurred at Olkiluoto 1 at the end of the fuel cycle. 
Attempts to find the leaking fuel assembly were 
made during the annual outage, without result. 
The possible leak has no significance for the radia-
tion safety in the area surrounding the NPP.
Plant operation has been systematic and safe. 
In 2014, three events warranting a special report 
were reported. These events did not influence the 
safety of the employees or the area surrounding 
the NPP. Defects in the safety culture were ob-
served in connection with one of these events. As a 
result of this event, TVO launched a project where 
it uses interviews to study the level of safety cul-
ture in production operation. TVO will submit the 
results to STUK. The events are described in more 
detail in Appendix 3.
The annual outages of the plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. A large number of maintenance 
measures and inspections are also carried out 
during each annual outage to ensure the safe and 
reliable operation of the NPP. STUK performed an 
annual outage inspection in compliance with the 
inspection programme during the annual outage. 
Good operations and examples of continuous im-
provement were observed during the inspection. In 
the inservice inspections carried out during the an-
nual outage, cracks were detected in the feedwater 
lines of both plant units. The cracks are at a mixing 
point of pipelines from the feedwater system and 
the shutdown coolant system where flows at differ-
ent temperatures mix. The cracked mixing points 
will be replaced during the next annual outage.
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety that were designed based on assess-
ments of the Fukushima accident are currently 
ongoing at the NPP. These modifications will im-
prove the provisions for extreme external threats. 
For example, the modifications will improve sys-
tems used to cool the reactor and add whole new 
systems for pumping water into the reactor in case 
of a complete loss of AC power. In 2014, a modifica-
tion of all the four trains of the auxiliary feedwater 
system was implemented at Olkiluoto 1. The modi-
fication will reduce the system’s dependence on the 
seawater cooling. TVO also submitted a conceptual 
design plan on a turbine-driven high pressure cool-
ant injection system. Processing of the conceptual 
design plan and more detailed system design are 
currently ongoing.
Other ongoing projects include an upgrade of 
the power plant’s emergency diesel generators 
where the eight diesel generators will be replaced 
and a ninth generator will be built. Furthermore, 
the NPP is planning to build remote shutdown 
stations to improve functionality of the current 
remote control systems. Also in 2014, STUK ap-
proved conceptual design plans on replacing the 
reactor coolant pumps and the frequency convert-
ers needed when controlling and supplying power 
to the pumps. The pumps are replaced because of 
their ageing.
The extension project of the interim storage 
facility for spent nuclear fuel proceeded as planned 
in 2014. System modifications were completed 
and some were also commissioned. Two of STUK’s 
commissioning inspections regarding the entire 
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facility were arranged over the course of the year. 
A decision on an application to increase the storage 
capacity of the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel is currently being prepared.
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of 
operating activities, it can be stated that with a 
view to ensuring safety TVO’s organisation has 
operated in a systematic and development-oriented 
way. Over the course of the year, STUK focused its 
oversight on TVO’s management procedures, modi-
fication and procurement processes. TVO continues 
to invest in the development of its operations. A 
reformed modification process has been taken into 
use. As part of the development project, TVO im-
plemented an organisational reform to better man-
age all of the Group’s projects and to manage all 
demanding modification projects in a centralised 
manner.
4.2.2 Operation of the plant units, 
events during operation and 
prerequisites for safe operation
Compliance with operational 
limits and conditions
TVO has ensured that the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) of Olkiluoto NPP are up to date. 
The OLC list the values within which nuclear 
power plant units must remain during operation. 
STUK has monitored compliance with the require-
ments and limits laid down in the OLC, the pro-
cess used to ensure that the OLC remain up to 
date when modifications, tests and safety analyses 
are reviewed, and supervised the licensee’s actions 
onsite. When the annual outages were concluded, 
STUK verified that the OLC were up to date and 
the plant unit complied with the OLC prior to issu-
ing a permit to startup of the unit. TVO continued 
development of the OLC to improve their justifica-
tion and clarify the requirements.
In 2014, TVO reported three events during 
which the plant was non-compliant with the OLC 
or a deviation from the OLC was made without 
an advance safety analysis and STUK’s permis-
sion. Both measuring channels of the radioactivity 
monitoring system were simultaneously detached 
at Olkiluoto 2 due to a human error during calibra-
tion of the system. Some of the covers that protect 
the pools in the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel from an airplane crash were lifted 
with an unapproved hoisting device. A generator 
grounding carbon brush was replaced at Olkiluoto 
1 in a manner that violated the NPP’s administra-
tive procedures. A special report on all of the three 
deviations from the OLC was submitted to STUK 
for approval. The individual events did not com-
promise the safety of the plant or its surrounding 
environment. TVO analysed the events and defined 
corrective measures to prevent recurrence of the 
events. STUK oversees the licensee’s operations 
onsite and carries out random inspections to en-
sure compliance with the requirements and limits 
of the OLC. No deviations were observed in the 
2014 inspections.
Over the course of the year, TVO submitted 
to STUK for approval 28 amendment proposals 
to the operational limits and conditions. Most of 
the amendments were due to modifications and 
component replacements carried out at the plant, 
as well as an OLC development project. During 
the annual outages in the spring, TVO introduced 
new fuel types that required an update of the OLC. 
TVO submitted for approval four pairs of figures 
pertaining to the OLC development project. The 
development project is described in Chapter 4.2.5. 
STUK approved most of the proposed amendments 
as such or with minor additional requirements. 
Some of the proposed amendments are still being 
processed by STUK.
TVO applied for permission from STUK for nine 
planned deviations from the operational limits and 
conditions (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). Three of 
the applications concerned installation of a recir-
culation line in the auxiliary feedwater system 
of Olkiluoto 1 and three concerned the expansion 
and modernisation of the interim storage facility 
for spent fuel. STUK approved all the applications, 
except for one. STUK refused TVO’s application to 
increase the trip limit for high circulating water 
temperature that starts the cooling circuits of the 
condensate pool because TVO did not provide suf-
ficient justification on the operation of the unit 
being safe at the proposed condensate pool tem-
perature. When processing this issue, it was noted 
that the currently valid OLC allow operation of the 
plant in a range that is not included in the scope 
of the analyses of the final safety analysis report 
(FSAR). STUK did not issue any requirements on 
amending the OLC during the processing of the 
exemption. Instead, the issue will be studied when 
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Table 3. Events at the Olkiluoto plant units warranting the power company's special report or root cause analysis. 
All	events	subject	to	reporting	are	discussed	in	Appendix	1	(indicator	A.II.1).
Event
Non-compliances 
with the OLC
Special report INES rating
Simultaneous detaching of radiation measuring channels in the reactor 
building of Olkiluoto 2
• • 0
Using an unapproved hoisting device at the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage 
facility 
• • 0
Replacing carbon grounding brushes of the generator during power operation • • 1
Operation and operational events
On 7 April 2014, TVO observed at Olkiluoto 2 that 
a radiation measuring channel had been detached 
despite the requirements of the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) in connection with calibration of the 
radiation measuring system. The calibration of the 
radiation measuring channel was erroneously started 
even though the parallel measuring channel had been 
detached shortly before to be sent out for calibration. 
This was an OLC non-conformance because the OLC 
requires that at least one of these parallel measuring 
channels must be operable at all times. When the OLC 
non-conformance was detected, TVO restored oper-
ability of one of the measuring channels. The devia-
tion lasted for three minutes.
Soon after the annual outages, problems with the 
grounding carbon brushes of the main generator were 
detected in both units: the grounding carbon brushes 
had worn through clearly faster than normal. The 
purpose of a grounding carbon brush is to safely 
release the voltage generated by the rotation of the 
turbine shaft to prevent it reaching a harmful level. 
The grounding carbon brushes were replaced twice 
during the summer of 2014 at Olkiluoto 2. To replace 
the brushes, the unit was placed into turbine bypass 
operation and the grounding carbon brushes were 
replaced while the turbine was in hydraulic turning 
gear operation. On 30 September 2014, the plan was 
to inspect condition of the grounding carbon brushes 
at Olkiluoto 1. It had been observed in connection 
with an inspection that the carbon brushes could be 
replaced simultaneously. The unit’s shift supervisor 
was not informed of the replacement of the carbon 
brushes. Some of the administrative procedures that 
guide the operation of the unit were not followed. 
There was no work permit for the replacement of the 
carbon brushes. Furthermore, the task took place in a 
room which, due to its radiation level, had been clas-
sified in the OLC as a room where work may only be 
performed with a radiation work permit, but no such 
permit for the task had been issued. The event did not 
have any direct impact on radiation safety, but it was 
still classified as an INES 1 event due to the related 
major defects in safety culture.
On 14 August 2014, STUK observed that TVO 
had lifted some of the covers that protect the pools in 
the storage facility from an airplane crash with an 
unapproved hoisting device. The lifting work was im-
mediately discontinued. An unapproved safety class 3 
hoisting device that had not undergone a construction 
inspection was being used. According to the OLC, all 
of the components of a crane must be operable before 
lifting work is started. The YVL Guides determine 
inspections of hoisting devices important to safety 
that had not been performed. The event did not com-
promise spent fuel storage safety. The lifting did not 
cause any fuel damage or any radiation hazard.
The events are described in more detail in Ap-
pendix 3.
processing the chapter on the containment submit-
ted for approval in connection with the OLC devel-
opment project.
Operation and operational events
STUK oversaw the operation on a daily basis at 
the plant site, reviewed regular reports on oper-
ating activities and event reports, as well as per-
formed three inspections of operations that focused 
on training and competence of control room opera-
tors, actions during annual outages and operating 
experience feedback. The results of the inspections 
are described in Appendix 5.
Six events classified as operational transients 
occurred at Olkiluoto NPP. One of the events caused 
a partial reactor trip at Olkiluoto 1: a malfunction-
ing valve during a bypass test of the LP heaters 
triggered a partial reactor trip due to high surface 
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level of a HP heater. The event decreased the reac-
tor power to approximately 20%. Four operational 
transients in which one of the reactor coolant pumps 
dropped to its minimum rpm were caused by voltage 
disturbances of the external 400 kV power grid. In 
two of these events, the reactor coolant pump speed 
was not reduced fully according to plan. TVO noticed 
that a reactor coolant pump equipped with a key 
switch dropped to its minimum rpm even though 
the undervoltage of 1,000 ms that is required for this 
action did not occur during either of the events. TVO 
will check and adjust the undervoltage and ramp 
control of the reactor coolant pumps during the 2015 
annual outage. A circulating water leak was detected 
in a condenser of Olkiluoto 1 in March. To repair the 
leak, the condenser was detached and the plant was 
dropped to 40% power.
The above-mentioned three events non-compliant 
with the OLC were events warranting a special 
report. The events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
In 2014, risks caused by component malfunctions, 
preventive maintenance and other events causing 
unavailability of equipment were 7.9% and 6.4% of 
the expected value of the annual accident risk calcu-
lated using the plant’s risk model for Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2, respectively. The result is in line with 
those of previous years.
Annual outages
During an annual outage, equipment and struc-
tures important to plant safety are inspected, ser-
viced, replaced or modified. These measures ensure 
the preconditions for operating the NPP safely dur-
ing the following fuel cycles. Furthermore, some of 
the nuclear fuel is replaced with fresh fuel during 
an annual outage. STUK oversees that the licensee 
ensures the safe completion of the annual mainte-
nance work and prevents radiation hazards to the 
plant employees and the environment. STUK per-
formed an annual outage inspection in compliance 
with the inspection programme during the annual 
outage. The inspection is described in more detail 
in Appendix 5.
Several events caused by human errors oc-
curred during the annual outages, but none of 
them warranted a special report. TVO drafted a 
joint event report for six human errors. In this 
report, TVO assesses the underlying causes of the 
Figure 13. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant in 2014.
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Figure 12. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 11. INES	classified	events	at	the	Olkiluoto	plant	
(INES	Level	1	or	higher).
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events and contributory factors, as well as lists 
measures to be performed in order to prevent their 
recurrence.
4.2.3 Ensuring plant safety functions
Deterministic safety analyses
An extensive evaluation of the transient and acci-
dent analyses (deterministic safety analyses) was 
carried out to verify that the safety functions of the 
plant have been performed in connection with the 
periodic safety review of 2009. Since then, TVO has 
further supplemented the analyses in connection 
with plant modifications in terms of expansion of 
postulated accidents and loss of coolant accidents. 
No updated deterministic safety analyses were 
submitted to STUK in 2014.
Probabilistic risk assessments
The risk of a severe nuclear accident is evalu-
ated on the basis of a probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA). As a rule, PRA calculations utilise regularly 
updated information on the occurrences of initiat-
ing events and the unavailability of equipment 
together with a logical model of the plant’s systems 
and their interdependencies. The model is used 
to assess, for example, the annual risk of severe 
reactor fuel failures, which is also called the core 
damage frequency.
At the end of the year 2014, the calculated core 
damage frequency for Olkiluoto 1 was 0.84 × 10-5/
year, which is around 30% lower than in 2013 (1.21 
× 10-5/year). At the end of the year 2014, the calcu-
lated core damage frequency for Olkiluoto 2 was 
1.41 × 10-5/year, which is around 16% higher than 
in 2013 (1.21 × 10-5/year).
TVO introduced separate risk models for Olki-
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 1 
(11–29 May 2014)
The maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 lasted for 
a little more than 17 days, which was around two 
days longer than expected. The delay was caused 
by, for instance, the need to locate a fuel leak in 
connection with the refueling and the repair of a 
valve in the relief train. Issues that caused delays 
during the startup of the unit included a loose con-
nector of a control rod actuator and the repairing 
of a leak in a steam line valve.
Around one fifth of the reactor fuel was re-
placed during the annual outage. The most major 
modifications implemented included replacing low 
voltage switchgears of two trains and modifying 
auxiliary feed water system recirculation lines 
of two trains where the recirculation lines drain 
into demineralised water storage pools that also 
act as the water source for the auxiliary feedwater 
system.
The auxiliary feedwater system modification 
will reduce the system’s dependence on the sea wa-
ter cooling. The modification will not influence the 
auxiliary feedwater system in any other operating 
mode apart from the recirculation mode. At pre-
sent, the water that has flowed through the pump 
in recirculation mode is cooled using a separate 
cooler from where the heat is transferred via an 
intermediate circuit to the service water system. If 
the service water cooling is lost, the temperature 
of the recirculated water will quickly increase, 
which will eventually lead to a loss of the auxiliary 
feedwater system pumps. In addition to the modi-
fications, a considerable number of inspections, 
maintenance work, repairs and tests were carried 
out on systems, equipment and structures.
An indication suggesting a fuel leak was ob-
served in the plant unit at the end of the fuel cycle 
in May 2014. Attempts to locate the fuel leak were 
made prior to the start of the annual outage. Minor 
indications of the location of the fuel leak were 
found and a leaking fuel assembly was searched 
for during the annual outage. The leaking assem-
bly was not detected, however. TVO has a guideline 
on the management of fuel leaks. It will be used if 
the leaking assembly is observed to be still in the 
reactor during the fuel cycle.
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 
(1–9 June 2014)
The refueling outage of Olkiluoto 2 took a little less 
than eight days, as planned. During the annual 
outage, one fifth of the reactor fuel was replaced. 
No major modifications are carried out during a 
refueling outage; instead, the work mainly consists 
of inspections, maintenance, repairs and tests of 
systems, equipment and structures, such as fuel 
inspections and leak tests of containment isolation 
valves.
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luoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in 2013. The differences be-
tween the units are mainly caused by the fact that 
plant modifications that improve safety are not 
implemented at the same time. The key reason be-
hind the decreased core damage frequency at Olki-
luoto 1 from the level of 2013 was a change made 
in two trains of the auxiliary feedwater system 
that reduced the system’s dependence on seawater 
cooling. The modification is described in Chapter 
4.2.5, Auxiliary feedwater system recirculation line 
modification and trial run results.
The increased core damage frequency of Olki-
luoto 2 is mainly due to changes in system separa-
tion implemented in order to be able to perform 
maintenance during the annual outage. The above-
mentioned modification of the auxiliary feedwater 
system that will decrease the risk has not been 
implemented at Olkiluoto 2 yet, but the plan is to 
implement it in the near future.
The accident risk at the Olkiluoto power plant 
and its changes are discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion A.II.4 of Appendix 1, Accident risk of nuclear 
power plants.
4.2.4 Integrity of structures and equipment
Reactor coolant system
At Olkiluoto 2, a crack in one of the welded joints of 
the reactor feedwater system has been monitored 
by means of ultrasound and eddy current examina-
tions during inservice inspections since the indica-
tion was detected in 2003. The crack is located in a 
weld in between the reactor pressure vessel nozzle 
butt weld and its joint (safe-end) on the inside 
of the nozzle. The crack may be a manufacturing 
fault that was originally left undetected and whose 
actual depth could not be determined until with 
the new inspection techniques. On the other hand, 
the crack may also be a fault caused by stress cor-
rosion that has grown over time and may continue 
to grow. In an inspection by TVO during the 2013 
annual outage, the depth of the internal crack was 
determined as 23 mm. The acceptable crack depth 
in terms of operation is max. 25 mm. The inspec-
tion was done using phased array ultrasonic test-
ing from the outside of the nozzle. During the 2013 
annual outage, STUK approved a strength analy-
sis submitted by TVO and a procedure where the 
crack would be monitored for the next three years. 
Based on inspections done during the 2014 annual 
outage, the crack has not grown. The inspections 
were done using two techniques from the inside of 
the nozzle and using one technique from the out-
side. TVO installed a leak detection system that is 
based on temperature in the area during the annu-
al outage. TVO has already made preparations for 
repairing the crack. The repair plan states that the 
crack will be removed by machining a groove that 
covers the entire circumference of the nozzle in the 
cracked area and then welding the groove shut.
In inspections done during the 2014 annual 
outages, several cracks were observed in feedwater 
line 1 and one crack in feedwater line 2 at Olki-
luoto 2. Several cracks were observed in the same 
part of feedwater line 2 at Olkiluoto 1. The cracks 
are at a mixing point of pipelines from the feedwa-
ter system and the shutdown cooling system where 
flows at different temperatures mix. The mixing 
flows cause continuous temperature fluctuation 
of the structural material when the unit is in hot 
standby or low power feedwater control mode. This 
means that the mixing point is subjected to fatigue. 
These pipeline mixing points were replaced in 
1986. STUK made a decision that required amend-
ment of the operating method and replacement of 
the cracked pipe sections during the 2015 annual 
outages.
According to the decisions, only the mixing 
point with fewer cracks may be used during the 
above-mentioned operating modes that will stress 
the cracked mixing point at both units during the 
fuel cycle following the 2014 annual outage. Both 
mixing points at Olkiluoto 2 will be replaced dur-
ing the 2015 annual outages. One of the mixing 
points at Olkiluoto 1 will be replaced during the 
2015 annual outage and the other during the 2016 
annual outage. STUK will oversee the planning of 
the replacement, manufacture and installation.
During the 2014 annual outage, TVO inspected 
supporting feet of the reactor moderator tank at 
Olkiluoto 1 based on operating experience from 
Sweden. In Sweden, two cracks were detected in 
welds between similar feet and the interior of the 
reactor pressure vessel in 2011. All of the eighteen 
supporting feet at Olkiluoto 1 were subjected to 
video camera and ultrasound inspections in 2014. 
No fault indications were detected. Based on video 
camera inspections done inside the reactor pres-
sure vessel, there are no faults that can be seen 
on the surface in the supporting feet. Based on 
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The manufacture of the 2015 fuel batches at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 was completed in 
compliance with the approved construction plans, 
mainly by the end of 2014. TVO implemented the 
planned delivery batch specific manufacturing and 
supplier control inspections at the fuel supplier 
factories and for their suppliers.
In early 2014, TVO submitted a construction 
plan on a new control rod type that will be commis-
sioned during the 2015 annual outages. During a 
manufacturing control inspection, TVO inspected 
the manufacturing and inspection methods of the 
rod type.
Maintenance and management of spare parts
Management of spare parts
STUK assessed the management of spare parts 
and supplies at the operating Olkiluoto plant units. 
The inspection, implemented in April 2014, cov-
ered procurement, reception, storage and handover 
from the warehouse of spare parts and supplies. 
Responsibilities, instructions, resources and data 
systems pertaining to these sectors of spare part 
management were studied. Furthermore, operation 
of the incoming goods unit and the storage facili-
ties were verified. An increased risk of fake goods 
could not be excluded in the inspection, since the 
supply chains are longer than before and suppliers 
are changed often. A fake product cannot usually 
be detected using normal quality assurance proce-
dures that are based on mutual trust. The risk of 
fake products can, however, be mitigated by adding 
more quality assurance measures at the spare part 
procurement and reception stage, as well as by pro-
viding more training. Measures pertaining to the 
prevention of fake products, in particular, was an 
issue that could not be verified during the inspec-
tion. STUK demanded that TVO study means it 
could use to identify forgeries. Based on the inspec-
tion results, TVO needs to add more precaution-
ary measures to its spare part procurement and 
inspection instructions in order to avoid a situation 
where fake spare parts or supplies are used at the 
plant. This requirement applies in particular to 
mechanical, electrical and I&C components that 
are serially produced and of the commercial grade 
as well as commercial supplies that influence the 
operability of a safety classified system, structure 
or component.
the ultrasound inspections done on the outside of 
the reactor pressure vessel, there are no internal 
faults in the pressure vessel wall material close 
to the supporting feet. Video camera inspections 
were started at Olkiluoto 2 in 2013 and will be 
concluded during the 2015 annual outage. No fault 
indications were detected in the inspections.
Fuel and control rods
In early 2014, TVO submitted to STUK for ap-
proval last parts of the construction plans for the 
fuel batches and test assemblies delivered to Olki-
luoto  1 and Olkiluoto 2 in 2014, as well as com-
missioning applications for these batches, which 
STUK approved in March. TVO implemented a 
simultaneous fuel inspection at both units during 
the 2013–2014 fuel cycle, except for the condition 
monitoring assemblies because TVO applied an ex-
tension for their inspections while updating the in-
spection plan for the 2014–2015 fuel cycle. Imple-
mentation of the spent fuel condition monitoring 
programme has been delayed and the inspection 
scope has been decreased because the fuel inspec-
tion equipment at the interim storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuel was not applicable for fuel as-
sembly channelling. Due to the installation sched-
ule of the covers at the interim storage facility 
for spent nuclear fuel, there was not enough time 
to implement a modification of the system. TVO 
will submit an updated condition monitoring pro-
gramme to STUK for information at a later date.
Fuel assemblies and channels were visually in-
spected during the 2014 annual outage. According 
to inspection reports submitted by TVO to STUK, 
no difference was observed in the reactor behav-
iour of channels that had been processed in an au-
toclave and channels that had not been processed 
in an autoclave. As in the previous years, some 
local flaky oxide particles were observed in the 
ZIRLO channel. TVO will pay special attention to 
this phenomenon in future inspections. Otherwise, 
the fuel behaved normally when taking into ac-
count the burn-up values. Control rod inspections 
and replacements were also implemented during 
the annual outages of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2 according to an approved plan. The control rods 
removed from the reactor were inspected after the 
annual outage, during the fuel cycle. Test batches 
of a new fuel assembly type were commissioned at 
both Olkiluoto units.
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Inservice inspections
TVO completed the inservice inspections of Olki-
luoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in compliance with the in-
service inspection programme approved by STUK. 
The programme included internal video camera 
inspections of the reactor pressure vessel, external 
ultrasound inspections of the reactor pressure ves-
sel and internal inspections of the reactor pressure 
vessel nozzles, for example. Pipelines were sub-
jected to inservice inspections and erosion meas-
urements. The most significant observations were 
the above-mentioned cracks in the material at the 
feedwater line mixing points.
Emergency diesel generators
A voltage controller in the diesel generator of one 
train at Olkiluoto 2 has been exceptionally often 
replaced in the past due to malfunctions. The sus-
pected cause of the malfunctions was too high me-
chanical vibration. The voltage controller is in a 
generator where it is susceptible to powerful vi-
brations from the diesel engine, similar to shock 
load. TVO conducted vibration measurements of 
the generator’s voltage controller in late 2013. It 
was observed that the vibration is very strong. 
The fixing structures of the voltage controller were 
repaired to reduce the vibration to an acceptable 
level. Vibration of the voltage controllers in the 
other emergency diesel generators at Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2 was measured in early 2014. It 
was noted that the vibration was fairly strong also 
at two other generators. The fixing structures be-
tween these voltage controllers and the generators 
were also repaired to rectify the situation. All of 
the above-mentioned measurements were taken 
from the cover of the voltage controller housing. In 
the summer of 2014, one of the voltage controllers 
was subjected to a test where, in addition to the 
vibration of the cover, the vibration and charac-
teristic frequencies of the circuit boards inside the 
housing were measured. Based on these vibration 
measurements, TVO designed rubber spacers to 
be placed in between the voltage controller and 
the internals of the generator frame. The plan is 
to conduct preliminary testing of the new arrange-
ment in early 2015. If the results seem promising, 
all of the voltage controllers will be subjected to the 
same modification.
Containment
The containments at Olkiluoto meet the design 
requirements. Based on leak tests implemented in 
2014, three valves were repaired at Olkiluoto 1 and 
two valves at Olkiluoto 2.
4.2.5 Development of the plant and its safety
Replacement of reactor coolant pumps 
and their frequency converters
In 2014, STUK approved TVO’s conceptual design 
plans on replacing the reactor coolant pumps and 
the frequency converters needed when controlling 
and supplying power to the pumps. The pumps 
are replaced because of their ageing. In connection 
with the replacement, a flywheel will be added to 
the reactor coolant pump shaft to ensure sufficient 
cooling of the nuclear fuel in case of a trip if the 
I&C and electric control systems are unavailable. 
The pump is currently shut down by means of elec-
tric control.
TVO decided to order the pumps from Westing-
house Electric Sweden AB. The company in charge 
of pump manufacturing is German KSB. The fre-
quency converter supplier is ABB. TVO also sub-
mitted the first detailed documents regarding the 
design of the new pumps at the end of the year. The 
plan is to commission the first new reactor coolant 
pump at Olkiluoto 1 during the 2016 annual outage, 
all of the six pumps at Olkiluoto 1 during the 2017 
annual outage and the remaining five pumps of 
Olkiluoto 1 in 2018.
High pressure coolant 
injection to the reactor
As part of the safety improvements following the 
Fukushima accident, TVO has proposed a turbine-
driven high pressure coolant injection system to 
manage a situation where a total loss of AC power 
has occurred. The system will consist of a pump op-
erated by the steam turbine: the steam will be tak-
en from the main steam line and supplied through 
a dedicated line to the pump turbine. The water 
will be supplied to the reactor by the system via 
one auxiliary feedwater line.
Such a system is necessary because, based on 
studies conducted by TVO, it is apparent that the 
first proposed solution (a low pressure system with 
supply via the fire water system) alone would not 
be enough to guarantee integrity of the reactor 
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core in case of a total loss of power. The high pres-
sure system will offer more time to start the low 
pressure system.
TVO submitted a conceptual design plan of the 
new system for approval in 2014. Processing of the 
conceptual design plan and more detailed system 
design are currently ongoing.
Auxiliary feedwater system recirculation 
line modification and trial run results
In 2013, STUK approved TVO’s plan on a modifica-
tion of the auxiliary feedwater system recircula-
tion line. The modification will not influence the 
auxiliary feedwater system in any other operating 
mode apart from the recirculation mode. During 
the modification, the recirculation lines will be con-
nected to the demineralised water storage pools 
that are also the water source of the auxiliary 
feedwater system, and cooling of recirculated wa-
ter with seawater will no longer be necessary. This 
means that the system will no longer be dependent 
on seawater.
The modification was implemented at Olkiluoto 
1 in 2014. Abnormal vibration and sounds were ob-
served in the new recirculation line and springs on 
the pressure side of the auxiliary feedwater system 
pump broke off during commissioning. This did not 
influence operation of the pump, however, and the 
fault would not have prevented the supply of water 
to the reactor in case of need. Studies to eliminate 
this problem are ongoing. The modification will not 
be implemented at Olkiluoto 2 until the studies are 
completed.
Construction of remote shutdown 
station at Olkiluoto
TVO is in the process of constructing remote shut-
down stations for the Olkiluoto units currently in 
operation in compliance with decisions made in 
STUK’s implementation decision regarding YVL 
Guide 5.5 and the periodic safety review of Olki-
luoto. STUK reviewed and approved a conceptual 
design plan for the remote shutdown stations in 
2012. Plans regarding the construction of the re-
mote shutdown stations and their ventilation at 
Olkiluoto 2 were reviewed in 2014 and the con-
struction work was completed in 2014. The plan is 
to install the electricity and I&C components and 
commission the remote shutdown stations at Olki-
luoto 2 in 2015 and at Olkiluoto 1 in 2016.
Replacement of diesel generators
TVO has continued the preparation of the re-
placement of the emergency diesel generators at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. STUK approved the 
conceptual design plan on the replacement of the 
diesel generators in early 2013, and TVO selected 
Wärtsilä Finland as the supplier of the new emer-
gency diesel generators. There are a total of eight 
emergency diesel generators in the units operat-
ing at Olkiluoto. A ninth one, to be shared by both 
units, will be added. Cooling of the diesel engines 
of the generators will be improved by adding an air 
cooling system that is independent of the seawater 
cooling system. At present, TVO’s goal is to start 
construction of the building for the ninth emergen-
cy diesel generator that will be shared by the units 
in the summer of 2015. According to the current 
estimated schedule, this emergency diesel genera-
tor, which will be used during the replacement 
project instead of the diesel generator that is cur-
rently being replaced at the units, will be installed 
and commissioned in the spring of 2017. The plan 
is to have the entire diesel generator replacement 
project completed by the spring of 2021.
Low-voltage switchgear replacement project
In 2010, TVO launched a low voltage switchgear 
replacement project at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. 
The key reasons for replacing the switchgears are 
an increase in maintenance costs due to the ageing 
of the original equipment, and the need to modern-
ise the switchgear to correspond to the current re-
quirements regarding plant and personnel safety. 
The replacement mainly concerns the switchgears 
and associated transformers of electricity systems 
important to safety. TVO already replaced the me-
dium voltage switchgears (6.6 kV) in 2005 and 
Pressure equipment manufacturers and 
inspection and testing organisations
A total of 12 nuclear pressure equipment manu-
facturers were approved for the Olkiluoto plant 
(plant units Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3). STUK approved 
11 testing organisations to carry out tests related 
to the manufacture of mechanical equipment and 
structures. Testing operators from three testing 
organisations were approved to carry out periodic 
tests of mechanical equipment and structures pur-
suant to YVL 3.8.
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2006. The voltage in the plant units’ low voltage 
networks varies from 24 VDC to 660 VAC. The 
switchgears are used to supply the required elec-
trical power to the plant units’ I&C systems and 
components that are important to safety.
According to the current plan, the low volt-
age switchgears will be replaced during the plant 
units’ annual outages between 2010 and 2016. TVO 
continued the work during the 2014 annual out-
age of Olkiluoto 1 by replacing the switchgears in 
two trains. STUK reviewed the documents for the 
switchgear project and oversaw the execution of 
the work onsite. TVO intends to continue the pro-
ject at Olkiluoto 2 during the 2015 annual outage 
by replacing the switchgears of two trains.
Development of operational 
limits and conditions
The development plan of the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) states that TVO improves 
the justification for requirements and clarifies the 
requirements as necessary. The OLC development 
project continued in 2014. Over the course of the 
year, TVO submitted four proposed amendments 
to STUK for approval. STUK approved two of the 
new chapters. The other two chapters were still 
being processed at the end of 2014. Also in 2014, 
STUK approved two chapters submitted in 2013 
with the changes required by STUK implemented. 
The development project will be continued in 2014 
and possibly also later.
Abnormal and emergency 
operating procedures
In 2014, TVO continued project on updating the ab-
normal and emergency operating procedures that 
was started based on the results of the periodic 
safety review. The goal of the project is to improve 
the procedures by describing the measures in more 
detail. Furthermore, the procedures will be im-
proved by adding flowcharts to clarify the divi-
sion of labour between operating personnel and the 
measures to be completed.
In 2014, the development project focused on ab-
normal operating procedures that apply to power op-
eration. TVO submitted to STUK for information ten 
updated abnormal operating procedures in 2014. The 
renewed procedures deal with reactor and turbine 
trips, triggering of the boron chain, loss of cooling 
channel (three separate procedures) and shutdown of 
the plant from outside the control room. STUK pro-
cessed the updated procedures as documents submit-
ted to STUK for information. In 2015, development of 
the procedures will still focus on abnormal operating 
procedures that apply to power operation.
Development targets based 
on Fukushima accident
After the Fukushima accident in 2011, STUK sent 
a decision to the licensees concerning provisions 
and plans to be made by the power companies for 
natural phenomena and power supply disruptions. 
In 2013, TVO submitted to STUK reports on the 
opportunity to use a water supply system inde-
pendent of existing plant systems to cool the reac-
tors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The proposed 
solution consists of supplying make-up water from 
the fire water system via the core spray system to 
the reactor after depressurisation. System design 
of this solution will be completed in 2014. The plan 
is to complete detailed design by the end of 2015 
and the plant modification in 2016–2017. In addi-
tion to the low pressure system, an automatically 
starting high pressure make-up water system that 
will guarantee sufficient time for a transfer into 
the low pressure system is being designed. TVO 
submitted to STUK a conceptual design plan (see 
Chapter 4.2.5) for the high pressure make-up wa-
ter system and additional reports in 2014. The plan 
is to commission the high pressure make-up water 
system by 2018.
In 2014, independence of the auxiliary feedwa-
ter system from seawater cooling was improved 
according to plan by implementing pipeline modi-
fications at Olkiluoto 1. The plan is to implement 
the same modifications at Olkiluoto 2 in 2015. For 
more information on the modification, please see 
Chapter 4.2.5.
TVO acquired five portable electric generators 
for the plant area in 2014. Portable generators can 
be used, for instance, to recharge the uninterrupt-
ible power supply batteries during long-lasting 
accidents. Two portable fire water pumps were also 
acquired in 2014. The portable fire water pumps 
can be used to fill up the containment in case of a 
severe accident and supply make-up water to the 
fuel pools in the reactor building and the spent fuel 
storage facility. In 2014, TVO improved seismic 
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resistance of the fire water systems by reinforcing 
pipe supports and the supports of electrical cubi-
cles and relay cabinets in the relay rooms.
According to the plan to ensure residual heat 
removal from the spent fuel pools, TVO installed 
fixed pipelines from the fire water system dry ris-
ers to the fuel pools at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. The 
plan is to implement the same modifications at 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2015. TVO submitted to STUK up-
dated design documentation of the fuel pool tem-
perature and level measuring monitoring system 
in 2014.
Radiation monitor upgrade
TVO has upgraded the fixed radiation measuring 
systems at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in stages. 
During the 2014 annual outages, the radionuclide 
specific activity measuring instruments used in 
fuel leak detection were replaced at both units. The 
new measuring instruments are easier to maintain 
than the old ones: the cooling system used for ra-
dionuclide analytics can be modernised so that it is 
electrically cooled.
The latest items to be upgraded are the ra-
diation measuring instruments used to monitor 
releases during normal operation of the plant. TVO 
conducted factory acceptance tests of these meas-
uring instruments at the equipment supplier’s 
facility in late 2014.
The measuring instrument modernisation pro-
ject will improve and standardise the plant’s oper-
ating components.
4.2.6 Spent nuclear fuel storage and 
NPP operational waste
The processing, storage and final disposal of low- 
and intermediate-level waste (NPP operation-
al waste) at Olkiluoto NPP were carried out as 
planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to reactor power remained low 
compared with most other countries. The contrib-
uting factors include the high quality requirements 
for nuclear waste management and nuclear fuel, 
the planning of maintenance and repair operations, 
decontamination as well as component and process 
modifications. In addition, the NPP employs effi-
cient procedures for reducing the volume of waste 
destined for final disposal. Because of waste moni-
toring and sorting, some waste types that contain 
very little radioactive materials can be released 
from control. Waste released from control included 
operational waste, scrap metal for recycling and 
non-radioactive hazardous waste to be further pro-
cessed, such as waste oil and fluorescent tubes. 
STUK has approved the licensee’s procedures on 
releasing waste from control. STUK will monitor 
the activities, the amount of waste exempted from 
control and its activity concentrations.
In 2014, STUK regulated operating waste man-
agement and final disposal of operating waste as 
well as the concrete and rock structures of the 
repository. STUK reviews and approves reports 
and other documents submitted to it, as well as 
performed regulatory inspections and inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme. 
No significant deficiencies or development needs 
were observed during the inspections carried out in 
2014. The inspections are described in more detail 
in Appendix 5.
Expansion of spent fuel storage facility
TVO is currently adding three pools to the interim 
storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. 
The structures of the storage facility will also be 
modified to comply with the current safety require-
ments. The original capacity of the interim storage 
facility for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto would 
have been sufficient until 2014. The expansion will 
increase the capacity for the spent fuel coming 
from the Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 and 3.
TVO submitted reports regarding expansion 
of the storage facility to STUK for approval at the 
end of 2009. The extension of the storage facility is 
designed to meet the current safety requirements, 
the most significant of which are its earthquake 
resistance and its ability to withstand a large 
airplane crash. The structures of the existing part 
of the storage facility will be simultaneously reno-
vated to comply with the current requirements.
In 2014, system modifications pertaining to the 
expansion of the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel were completed and some systems 
were commissioned. Two commissioning inspec-
tions regarding the entire facility were arranged. 
In the first inspection, the work in the original 
part of the interim storage facility for spent nu-
clear fuel was found completed and commissioned. 
Furthermore, it was verified that spent fuel can 
be transferred to the pools in the original storage 
facility part. However, some issues about require-
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ments on the commissioning of the extension were 
not concluded during the first inspection. TVO was 
able to complete some works pertaining to the com-
missioning of the extension by the second commis-
sioning inspection, and most of these open issues 
were concluded at that time.
Preparation of STUK’s decision regarding the 
increasing of the capacity of the interim storage fa-
cility for spent nuclear fuel has been postponed to 
2015. The decision will be made once the last works 
linked to the commissioning have been completed.
In 2014, one operational event warranting a 
special report took place at the interim storage fa-
cility for spent nuclear fuel: objects were lifted with 
an unapproved hoisting device. For more informa-
tion on this operational event, please see Chapter 
4.2.2 and Appendix 3.
Final disposal of radioactive waste 
managed by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority
An approval of the operating license for the low- 
and intermediate-level waste repository located in 
the Olkiluoto plant area that was implemented on 
22 November 2012 enables the final disposal of the 
radioactive waste managed by STUK’s Environ-
mental Monitoring Department that is stored at 
Olkiluoto in the silos for low- and intermediate-lev-
el waste. The waste consists of radioactive sources 
generated by the use of radiation that have been 
decommissioned as radioactive waste. By virtue of 
the Radiation Decree, the state is in charge of such 
waste.
STUK’s Nuclear Waste and Nuclear Material 
Regulation Department demanded a separate plan 
on implementation of the final disposal of the waste. 
The plan, drafted by TVO, includes descriptions 
of, for instance, sorting of waste packages, records 
and final disposal. TVO submitted the plan and 
supplements to it to STUK in late 2014, and STUK 
processed and approved them. The sorting and final 
disposal of the waste packages in the Olkiluoto NPP 
repository will take place in early 2015.
Provisions for the costs of 
nuclear waste management
In compliance with section 88, subsection 2 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree, TVO provided the Minis-
try of Employment and the Economy with infor-
mation on the costs and prices of nuclear waste 
management measures by the end of June. A sup-
plemented waste management scheme includes an 
updated cost estimate of the remaining waste man-
agement costs.
STUK reviewed the documents submitted in 
compliance with the Nuclear Energy Decree and 
submitted a statement regarding them to the Min-
istry of Employment and the Economy. In its state-
ment, STUK assessed the cost estimates on which 
the financial provisions are based, considered them 
acceptable and stated that they can be used as the 
basis for the cost provisions. TVO’s extent of liabil-
ity was €1,349.1 million at the end of 2014.
According to the Nuclear Energy Decree, sup-
plemented waste management schemes for techni-
cal and financial plans, as well as related calcula-
tions, must be prepared every three years. The next 
revision will take place in 2016.
4.2.7 Organisational operations 
and quality assurance
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that with a view to 
ensuring safety TVO’s organisation has operated in 
a systematic and development-oriented way.
Over the course of the year, STUK focused its 
oversight on TVO’s management procedures, modifi-
cations, resources and procurement processes.
TVO will continue to invest in the development 
of its operations. As part of these investments, TVO 
has implemented changes that influenced its or-
ganisational structure. The organisational reform in 
the Nuclear Safety Department aimed at focusing 
the management of nuclear safety issues in a single 
department that is directly managed by the com-
pany’s President and CEO. The reform also involved 
transferring the Operating Safety Office from the 
Quantities of spent fuel and low-and 
intermediate-level waste in Olkiluoto
The volume of spent nuclear fuel on-site at the 
Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2014 was 8,304 as-
semblies 1,461 tU, tonnes of original uranium) 
with an increase of 208 assemblies (36 tU). The 
volume of low- and intermediate-level waste fi-
nally disposed of was 5,898 m³ at the end of 2014. 
The total increase of volume from 2013 is 217 m³. 
Approximately 95 % of the waste has been finally 
disposed of.
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Production Department to the Nuclear Safety De-
partment. TVO implemented the organisational re-
form to better manage all of the Group’s projects 
and to manage all demanding modification projects 
in a centralised manner.
As part of the development of its management 
processes, TVO has introduced new scorecards that 
comply with its new business model and measure 
changes. The development work has also involved 
training of supervisors. TVO is not using process 
indicators yet, but development of the indicators is 
underway.
A periodic self-assessment of the safety cul-
ture has been performed, and responsibilities and 
schedules for the changes to be implemented have 
been determined. The recommendations include 
studying the underlying cause for the low response 
rate to a personnel survey, paying attention in 
creating an atmosphere at work that does not in-
clude any laying of blame, as well as increasing the 
recognition, training and use of tools for managing 
human errors.
A resource management development project 
aimed at streamlining the operations, for example. 
TVO has introduced a competence centre model 
that can be used to standardise ways of working 
and evening out the workload. STUK has demand-
ed that TVO determine the role of the competence 
centres in more detail and communicate the role to 
the personnel.
TVO has reformed its internal auditing pro-
gramme to make it more comprehensive. The audit-
ing programme was changed from a process-centred 
study to a study that mainly focuses on activities. 
The programme extends until the year 2020. During 
the first quarter of 2015, TVO must report to STUK 
how it plans to ensure that the internal auditing 
programme supports the assessment of the process-
based management system.
Over the course of the year, TVO performed 
supplier audits. STUK also participated in some of 
them as an observer.
In 2014, STUK approved the following people 
required by the Nuclear Energy Act: a deputy of 
the person responsible for emergency prepared-
ness, a deputy of the person responsible for nuclear 
security, two people responsible for the safeguards 
of nuclear materials, a person responsible for inter-
national transfers and a deputy of the responsible 
director in charge of operation. The people respon-
sible for emergency preparedness and nuclear 
security will be the deputies during both construc-
tion and operation.
STUK oversaw the oral examinations of shift 
personnel where the shift managers, operators and 
trainee operators prove that they are competent in 
all key issues related to plant operation and safety. 
In 2014, STUK granted 34 licenses to shift manag-
ers and operators on application by the power com-
pany and following a successful oral examination, 
eight of them to new operators. In addition, an ex-
tension of four months without an oral examination 
was granted for one shift manager license. TVO ap-
plied for the extension because the person will retire 
soon after the expiration of the license and a new 
oral examination was thus deemed unnecessary. 
STUK granted the extension because the person’s 
results in previous examinations have been good. 
All the participants passed their examinations in 
2014. The new operators had good results in the ex-
amination, which is an indirect indication that the 
basic training programme is effective. The operators 
renewing their licenses also had good results in 
the examination, which, for its part, indicates that 
the power company’s refresher and supplementary 
training is effective.
4.2.8 Fire safety
Fire safety at the Olkiluoto NPP was acceptable. 
No events classified as fires occurred in the Olki-
luoto plant area in 2014. There was a minor fire 
outside the plant area at the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion site, but it petered out by itself before the 
plant fire brigade was able to respond. In 2014, 
STUK oversaw the maintenance and upkeep of the 
fire protection systems that ensure fire safety of 
the plant by means of regulatory inspections and 
by reviewing reports submitted by TVO. An inspec-
tion included in the periodic inspection programme 
and onsite inspections by the resident inspectors 
were performed onsite.
TVO continuously develops fire safety at Olki-
luoto NPP. The plant’s fire load was minimised in 
2014. Extinguishing systems in a cable room below 
the control room at Olkiluoto 1 and in some tall 
cable channels were replaced. Due to the improve-
ments demanded after the Fukushima accidents, 
portable fire water pumps that can be used in the 
containments and also to fill the fuel pools will be 
acquired for Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The NPP 
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has an appropriate fire safety training programme. 
The plant fire brigade’s duties also include fire pro-
tection at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site and in 
the Posiva NPPs.
4.2.9 Operating experience feedback
STUK assessed the operating experience feedback 
activities and corrective measures on the basis of 
reports, regulatory inspections and inspections 
within the periodic inspection programme.
In 2014, a total of 63 reported events that in-
cluded measures took place at Olkiluoto NPP. Re-
garding the events in 2014, fourteen transient and 
event reports were submitted to STUK for infor-
mation and three special reports were submitted 
for approval. All of the events warranting a special 
report involved an event that was non-compliant 
with the OLC. The special reports were drafted 
and submitted to STUK in compliance with the re-
quirements. The events warranting a special report 
are described in more detail in Appendix 3.
In 2014, one event classified as Level 1 on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) took 
place at Olkiluoto NPP (the replacing of generator 
carbon grounding brushes during power opera-
tion). The licensee has decided to draft a root cause 
analysis on the events involving hoisting devices.
In the operating experience feedback inspec-
tion, STUK verified methods, procedures and 
new practices related to the operations. There 
are development actions in progress in both the 
internal and external operating experience activi-
ties at Olkiluoto NPP. Despite personnel changes, 
operations were found to be well organised and 
instructed, and had adequate resources. The oper-
ating experience feedback team meets every two 
weeks. The team discusses experience feedback 
from Finland and from abroad, as well as the 
utilisation of the feedback in the improvement of 
operations.
Of all the recent events at Olkiluoto, STUK 
decided to draft one new report on problems with 
the cracks at the pipeline mixing points at Olki-
luoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 for the International Re-
porting System for Operating Experience (IRS) 
maintained by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). In addition, STUK saved in the 
IAEA database a report on the cracks of stator 
welds observed during periodic maintenance of the 
emergency diesel generators at Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2013.
Olkiluoto NPP uses methods to assess and uti-
lise operating experience from other plants. TVO 
has utilised Nordic cooperation in the preselection 
of reports from the World Association of Nuclear Op-
erators (WANO), the IRS database maintained by 
the IAEA and reports from the plants in the United 
States. TVO continues to develop methods and pro-
cedures for operating experience feedback activities 
during construction and commissioning.
4.2.10 Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
Occupational radiation safety
STUK carried out a radiation protection inspec-
tion as part of the periodic inspection programme 
of Olkiluoto NPP, focusing on radiation measure-
ments in particular. The scope of the inspection 
included the environmental radiation monitor-
ing programme and the instruments intended for 
measuring radiation at the plant. Special attention 
was paid to the representativeness of radiation 
measuring and analyses, as well as the environ-
mental monitoring programme. STUK required 
after the inspection that the power company up-
date its final safety analysis report and its internal 
guidelines pertaining to environmental radiation 
protection.
The dosimeters used for measuring the occupa-
tional radiation doses underwent annual tests. The 
tests comprised irradiating a sample of dosimeters 
at STUK’s measurement standard laboratory and 
reading the doses onsite. The test results showed 
that the plant’s dosimeters are in working order.
STUK carried out targeted radiation protection 
inspections during the annual outages at the Olki-
luoto plant units. Radiation protection activities 
of the plant’s radiation protection personnel and 
employees within the controlled area were assessed 
during these inspections. Based on the inspection 
results, radiation protection at the NPP is good: 
no major defects were observed. Individual devel-
opment targets were observed in the inspections, 
concerning the use of personal protective equipment 
in the controlled area, radiation protection mark-
ings and transfers related to the reactor’s feedwater 
dividers.
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Radiation doses
In 2014, Olkiluoto 1 underwent a maintenance out-
age and Olkiluoto 2 a refueling outage. The oc-
cupational radiation doses of nuclear power plant 
workers mostly accumulate during work carried 
out during annual outages. The radiation levels 
of both plant units’ turbine islands continued to 
decrease due to new moisture separators that were 
installed in 2005–2007.
The highest individual radiation dose accumu-
lated was 3.1 mSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 3.9 mSv at 
Olkiluoto 2. The highest individual dose incurred 
during the entire year was 7.7 mSv. This dose was 
caused by cleaning work. The highest individual 
radiation doses have been less than 10 mSv during 
the last eight years.
The radiation doses for plant employees re-
mained below the individual dose limits. The effec-
tive dose for a worker from radiation work may not 
exceed the 20 manSv/year average over any period 
of five years, or 50 manSv during any single year.
The collective occupational dose of employees 
for the entire year was 0.40 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 
and 0.24  manSv at Olkiluoto  2. Due to improve-
ments in radiation safety, the collective occupa-
tional radiation dose of Olkiluoto employees was 
the lowest ever recorded during the operation of 
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Figure 14. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
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Figure 15. Annual radiation doses to the most exposed person of the public since the start of operation of the 
Olkiluoto units 1 and 2. Over the recent years, the doses calculated based on the radioactive discharges has 
remained below one percent of the set limit, 0.1 milliSv.
Table 4. NPP originated radioactive nuclides found 
in the environmental samples of the Olkiluoto power 
plant in 2014.
Sample types containing detected radionuclides. Figures indicate  
the number of positive samples in a sample group. Several different 
nuclides may be found in the same sample..
Radionuclide
Type of sample
Mn-54 Co-60 Total
Air 2 2
Aquatic plants 2 6 8
Perifyton 2 4 6
Sedimenting materials 10 10
Sediment 4 4
Rainwater 1 1
Dumping ground ditch water 1 1
Total 4 27 31
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the NPP. The collective radiation dose of employees 
due to operations during the outage at Olkiluoto 1 
was 0.33 manSv, and the collective radiation dose 
due to operations during the outage at Olkiluoto 2 
was 0.19 manSv. The collective occupational radia-
tion doses of employees in Olkiluoto were clearly 
lower than the average doses of employees working 
in boiling water reactors in OECD countries.
According to the YVL Guide issued by STUK, 
the threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose av-
eraged over two successive years is 2.5 manSv per 
one gigawatt of net electrical power. This means an 
average annual dose value of 2.20 manSv per Olki-
luoto plant unit. This threshold was not exceeded 
at either of the units.
The radiation dose distribution of employees at 
the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs in 2014 is given in 
Appendix 2.
Radioactive releases and environmental 
radiation monitoring
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
Olkiluoto NPP remained well below the authorised 
annual limits in 2014. No releases of radioactive 
noble gases into the environment were detected. 
Releases of iodine into the air were approximately 
0.3  MBq (as I-131-equivalent activity), which is 
approximately 0.0002% of the set limit. Releases 
through the vent stack into the air also includ-
ed radioactive particulate matter amounting to 
7  MBq, tritium amounting to 0.7  TBq and car-
bon-14 amounting to approximately 0.8 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid effluents released 
into the sea, 1.6 TBq, was around 9% of the annual 
release limit. The total activity of other radionu-
clides released into the sea was 77 MBq, which is 
approximately 0.03% of the plant location-specific 
release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
around 0.05 µSv, i.e. less than 0.05% of the set lim-
it (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c). An average person 
living in Finland receives the equivalent radiation 
dose from radiation sources in nature and in space 
in about 20 minutes.
A total of around 300 samples were collected 
and analysed from the land and marine environ-
ment surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant in 
2014. External background radiation and the ex-
posure to radioactivity of people in the vicinity 
of the NPP were also regularly measured. Min-
ute amounts of radioactive substances originating 
from the nuclear power plant were observed in 
some of the analysed environmental samples. The 
amounts were so small that they are insignificant 
in terms of people’s radiation exposure.
4.2.11 Emergency preparedness
STUK oversees the capability of the emergency 
preparedness organisations of nuclear power 
plants to act under abnormal conditions. No events 
requiring emergency response actions occurred at 
Olkiluoto NPP in 2013.
Emergency preparedness at Olkiluoto NPP 
complies with the key requirements. STUK’s in-
spection of the emergency preparedness arrange-
ments at Olkiluoto NPP, which is part of the peri-
odic inspection programme, was implemented in 
April 2014. It focused on the emergency prepared-
ness organisation, drills, alarm arrangements, the 
environmental monitoring system, meteorological 
measurements at the plant site, drafting of spread-
ing forecasts and planning of emergency prepar-
edness operations at Olkiluoto 3. STUK required 
after the inspection a test on how well the alarms 
that are used to alert the general population can be 
heard indoors in the accommodation village and an 
update of the materials used when assessing the 
size of accident releases due to the transfer of the 
environmental monitoring system stations. Some 
of the measures pertaining to emergency prepar-
edness that were required after the Fukushima 
accident have been completed and others are being 
implemented. The amended Government Decree 
on Emergency Response Arrangements at Nuclear 
Power Plants (VNA 716/2013) entered into force 
in October 2013. Some of the new requirements of 
the Government Decree have been met, while the 
details of others will be specified in the implemen-
tation decision of Guide YVL C.5 in 2015.
The Olkiluoto 3 construction site did not influ-
ence TVO’s emergency preparedness operations to 
any great extent.
In the autumn, an extensive two-part coop-
eration drill, OLKI 14, was arranged at Olkiluoto 
NPP. In addition to the NPP, around sixty private 
organisations, as well as central, regional and lo-
cal administration organisations participated in 
the drill. The first part of the drill was arranged 
in September. It involved rehearsing the man-
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agement of an accident with the help of maps. A 
release generated during the first part of the drill 
was used as the scenario for the second part of the 
drill. The second part was the first drill in Finland 
on extensive preparation for the management after 
an accident and the required measures.
4.2.12 Nuclear security
In 2014, STUK completed two inspections of nu-
clear security that were included in the scope of 
the periodic inspection programme. An inspection 
dubbed Nuclear security as part of the manage-
ment system focused on procedures used to man-
age the risks caused by illegal activities as part 
of the company’s comprehensive risk management 
process, the processing of nuclear security non-
conformances and observations, as well as the pro-
cessing of nuclear security issues in management 
reviews. The inspection covered both nuclear secu-
rity and information security. TVO has developed 
its risk management in the past few years based 
on the inspection results, and risk management is 
now systematic. Non-conformances and observa-
tions are processed in an established manner and 
continuous development occurs in, for instance, 
processing nuclear security non-conformances as 
commensurably and systematically as possible in 
the organisation’s normal system for processing 
non-conformances and observations while tak-
ing into account confidentiality issues. STUK de-
manded that TVO continue the development of the 
process used to identify risks pertaining to illegal 
activities in all of the organisation’s operations as 
well as the management of non-conformances and 
observations pertaining to nuclear security and 
information security as a whole.
A second inspection focused on the technical 
implementation of nuclear security. The inspection 
covered all of the surveillance systems and proce-
dures that are part of nuclear security at Olkiluoto 
NPP. During the inspection visit, STUK inspected 
access control arrangements of a new work permit 
office and monitored the on-call operations of the 
alarm centre. One issue that needs to be updated 
in the safety organisation’s security instructions 
was observed during the inspection.
STUK also inspected nuclear security of the 
spent fuel storage facility as part of the commis-
sioning inspection of the extension. TVO provided 
information on planned supplements to other ar-
rangements. STUK deemed the plans good.
In an inspection of the transport of fresh fuel, 
STUK verified that the arrangements complied 
with the requirements.
4.2.13 Safeguards of nuclear materials
A total of 18 inspections of TVO’s operating plants 
and the spent fuel storage facility were performed. 
STUK performed, together with the IAEA and the 
European Commission, inspections on the physical 
inventory of nuclear materials at both plant units 
and the spent nuclear fuel storage facility both 
before and after the annual outages. The amount of 
nuclear material in the spent nuclear fuel storage 
facility was separately verified because the verifi-
cation could not be implemented simultaneously 
with the reactor units due to the construction of 
the extension. Furthermore, STUK inspected the 
locations of the fuel assemblies in the reactor prior 
to the closing of the reactor cover at Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2. STUK also performed two safe-
guards of nuclear materials inservice inspections 
at Olkiluoto 1 and one at the spent fuel storage 
facility.
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Figure 16. Amounts of uranium and plutonium at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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STUK approved TVO’s records of international 
transport of nuclear fuel and the nuclear material 
manual that provides instructions on regulatory 
activities. At the end of 2014, TVO submitted to 
STUK for approval a nuclear material manual on 
material balance areas of Olkiluoto 1, Olkiluoto 2 
and the spent fuel storage facility as well as other 
operations by TVO pertaining to nuclear materi-
als. It complies with the requirements of the new 
Guide YVL D.1, and its processing will be contin-
ued in 2015.
4.3 Regulatory oversight of the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3
4.3.1 Overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3
The overall safety assessment of Olkiluoto 3 dis-
cusses the observations made by STUK on the 
basis of a review of plans, the oversight of manu-
facturing, construction, installation and commis-
sioning operations, results of the construction in-
spection programme during construction, oversight 
of the plant supplier and its subcontractors, and 
experience acquired as a result of interactions be-
tween STUK, TVO and the plant supplier.
The most important open issue regarding plant 
design is instrumentation and control (I&C). Over 
the course of the year, the licensing of I&C pro-
ceeded well as STUK approved the overall I&C 
plan, i.e. architecture , and found that the analyses 
of active failures were acceptable. STUK required 
some changes in the architecture but the required 
changes are so minor that the plan could be ac-
cepted.
STUK had already requested TVO take into 
account the possibility of failures in the I&C sys-
tem software and possible consequences of such 
failures when assessing the implementation of 
the plant’s general design bases. In 2014, STUK 
approved the method used for the analyses and 
reviewed the analyses themselves. STUK did not 
have any remarks concerning the scope or results 
of the analyses. Some modification needs in the 
control of components have been identified based 
on the analyses.
The plant supplier started test bay testing of 
the I&C systems in early April. STUK participated 
in some of the test kick-off meetings and visited 
the test bay to observe the tests. STUK reviewed 
and accepted the system testing plans.
The licensee submitted to STUK for approval 
several failure mode and effects analyses on pro-
cess and electricity systems, as well as piping load-
ing descriptions. Some updates and supplements to 
system and component plans were submitted. Most 
of the plans have been of a high quality. The licen-
see has also started to submit its own inspection 
memorandums in connection with key materials to 
demonstrate the scope of the licensee’s inspections 
and the conclusions made.
Installation activity at the Olkiluoto 3 construc-
tion site slowed down starting in early 2014. Manu-
facture and installation of the emergency diesel 
generator auxiliary system pipelines was almost 
the only work that was still ongoing in 2014. Modi-
fications of the already installed I&C and electri-
cal cabling due to supplemented plans started in 
the autumn. The fact that the construction site is 
restarted will bring new organisations and employ-
ees to the construction site, which is why the plant 
supplier and TVO must make sure that they handle 
the project and its safety in a systematic manner. 
In connection with an inspection, STUK demanded 
a plan on preparation for the reopening of the con-
struction site.
Pressure and leak tightness tests of the con-
tainment took place at the nuclear island in Febru-
ary. STUK closely monitored the preparation for 
the tests and conducted an inspection on meeting 
the prerequisites for the tests prior to the test-
ing. STUK oversaw testing onsite with the help 
of experts from VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland. The tests were implemented according to 
plan and on schedule, and the test results clearly 
met the acceptance criteria. STUK has reviewed 
and approved some of the test reports but a final 
summary report of the test results was not sub-
mitted to STUK by the end of the year. STUK has 
expressed its concern regarding the long drafting 
times of test result reports in several connections.
In 2014, STUK ordered a preliminary report on 
the safety culture during commissioning of Olki-
luoto 3. The report focused on potential threats 
and any operating methods of the organisation 
that could compromise safety at the commissioning 
stage. Challenges highlighted in the report includ-
ed the highly complex stage during the lifecycle of 
the plant and the fact that open items and devia-
tions from the construction stage tend to cumulate. 
Issues that were deemed especially challenging 
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included potential slow processing of unexpected 
events and people focusing only on their own work 
in a very narrow sector. The results will assist 
STUK in targeting its regulatory oversight to the 
key issues and challenges during the commission-
ing stage.
To ease the workload at the operating license 
stage, STUK began at TVO’s request a pre-review 
of the operating license application documents 
before the submittal of the actual application. The 
documents submitted for pre-review must form a 
logical entity, and represent the final plant design. 
In 2014, a chapter of the final safety analysis re-
port on the reactor, parts of a chapter on accident 
analyses and the plant’s operational limits and 
conditions were submitted to STUK for pre-review. 
STUK presented to TVO its observations regarding 
the chapter on the reactor. The other pre-review 
documents were still being reviewed at the end of 
the year. STUK ordered comparison analyses to 
verify correctness of the plant supplier’s accident 
analyses. No major discrepancies were observed in 
the results of the analyses made. More comparison 
analyses will be made in 2015.
Based on the construction inspection pro-
gramme and other oversight activities by STUK, 
the methods, operations and adequacy of TVO’s or-
ganisation have mainly been found to be at a good 
level, for example as far as the commissioning of 
the plant is concerned. During construction, TVO 
and the plant supplier have taken into account 
modification needs that have emerged as design of 
the various areas of technology has become more 
detailed. Deficiencies detected in manufacturing 
and installation have either been corrected so that 
the original quality requirements are met, or it has 
been demonstrated by means of additional inspec-
tions or analyses that the requirements are met. In 
summary, based on the results of regulatory over-
sight, STUK is able to state that the original safety 
targets of the plant can be achieved.
4.3.2 Design
Plant and system design
STUK continued to review the detailed design of 
process systems, support systems and electricity 
systems. STUK has approved most of the process 
system, support system and electricity system de-
signs, but some ventilation system plans still need 
to be updated before the operating license stage. 
Furthermore, TVO announced that the plant sup-
plier will make some additional plant system modi-
fications that may require STUK’s approval.
The most important open point of plant design 
is the plant’s I&C systems. In the spring of 2014, 
STUK approved the overall I&C plan or the I&C 
architecture. STUK issued requirements regard-
ing the plan but they were so minor that the plan 
could be approved. The requirements concerned 
for example the independence of a system used in 
the management of severe accidents from other 
systems and alarms on I&C failures. After the ap-
proval, STUK started reviewing the technical I&C 
materials. The technical materials include system 
requirement specifications and system descrip-
tions, as well as testing plans. STUK has processed 
some old versions of the technical materials in the 
past but now all the materials have been rewritten 
to comply with the processes approved by STUK.
The plant supplier started test bay testing of 
the I&C systems in early April. STUK participated 
in some of the test kick-off meetings and visited 
the test bay to observe the tests a couple of times. 
STUK approved TVO’s application to test the pri-
ority management system directly onsite. The pri-
ority management system ensures that controls of 
a higher safety class will bypass controls of lower 
safety classes.
The qualification of I&C components continued 
to proceed slowly; STUK did not receive many 
applications. Qualification ensures that the com-
ponents will operate as planned under all the con-
ditions determined for them, including potential 
accidents. The components may not be installed 
before their qualification has been approved.
Fault analyses of plant and system design
The key issue regarding fault analyses in 2014 was 
the processing of active I&C faults. The term “ac-
tive fault” refers to an I&C transient where unnec-
essary or erroneous control signals or messages are 
sent to process components, electrical devices or 
other I&C components. In 2013, STUK demanded 
that the possibility of such faults be surveyed and 
the consequences of such faults be analysed. In 
March 2014, TVO submitted to STUK a description 
of a method based on which the analyses will be 
conducted. STUK did not consider the method suf-
ficient and demanded some supplements. STUK’s 
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requirements had been taken into account in the 
updated method description that was submitted 
to STUK in July. STUK received the analyses per-
formed using this method for review in October. 
Some modification needs in the control of compo-
nents, such as the control of the I&C rooms ven-
tilation system, have been identified based on the 
analyses. STUK did not have any remarks concern-
ing the scope or results of the analyses.
STUK approved all of the updated failure mode 
and effects analyses on electricity systems and 
components, and nearly all of the failure mode 
and effects analyses on process systems. However, 
STUK demanded that the process system analyses 
be supplemented with a review of vent and drain 
valve faults, as necessary. Before the operating li-
cense stage, TVO must submit analyses on systems 
whose design has been changed.
STUK reviewed an update of the plant’s com-
mon-cause failure and diversity analysis regarding 
process and support systems. STUK approved the 
analysis but required some corrections and checks. 
Since the required corrections are minor, taking 
them into account in the operating license applica-
tion documents will suffice.
STUK also inspected some flood analyses in 
2014. No significant deficiencies were found in the 
analyses.
Transient and accident analyses
The transient and accident analyses included in 
the final safety analysis report of Olkiluoto 3 were 
submitted to STUK for a pre-review in late 2014. 
Most of the submitted analyses are the same as 
those already unofficially submitted in 2012 to as-
sist in the review of analysis methodology reports. 
STUK ordered comparison analyses of the accident 
analyses to verify correctness of the plant sup-
plier’s accident analyses. No major discrepancies 
were observed in the results of the analyses made. 
More comparison analyses will be made in 2015.
Probabilistic risk assessments
An updated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for 
Olkiluoto 3 was not submitted to STUK in 2014. The 
review of the PRA and its reference materials focused 
on ensuring meeting of the key design principles in 
the detailed system and structure design materials 
and their updates. Furthermore, STUK pursued to 
ensure that the content and up-to-dateness of the 
materials regarding the PRA and its applications 
that are to be submitted as appendices to the operat-
ing license application, are in compliance with the 
requirement level laid down in the YVL Guides.
Radiation safety
A radiation protection inspection included in the 
construction inspection programme was carried 
out in 2014. The inspection focused on commis-
sioning of the area that will be the plant unit’s con-
trolled area, TVO’s experiences and observations 
regarding meeting of the radiation protection re-
quirements and status of the radiation measuring 
system. STUK required after the inspection that 
the power company submit a plan which describes 
the procedures that will be used when commission-
ing the plant unit’s controlled area and implement-
ing the licensee’s commissioning inspection.
In 2014, STUK approved a report by TVO on 
radiation protection of a fuel transfer tube in 
between the reactor building and the fuel build-
ing as well as a report on the impact of changed 
consistency of the high-density concrete used at 
Olkiluoto 3 on radiation safety. In connection with 
the suitability assessment of electrical and I&C 
equipment, STUK reviewed compliance with re-
quirements regarding the radiation resistance of 
equipment in normal operation and during acci-
dents. At the licensee’s request, the deadlines for 
updating several radiation measurement system 
design documents were postponed in 2014.
Plant fire safety
STUK has demanded that the fire hazard analyses 
be updated to comply with the final plant design. 
In 2014, STUK demanded from TVO a report on 
cable types and the quantity of cables as laid down 
in final design. STUK will use the report when as-
sessing whether cable fire tests and analyses by 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, which 
were made to support a previous inspection by 
STUK, can still be used. The fire hazard analyses 
must be updated and representativeness of com-
parison analyses must be studied before submit-
ting the operating license application.
Design of components and structures
In 2014, the plant supplier focused its resources in 
finalising plant and system design and reduced the 
resources allocated to detailed component design. 
STUK-B 191
65
4.3 ConstruCtion of olkiluoto 3
Thus, STUK received clearly fewer design docu-
ments than in the previous years. Most of the sub-
mitted component design documents were linked 
to updates of construction plans or pipeline design 
documents. Final loading descriptions of nuclear 
island piping systems were assessed in the au-
tumn of 2014. Approved loading descriptions are 
required before final piping stress analyses.
STUK continued the review of design docu-
ments for steel platforms. In contrast to the origi-
nal plans, the safety significance of the steel plat-
forms has increased because process piping and 
equipment important to safety will be supported 
on them. The steel platforms have been approved 
for component installation purposes after construc-
tion inspections done in stages. Compliance with 
the requirements set by plant operation will be 
confirmed before the final commissioning of the 
steel platforms. STUK has implemented inspec-
tion visits to verify that TVO’s inspections have 
progressed in line with the approved procedure. 
STUK will review the final design documents of 
steel platforms before starting its own commission-
ing inspections where compliance with the require-
ments will be ultimately verified.
4.3.3 Construction
Except for some final touches, construction work 
on the Olkiluoto 3 buildings is completed. In 2014, 
STUK oversaw the installation of the steel plat-
forms.
In January 2014, STUK concluded the first 
stage of commissioning inspections on the contain-
ment base plate, the interior concrete structures, 
the concrete part of the containment wall and 
structural engineering monitoring systems of the 
containment.
The procedures to determine readiness to start 
commissioning inspections have proven functional. 
These procedures have served to ensure that the 
plant supplier and TVO have inspected and ap-
proved the structures and their testing plans be-
fore STUK is invited to complete its inspections.
4.3.4 Manufacture of components and piping
Some of the Olkiluoto 3 valves, pipeline flow meas-
uring components and flow limiters had not been 
manufactured yet in 2014. STUK oversaw their 
manufacture by means of inspection visits to the 
manufacturers’ facilities.
Furthermore, the manufacture of the emergen-
cy diesel generator auxiliary system pipelines also 
continued in 2014. In early 2014, manufacturing 
operations were interrupted to study quality prob-
lems detected in prefabricated pipes.
4.3.5 Installation
The plant supplier almost completely discontinued 
installation work at the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
site in 2014, except for the work on the diesel 
building pipings.
An extensive modification of cabling was started 
in the nuclear island in the autumn of 2014. In this 
modification, the I&C cables of the plant will be 
updated to comply with the current design status. 
In 2014, the cabling modification consisted of dis-
mantling cables to be removed. The installation of 
new cables will start in 2015. STUK oversaw the 
dismantling of cables onsite in connection with its 
site visits. Implementation plans on the disman-
tling were also covered in construction inspection 
programme inspections on electricity systems. No 
major non-conformances were observed in the plans 
or implementation of the work.
STUK inspected TVO’s installation supervision 
in several inspections carried out in accordance 
with the construction inspection programme and 
in connection with regulatory activities onsite to 
verify the sufficiency of TVO’s supervision methods. 
During daily oversight, compliance with approved 
procedures was monitored, among other things.
4.3.6 Commissioning
Commissioning tests of 
equipment and systems
Pressure and leak tightness tests of the contain-
ment took place at the reactor island in Febru-
ary. STUK closely monitored the preparation for 
the tests and conducted an inspection on meeting 
the prerequisites for the tests prior to the testing. 
STUK oversaw the tests onsite. The tests were im-
plemented according to plan and on schedule, and 
the test results clearly met the acceptance criteria. 
STUK has reviewed and approved some of the test 
reports but a final summary report of the test 
results was not submitted to STUK by the end of 
the year. STUK has expressed its concern regard-
ing the long drafting times of test result reports in 
several connections.
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In addition to the tests in the containment, 
testing of the building technology systems (such 
as telephone systems, fire detection systems and 
lighting systems) has also continued in the reactor 
island. The other parts of nuclear island commis-
sioning will not be continued until the operational 
I&C has been installed.
Testing of equipment and systems in the tur-
bine island continued. All the tests that can be 
completed without the nuclear island were com-
pleted over the course of the year. STUK monitored 
selected tests. Corrosion damage was observed in 
the circulating water piping and related compo-
nents (such as heat exchangers) in the turbine is-
land. Based on the observations made, the turbine 
island supplier, Siemens, conducted extensive in-
spections of the turbine island piping and repaired 
any damage observed. It is assumed that the dam-
age was caused by the protective coating on the 
inside of the pipes being thinner than planned, 
damage incurred during installation and the fact 
that the electronic corrosion protection for the pip-
ing was not used when the piping was filled with 
water because it generates hydrogen and hydrogen 
cannot be vented from the piping if the water is not 
circulating. STUK has requested a report on the 
underlying causes of the damage. The damage in 
the turbine island is not significant in terms of the 
plant’s nuclear or radiation safety, but the underly-
ing causes must be studied in order to learn from 
the mistakes and prevent similar problems at any 
points that are important to safety.
Inspecting of commissioning test programmes 
is an important element of STUK’s regulatory 
work. Only a few commissioning test programmes 
were submitted to STUK for review in 2014. Most 
of them were updated versions of programmes that 
had already been reviewed before. Only a few test 
programmes were submitted to STUK because 
most of the reactor island system test programmes 
will not be updated until the detailed I&C design 
has been completed. Furthermore, TVO has an-
nounced that most of the already approved test 
programmes will be revised, which means that 
they have to be resubmitted to STUK for approval.
Preparations for future 
operation of the plant unit
In addition to technical trial runs, commissioning 
also includes verification of the organisation’s ca-
pability to operate the plant in a safe manner. The 
prerequisites of safe operation include an adequate 
number of licensed operators and the necessary 
plant documentation, such as procedures and the 
operational limits and conditions.
An inspection included in the construction in-
spection programme in November 2014 focused on 
operator training and status of plant procedures. 
Simulator training for trainee operators has not 
been started yet because the I&C design is still 
incomplete. A number of test cases must be run 
on the simulator before operator training can be 
started. The trial runs will be performed to assess 
whether the simulator describes the plant accu-
rately enough for it to be used in training.
The preparation of plant procedures and the op-
erational limits and conditions, as well as the vali-
dation of operating procedures, the control room 
and human-machine interfaces have also been 
delayed because the I&C design is still incomplete. 
Drafting of plant procedures is proceeding, how-
ever, and most draft versions have been completed. 
The operational limits and conditions, except for 
the I&C part, have been submitted to STUK for 
pre-review.
4.3.7 Reviewing documents related to 
operating license application
STUK has agreed with TVO that STUK may re-
view parts of the operating license application doc-
uments before the delivery of the actual operating 
license application. The pre-review will balance the 
workload of the various parties as completed the-
matic sections can be reviewed in advance. The 
documents submitted for pre-review must form a 
logical entity, and represent the final plant design. 
As a result of the pre-review, STUK will present 
a decision including potential observations and 
requests for further clarifications. The pre-review 
also functions as practice for the review procedures 
planned for the operating license stage. All the 
documents that are delivered to STUK in connec-
tion with the operating license application will be 
reviewed by STUK at the operating license stage 
as a whole, and STUK will approve their key parts 
before delivering a safety assessment and a state-
ment on the operating license application to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
The pre-review of the operating license applica-
tion documents began in 2012 with the review of 
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the methodology reports and radiological analyses 
presented in Chapter 15 of the final safety analy-
sis report. In 2014, Chapter 4 of the FSAR (Reac-
tor), parts of Chapter 15 (Accident analyses) and 
Chapter 16 (OLC) were submitted for pre-review. 
STUK completed the review of Chapter 4 in 2014 
and submitted its comments to TVO. No significant 
remarks regarding the chapter were made. At the 
end of the year, Chapters 15 and 16 were still being 
reviewed.
4.3.8 Organisational operations
Organisation
The total number of personnel working at the Olki-
luoto 3 construction site towards the end of 2014 
was around 1,100, of whom around 290 were part 
of the plant supplier’s construction site organisa-
tion and around 490 were employees of subcontrac-
tors. TVO’s project organisation consisted of pro-
ject personnel (around 50), TVO’s line organisation 
personnel (around 95) and consultants, of whom 
some worked part-time (around 170). The number 
of plant supplier and subcontractor personnel at 
the construction site clearly decreased in 2014, but 
the plant supplier has estimated that more em-
ployees will be added again in early 2015. The fact 
that the construction site is restarted will bring 
new organisations and employees to the construc-
tion site, which is why the plant supplier and TVO 
must make sure that they handle the project and 
its safety in a systematic manner.
The project organisations of both the licensee 
and the plant supplier were changed over the 
course of the year. The organisational changes 
were caused by the schedule of the remaining work 
to be done by the plant supplier, for example. The 
organisations were changed in a manner that will 
make finding a “counterpart” in the other organisa-
tion easier. The plan is to increase the amount of 
cooperation between the plant supplier and TVO. 
TVO’s organisational reform also aims at improv-
ing efficiency of the operations: responsibilities 
and roles have been clarified. STUK studied in an 
inspection included in the construction inspection 
programme how the organisational reform by TVO 
has influenced the project and thus safety. No is-
sues that compromise safety were observed in the 
inspection or any other assessments of the organi-
sational changes implemented by TVO. STUK will 
continue to monitor the sufficiency of personnel 
and the organisation’s operations under the chang-
ing conditions.
Functionality of the management system
In accordance with the project agreement, instruc-
tions provided by the plant supplier are followed 
by the Olkiluoto 3 project. The parties have ac-
cepted these instructions. In addition to the plant 
supplier’s instructions, a quality management sys-
tem drafted for the Olkiluoto 3 project controls 
TVO’s own operations. When operation of the plant 
starts, TVO will be in charge of the operation and 
safety, however. In 2014, STUK demanded from 
TVO reports on how the procedures applied to the 
Olkiluoto 3 project can be revised to correspond to 
the procedures required for an operating nuclear 
power plant. According to TVO, the separate man-
agement system for the Olkiluoto 3 project will be 
discontinued at the latest when applying for the 
operating license. At that time, the general part of 
TVO’s management manual, which has been ap-
proved by STUK, will enter into force. It will also 
be supplemented with a quality plan for the Olki-
luoto 3 project. It determines the functions and 
documentation that will be used during component 
and system installation and commissioning stages 
until the final handover of the plant unit. STUK 
has emphasised the fact that all documents per-
taining to this change must be submitted to STUK 
well before the implementation of the change.
Quality assurance and supplier monitoring
TVO’s independent quality assurance unit (QA) 
monitors quality issues of the Olkiluoto 3 project 
by processing any critical non-conformances ob-
served in the operations of the plant supplier and 
its subcontractors, product non-conformances and 
audit results, as well as by recording statistics and 
analysing information pertaining to the underlying 
causes for the non-conformances. A continued con-
cern regarding the Olkiluoto 3 project is the large 
number of open issues. Even though some issues 
were concluded over the course of the year, particu-
larly towards the end of the year, there are still a 
large number of open issues. Fewer audits pertain-
ing to the monitoring of suppliers than in the pre-
vious years were conducted in 2014. In connection 
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with previous inspections, STUK has demanded 
that the adequacy of quality assurance resources 
must be verified when replacing personnel, and 
TVO has transferred some experienced employees 
to quality assurance positions.
Safety culture
In 2014, STUK ordered a preliminary study on the 
safety culture during commissioning of Olkiluoto 
3. It focused on potential threats and any operat-
ing methods of the organisation that could com-
promise safety at the commissioning stage. The 
report studied the clarity of the division of roles 
between TVO and the plant supplier, the clarity of 
procedures and instructions, personnel turnover, 
planning of personnel resources, decision-making, 
language problems and the management of unex-
pected events. Challenges highlighted in the report 
included the highly complex stage during the life-
cycle of the plant and the fact that problems from 
the construction stage tend to cumulate. Issues 
that were deemed especially challenging included 
slow processing of unexpected events and people 
focusing only on their own work in a very narrow 
sector. The fact that the project seems temporary 
but still drags on may lead to temporary solutions, 
several interfaces, delays and high personnel turn-
over. The research results suggest that TVO should 
take on a more active role of a vanguard. The re-
sults will assist STUK in targeting its regulatory 
oversight to the key issues and challenges during 
the commissioning stage.
4.3.9 Nuclear security
Over the course of the year, STUK processed infor-
mation security plans and assessed the adequacy of 
technical and administrative information security 
control in connection with reviewing materials, site 
visits and inspections. Information security was also 
studied and assessed during a review of I&C materi-
als and during I&C test field visits. STUK observed 
some development issues pertaining to information 
security and some deficiencies in documentation.
Taking into account security issues when as-
sessing and developing the safety culture was 
studied in an inspection of quality assurance and 
the safety culture, which is part of the construc-
tion inspection programme. Some issues requiring 
development were observed.
4.3.10 Safeguards of nuclear materials
STUK performed a safeguards inspection of the 
Olkiluoto 3 design information (basic tecnical char-
acteristics) with the IAEA and the European Com-
mission. The review focused on locating the key 
issues in terms of the safeguards of nuclear ma-
terials, such as fuel storage locations and transfer 
routes. No remarks pertaining to the NPP were 
made during the inspection, but TVO was obligated 
to submit up-to-date basic technical characteristics 
document to the Commission and STUK.
4.4 New nuclear power plant projects
In 2014, STUK drafted preliminary safety reviews 
on supplementary applications for the decisions-in-
principle on Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 and TVO’s 
Olkiluoto 4 and submitted them to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy in compliance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act.
4.4.1 Olkiluoto 4
In its supplementary application, TVO applied 
for an extension of five years to the deadline for 
submitting a construction license application for 
the new nuclear power plant unit at Olkiluoto in 
compliance with the 2010 decision-in-principle. Ac-
cording to the decision-in-principle made in 2010, 
a construction license for the plant would have to 
be applied by the end of June 2015. The Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy requested from 
STUK a preliminary safety assessment in compli-
ance with the Nuclear Energy Act on TVO’s ap-
plication. STUK stated that there are no nuclear 
safety issues that would prevent the extending of 
the deadline. STUK is of the opinion that the ex-
tension requested by TVO could be used to revise 
the design of the selected plant type to meet the 
new Finnish safety rules, as well as to develop 
TVO’s expertise and management system.
4.4.2 Hanhikivi 1
In its preliminary safety assessment of the Han-
hikivi 1 plant unit of Fennovoima, STUK assessed 
whether Fennovoima could build a NPP of the 
AES-2006 type by Rosatom in a manner that meets 
the Finnish safety requirements and whether Fen-
novoima would be able to ensure safety of the NPP. 
In its preliminary safety assessment, STUK fo-
cused on issues that have changed since the origi-
nal decision-in-principle four years ago. The most 
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major changes include the plant type having been 
changed to AES-2006 as well as E.ON withdrawing 
from the project and Rosatom entering the project 
as an owner. STUK is of the opinion that these 
changes have clearly influenced the progress of the 
project and the development of the Fennovoima 
organisation, Fennovoima’s resources and Fenno-
voima’s activities. STUK also assessed the Fen-
novoima management system, organisation and 
expertise also in terms of the preparation for the 
construction license stage.
In its preliminary safety assessment, STUK 
stated that an AES-2006 nuclear power plant can 
be constructed in a manner that meets the Finn-
ish safety requirements at the location indicated 
by Fennovoima, Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki. STUK paid 
attention in issues where compliance with the Finn-
ish safety requirements would require changes in 
plant design, such as provisions for an airplane 
crash, internal floods, fires and severe accidents. 
Furthermore, STUK identified other technical de-
tails that would require further analyses or tests at 
the construction license stage. STUK also stated in 
the preliminary safety assessment that Fennovoima 
will need expertise and will have to take action al-
ready before the next license stage, i.e. the submit-
ting of the construction license application, in order 
to change the design so that it meets the require-
ments and draft the documentation to be submitted 
to STUK. STUK is of the opinion that Fennovoima 
must improve its expertise and develop its manage-
ment system in order to be capable to assess and en-
sure the safety of a new NPP, as well as to draft the 
construction license materials to be submitted to 
STUK. In its statement to the Ministry of Employ-
ment and the Economy, STUK questioned whether 
the company could submit comprehensive documen-
tation to STUK simultaneously with submitting the 
construction license application to the Government. 
STUK stated that this issue must be taken into ac-
count when planning the creation of the materials 
to be submitted to STUK at the construction license 
stage and their schedule, as well as when assessing 
the duration of the construction license stage.
STUK and Fennovoima arranged several meet-
ings on various themes, such as plant technology, 
the preliminary safety assessment, nuclear waste 
management, safeguards of nuclear materials, civil 
engineering, planning of licensing, management 
systems and seismology. The significance of thor-
ough licensing planning was emphasised in both 
project meetings and the themed meetings. Fen-
novoima has faced some challenges in its licensing 
planning. Submission of the first version of the 
licensing plan to STUK was postponed from early 
autumn 2014 to 2015.
STUK monitored the development of Fennovo-
ima’s management system and quality assurance, 
and assessed the company’s organisational resourc-
es to begin construction of a nuclear power plant. 
In the discussions, STUK aimed at improving the 
company’s expertise. Furthermore, STUK’s experts 
participated as observers in audits of the plant 
supplier and its subcontractors arranged by Fenno-
voima. The Fennovoima supplier audit programme 
was mostly completed in late 2014.
Unlike expected by STUK, Fennovoima did not 
send a large quantity of documents to STUK for 
advance approval. By virtue of an amendment of 
section 55 of the Nuclear Energy Act that entered 
into force in the autumn of 2012, STUK can launch 
the approval procedure of components and struc-
tures before a construction license decision has been 
made. STUK can also pre-review plant and system 
level documents.
STUK processed Fennovoima’s nuclear security 
by means of reviewing documents and participated 
as an observer in the plant supplier audit. STUK 
processed documents pertaining to the processing 
and delivery methods of safety classified and con-
fidential information, and approved a new status 
proposed by Fennovoima for the processing of safety 
classified information.
4.4.3 STUK’s preparation for plant projects
In 2014, STUK started its preparations for the 
processing of the construction license applications 
for the new plants. The plan is to establish pro-
ject-specific workgroups within STUK to coordi-
nate and partially also process issues pertaining 
to their dedicated project. Some expert resources 
were tied up in the processing of supplements to 
the decisions-in-principle and related preliminary 
safety assessments, and these experts could not 
participate in the preparation. On the other hand, 
processing of the new plant type proposed by Fen-
novoima provided STUK with more understanding 
of the plant and how its design would meet the 
Finnish safety requirements at the time of the ap-
plication being submitted.
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dated nuclear waste management plan for the re-
search reactor to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy in June 2014. The document includes 
a preliminary plan on decommissioning the reac-
tor, handling and intermediate storage of the de-
commissioning waste. By request of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, STUK submitted a 
statement on the nuclear waste management plan 
on 28 November 2014. In this statement, STUK 
emphasised the importance of a systematic study 
on how the final disposal of the decommissioning 
waste should be managed.
VTT started an environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA) procedure for the reactor’s decommis-
sioning by submitting an EIA programme to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy on 6 No-
vember 2013. STUK submitted a statement on the 
EIA programme to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy on 13 January 2014. Based on 
the EIA programme, VTT prepared an EIA report, 
and STUK issued its statement on the report on 
18 December 2014. In its statements, in addition 
to the safe operation of the research reactor, STUK 
paid special attention to more specific planning 
of the demolition and more specific planning of 
nuclear waste management during the decommis-
sioning stage.
There are safety requirements for decommis-
sioning in the Nuclear Energy Act, acts and decrees 
on the use of radiation and the YVL Guides. A new 
YVL Guide, YVL D.4, deals with the decommission-
ing of nuclear facilities. It entered into force on 1 
December 2013 for new nuclear facilities. The plan 
is to extend the Guide to cover FiR 1 based on a de-
cision by STUK in 2015. The Guide states that the 
licensee must, for example, submit a final decom-
missioning plan to STUK for approval.
Safeguards of nuclear materials
In 2014, STUK conducted one inspection of nuclear 
material inventory together with the European 
Commission.
Nuclear security
STUK implemented an inspection of the research 
reactor that is included in the periodic inspection 
programme and oversaw the implementation of 
nuclear security. STUK approved a deputy of the 
person responsible for nuclear security.
STUK launched requirement management de-
velopment projects VAHA-A and VAHA-B to create 
the prerequisites for proving compliance with re-
quirements in the license procedures in compliance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act. VAHA-A includes the 
determination of attributes for each of the around 
8,000 requirements in the YVL Guides. The at-
tribute determination process is very extensive. In 
addition to the STUK experts, experts of the power 
companies participate in the work. The requirement 
attributes will allow STUK to specify interpretation 
of the requirements and achieve the prerequisites 
needed to utilise requirement management working 
methods. In VAHA-B, STUK will determine, acquire 
and commission a requirement management tool. 
Due to the high workload, the original deadline for 
the VAHA-A project’s attributes was postponed from 
the autumn of 2014 to the spring of 2015.
4.4.4 Safeguards of nuclear materials
Including the safeguard requirements in the design 
and construction of new plants as early on as possi-
ble is important both in terms of the operator’s own 
supervision activities and the safeguards of nuclear 
materials arranged by STUK and international par-
ties. TVO submitted preliminary design information 
(i.e. the basic technical characteristics documents) 
for Olkiluoto 4 in November 2012 and Fennovoima 
submitted preliminary design data for Hanhikivi 
1 in July 2013. The European Commission issued 
Material Balance Area codes for the plants and sub-
mitted the design information to the IAEA. Thus, in-
ternational safeguards organisations have been able 
to start the planning of their regulatory actions and 
regulation of the projects. In 2014, STUK approved 
a handbook by Fennovoima on the safeguards of 
nuclear materials, which provides instructions on 
the safeguards of nuclear materials at this stage, i.e. 
mainly on procedures pertaining to data subject to 
license.
4.5 Research reactor
Decommissioning and waste management
The operating license for the research reactor 
FiR 1 is valid until the end of 2023. However, VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland has decided 
to shut down and decommission the reactor earlier 
due to financial reasons. VTT submitted an up-
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plication and submitting a statement. STUK esti-
mated that the work should be completed at the 
end of 2014. The plan was to submit STUK’s state-
ment and the safety assessment to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy in January 2015. 
This schedule could only be met if the supplements 
to the application submitted by Posiva in the au-
tumn were sufficient. The Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy approved STUK’s proposition on 
extending the processing period of the Posiva con-
struction license application. In its decision, the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy request-
ed that STUK submit its statement and the safety 
assessment by the end of January 2015, if possible.
Of the key documents included in the license 
application, STUK approved in 2014 Posiva’s man-
agement handbook, a preliminary emergency pre-
paredness plan, a report on quality assurance 
during construction, a plan on arranging regula-
tory activities necessary to prevent the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons, general inspection plans 
and a plan on a study on radiological baseline in 
the environment. Furthermore, decisions on the 
preliminary safety analysis report, a safety case, 
a proposal on a classification document, a prelimi-
nary nuclear security plan, a preliminary report on 
ageing management principles to be applied to the 
facility and a probabilistic risk assessment for the 
design stage were prepared. These decisions will 
be issued in January and February 2015. Detailed 
review reports were also prepared to support the 
decisions on the preliminary safety analysis report 
and the safety case, as well as the presentation 
memorandums.
STUK used an international group of experts 
in various fields to support the review of the safety 
case on long-term safety. STUK used plenty of 
man-hours when planning, controlling and admin-
istering their work. This was necessary for STUK 
to benefit as much as possible from the independ-
ent review work of the external experts when re-
viewing all the documents.
Sweden is almost exactly at the same point as 
Finland in its license process for a spent nuclear 
fuel disposal project. The Swedish Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (SSM) is currently pro-
cessing the license application. On 22–24 Septem-
ber 2014, STUK and SSM arranged a seminar on 
observations made during the license application 
review in Finland and Sweden, the background for 
4.6 Encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel
4.6.1 Processing of construction 
license application
At the end of 2012, Posiva submitted to the Gov-
ernment a construction license application for an 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel and submitted to STUK the construc-
tion license application documentation laid down 
in the Nuclear Energy Decree and Government 
Decree 736/2008.
Actual review of Posiva’s construction license 
application documents continued in 2014. Accord-
ing to the original schedule, STUK’s review work 
was to be completed in June 2014, but the process-
ing took longer because the review of the applica-
tion documents and the overall safety assessment 
took longer than expected. The key reasons for the 
delay were the following:
•	 Posiva	was	not	able	to	submit	all	of	the	techni-
cal materials included in the construction li-
cense application in connection with the license 
application in late 2012. Since the materials 
were incomplete, STUK could not launch the 
review process in its entirety in early 2013.
•	When	 reviewing	 the	 application	 documents,	
STUK observed some deficiencies due to which 
Posiva had to update and supplement the appli-
cation. The key supplements required by STUK 
involved plant design materials, plant operation 
transient and accident analyses, proving perfor-
mance of the final disposal system, long-term 
safety analyses and nuclear security plans.
•	 Encapsulation	 plant	 and	 disposal	 facility	 for	
spent nuclear fuel are facilities of a new type. 
There is only little previous experience on the 
design and construction of such facilities, as 
well as the assessment of their safety. Further-
more, STUK’s new safety requirements (YVL 
Guides) on nuclear facilities that were pub-
lished in late 2013 were applied for the first 
time in the construction license process of Posi-
va’s nuclear facilities. For the above-mentioned 
reasons, special attention had to be paid in the 
safety assessment.
In June, STUK applied from the Ministry of Em-
ployment and the Economy an extension to the 
deadline for processing the construction license ap-
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these observations and lessons learned during the 
review processes in general.
In addition to the above-mentioned decisions, 
a statement and a safety analysis report to be 
submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy were prepared at the end of the year. Fur-
thermore, a statement on the construction license 
application based on STUK’s statement and safety 
analysis report was requested from the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety. The Advisory Com-
mittee’s statement will be enclosed with STUK’s 
statement as laid down in section 37 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree.
Plant design, plant construction, safety 
classification and operational safety
In 2014, Posiva supplemented the plant design 
documents included in the construction license 
application in terms of the general parts of the 
preliminary safety analysis report and system de-
scriptions both at its own initiative and based on 
requests for supplementary information by STUK 
as a result of the review. STUK’s review focused on 
reviewing plant design safety principles and the 
review of safety classified systems.
Of the general chapters of the preliminary safe-
ty analysis report, Posiva updated chapters on gen-
eral safety and design principles, construction and 
operation, management of radioactive materials, 
as well as transients and accidents. The key sup-
plements to the safety principles were implemen-
tation of the defence in depth principle in plant 
design, the definition of a controlled and safe state 
and behaviour of the plant in case of a loss of pow-
er. In the transient and accident analyses, selection 
criteria for transients and accidents selected for a 
more detailed study, details of analyses and radia-
tion protection issues were supplemented.
In terms of system design, Posiva supplemented 
system descriptions, which cover most of the safety 
classified systems. System descriptions in the fol-
lowing fields were updated: hoisting and transfer 
devices, radiation measuring, ventilation, electric-
ity and I&C, underground rooms, emergency power 
supply units and the supply of emergency power, 
fire safety and civil engineering. Requested system 
description supplements involved more details in 
design bases, analysis used to justify the design 
solutions and principles of safety classification. 
Major proposed changes to design given by Po-
siva included changing the safety classification of 
emergency power and changing the canister hoist 
into a single failure tolerant system. The change 
regarding the canister hoist meant that a shock 
absorber, which was to be placed at the bottom of 
the canister shaft, was no longer necessary to en-
sure safety. Thus, the shock absorber was changed 
into an option.
A plant design inspection report was prepared 
during the year. It included observations made 
based on a review of the preliminary safety analy-
sis report and justification for these observations. 
Changes made in latest documentation updates 
were taken into account when finalising the re-
port. Safety classification and seismic classifica-
tion of systems were reviewed when inspecting 
the systems and reviewing the proposed classi-
fication document. A request for supplementary 
information was submitted to Posiva regarding 
the classification document and observations on 
classification made during the system description 
review, in which further information about basis of 
the classification, supplements to the documents, 
as well as standardising of system inspection 
and the classification document were requested. 
Posiva proposed changing the safety class of the 
emergency power supply to EYT (non-nuclear), 
since Posiva is of the opinion that the facility can 
meet the safety function requirements without ex-
ternal power supply with battery-backed systems. 
In terms of the seismic classification, the request 
stated that Posiva should provide further informa-
tion on safety functions that will be retained after 
an earthquake. Based on the request for supple-
mentary information, Posiva submitted an updated 
proposed classification document.
Long-term safety
STUK continued its review of long-term safety and 
prepared a report on the observations made when 
reviewing the performance of the engineered bar-
riers and natural barrier and the safety analysis.
STUK used the independent expertise of around 
twenty Finnish and foreign consultants to support 
its review of the safety case in terms of the disposal 
facility location, engineered barriers and the safety 
analysis. The consultants met in a concluding 
workshop on 12–16 May 2014 to summarise their 
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review findings. Based on results presented at the 
meeting, the consultants drafted separate summa-
ry reports that are independent of STUK’s review 
of Posiva’s safety case. The summary reports by the 
consultants on the disposal site, the engineered 
barriers and the safety analysis were completed by 
the end of 2014.
STUK’s review of the Posiva safety case started 
in 2013. Most of the review work was done in 2014, 
however. The review was completed in late 2014. 
STUK drafted a safety case review report and a 
draft decision during the last quarter of the year. 
The review report includes justification for STUK’s 
requirements on further studies to further ensure 
properties of the bedrock, performance and suit-
ability as well as to develop the rock classification 
system to be used during layout planning of the fa-
cility and verifying acceptability of excavated rooms. 
In terms of engineered barriers, the review report 
includes e.g. justification for requirements on prov-
ing performance of the engineered barriers and un-
certainties about performance. As part of the safety 
analysis, the review report includes justification for 
requirements on developing the safety case, devel-
oping the safety analysis methods, and combining 
the low- and intermediate-level waste disposal facil-
ity safety analysis with the safety analysis of the 
spent fuel disposal facility. The safety case review 
report includes background for and details of the 
requirements included in the decision on the safety 
case and plenty of review observations made. The 
safety case decision to be given in January or Febru-
ary 2015 will include the issues most important to 
safety as requirements.
Based on the safety case materials reviewed 
by STUK, long-term safety of the facility has been 
analysed to an extent that is sufficient for the 
construction license application stage. The results 
show that the facility will be safe in terms of the 
environment, people and other living organisms 
after the closing of the facility in the manner re-
quired by the Government Decree. Furthermore, 
Posiva has proven suitability of the disposal meth-
od and site in a manner sufficient for the construc-
tion license application stage. The review showed, 
however, that the safety case needs to be further 
developed by clarifying the safety arguments and 
related methods, and by eliminating some of the 
uncertainties regarding the performance of the 
barriers.
Engineered barriers and bedrock 
at the disposal site
Regarding the safety case for the disposal facility, 
STUK submitted to Posiva requests for supple-
mentary information that requested that Posiva 
supplement the rock classification system criteria, 
the occurrence of natural resources, the selection 
criteria for the depth of the disposal facility and 
performance for the bedrock surrounding the dis-
posal facility near-field. In terms of engineered bar-
riers, the requests involved e.g. the performance of 
engineered barriers, the changing of the sealing 
method of the canisters, thermal properties of the 
engineered barriers, buffer saturation, montmoril-
lonite in the buffer and tunnel filling material, as 
well as dimensioning of the buffer and tunnel fill-
ing material density.
Themed workshops on the disposal site that 
were launched in late 2013 were continued in 2014. 
A workshop on the hydrogeological discrete frac-
ture network model used by Posiva was arranged 
on 24–26 February. In this workshop, sources of 
errors in characterisation measurements and hy-
drogeological flow models, the link between paleo-
hydrogeochemistry and flow models, as well as the 
links between rock classification and flow models 
were discussed. A workshop on Posiva’s seismic 
modelling was arranged on 19–21 March. This 
workshop focused on the initial data and model 
assumptions used, seismicity caused by thermal 
expansion, analysing the consequences of earth-
quakes and further development plans of Posiva’s 
earthquake analyses. A workshop on interpreta-
tion and modelling of the rock structures in the 
Olkiluoto area was arranged on 31 March – 1 April. 
It focused on reconciling the collected geological 
data and model presentations into a comprehen-
sive view.
Safety analysis
Review of the long-term safety analysis for the 
final disposal was completed in 2014. Posiva sub-
mitted responses to requests for supplementary 
information by STUK regarding Posiva’s compu-
tational safety analysis, biosphere assessment, fi-
nal disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste 
and long-term safety. STUK reviewed the results 
of the computational safety analysis by Posiva to 
verify that the issues included in the safety case 
are sufficient to prove compliance with the safety 
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requirements. Posiva has presented annual doses 
and releases of radioactive materials calculated 
as a result of analyses on probable scenarios and 
analyses on weakening of the safety functions. Po-
siva has compared these results with the set dose 
and release limits. The results remain below the 
set limits.
Organisational operations 
and quality assurance
In 2014, Posiva continued to develop and improve 
its management system, procedures and instruc-
tions. One of Posiva’s goals in this development 
work is creating a system that complies with the 
requirements set for a management system of a 
nuclear facility during the construction stage in 
the renewed YVL Guides by STUK. The improve-
ments involve Posiva’s management system as a 
whole. The management system comprises a man-
agement handbook, an organisation handbook, pro-
cesses used to control the activities and procedures 
in the form of handbooks. To support the develop-
ment, Posiva ordered an annual independent as-
sessment of the management system’s compliance 
with the requirements.
The procedures guiding Posiva’s operations 
have been compiled into several handbooks cover-
ing a variety of areas, such as the R&D handbook, 
the procurement handbook, the design handbook, 
the manufacturing handbook and the construction 
handbook. In 2014, Posiva completed some of these 
handbooks and started using them. STUK reviewed 
the instructions included in the handbooks sub-
mitted by Posiva to STUK. Based on a request by 
STUK, Posiva created a schedule on preparation of 
the missing handbooks in such a manner that the 
handbooks will be approved and in use at the cor-
rect plant project stages.
Posiva developed its organisational structure 
in 2014 to better correspond to the needs of the 
preparation and construction stage after delivery 
of the construction license application. The project 
organisation in charge of the construction of the 
nuclear facilities was published in 2014. The line 
organisation will be in charge of the development 
of the final disposal concept and supporting func-
tions at the company level for the construction pro-
ject. The project organisation will be complemented 
later based on the construction requirements. In 
2014, STUK continued evaluation of the Posiva or-
ganisation, personnel resources and competence as 
part of the construction license application process.
In 2014, STUK assessed Posiva’s management 
system and organisation by conducting nine in-
spections of Posiva’s operations as part of the 
processing of the construction license application. 
One of the goals of these inspections was to assess 
readiness of the Posiva organisation to carry out 
the construction project. The inspections and their 
results, as well as the requirements by STUK, are 
described in more detail in Appendix 8.
Emergency preparedness 
and nuclear security
Posiva submitted to STUK in connection with its 
construction license application a preliminary 
emergency response plan and an update to the 
plan, which STUK reviewed. STUK also took into 
account a statement by the Ministry of the Interior 
in its assessment. STUK approved the preliminary 
emergency response plan by Posiva on 3 April 2014. 
Planning of the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility in terms of emergency prepared-
ness and plans of action for the site are sufficient.
STUK will continue to oversee the progress of 
emergency preparedness during construction of 
the encapsulation plant and disposal facility by, 
for example, reviewing Posiva’s updated accident 
analyses and the estimated radiation doses and 
early stage protection activities based on them, as 
well as by monitoring how the division of labour 
between Posiva and TVO is specified and how re-
sources are allocated in case of emergencies.
STUK processed the documents submitted in 
connection with the construction license applica-
tion linked to nuclear security and prepared a deci-
sion that takes into account the requested state-
ment by the Ministry of the Interior.
STUK has processed Posiva’s proposed nuclear 
security for the construction period and will over-
see the progress and development of Posiva’s nu-
clear security issues during construction of the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility.
Safeguards of nuclear materials
Since safeguards of nuclear materials is interna-
tional, several technical meetings with the Europe-
an Commission and the IAEA have been arranged 
on safeguards of nuclear materials at the Posiva’s 
planned nuclear facilities. Based on these meet-
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ings, the Commission and the IAEA prepared in 
2014 a plan on surveillance and monitoring instru-
ments to be installed in the encapsulation plant. 
STUK reviewed a description of arrangements 
required for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
that was submitted by Posiva as laid down in sec-
tion 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree when submit-
ting the construction license application. It was 
noted that the plan can be approved and Posiva 
must take into account during further planning 
the monitoring needs by the IAEA, the Commis-
sion and STUK.
4.6.2 Construction of research facility Onkalo
Excavation of underground facilities
The excavation of a vehicle tunnel to Onkalo started 
in 2004. Most of the excavation works were complet-
ed in 2012. Total length of the vehicle tunnel, shafts, 
research facilities, demonstration tunnels and other 
facilities is around 9,000 metres, extending from the 
ground level to a depth of 455 metres (Fig. 17). The 
excavated volume is around 365,000 m³.
The Onkalo supply air shaft and personnel 
shaft were opened between levels –290…–455 by 
raise boring by early April. Before the raise bor-
ing of the personnel shaft and supply air shaft, 
water-conducting zones in the surrounding bedrock 
were sealed by injecting several times with grout-
containing ultrafine silica.
Measuring of seepage water in the personnel 
shaft and supply air shaft started in July 2014. 
Based on the results obtained, sealing of the sur-
rounding bedrock with ultrafine silica was suc-
cessful: the amount of seepage water in the shafts 
varied between almost zero to around 1.8 litres 
per minute. The total seepage water volumes in 
Onkalo are discussed in the chapter Monitoring 
and studies below.
An extensive area of around 15–20  m² where 
the shotcrete used to reinforce the bedrock had 
come partially or wholly loose was observed dur-
ing a seepage water survey in mid-November. 
According to Posiva, the shotcrete has come loose 
partially because the basis on which it was spread 
was uneven and partly because of the geology and 
tensions. Lowering the amount of shotcrete deter-
mined in the reinforcement plan may be needed.
Testing of bedrock suitability 
classification at Onkalo
The demonstration area on level –420 includes 
four demonstration tunnels: DT2 (105 metres in 
length), DT1 (52 m), DT3 (25 m) and DT4 (21 m). 
Posiva plans to use the demonstration area to test 
the final disposal methods and performance of en-
gineered barriers as well as to conduct installa-
tion tests and trial runs of the machinery and 
equipment to be used during final disposal. Under-
ground joint operating tests of several engineered 
barriers will also take place in the demonstration 
area.
Figure 17. Status of the excavation of Onkalo in January 2015. Lightgray parts denote Posiva’s excavation plans 
for 2015.
Technical facilities
–437 m
Ventilation shaft (out)
Personnel shaft
Ventilation 
shaft (in)
Access tunnel Demonstration tunnels
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In 2014, pilot holes for test disposal holes 
were drilled in DT2. A probe hole drilled during 
construction of the demonstration tunnel DT2 
penetrates two of the test disposal holes, which 
means that they might not be eligible for the in-
tended studies. In terms of the excavation of the 
repository, Posiva clearly needs to develop its ex-
cavation methods, the supervision of excavation 
and its documentation on the final results. STUK 
will oversee the drilling of the test disposal holes 
because Posiva plans to use the same method when 
drilling the actual final disposal holes.
The main purpose of the demonstration tun-
nels, in addition to providing a location for testing, 
is to yield information for the development of the 
rock suitability classification (RSC), as well as 
information for the needs of characterisation and 
modelling of the Onkalo bedrock.
Posiva started construction of a testing hall at 
the Onkalo construction site in the autumn of 2013. 
The hall was completed in the spring of 2014. The 
plan is to use the testing hall to test the installation 
of canisters and buffer blocks as separate systems 
and together. A structure that is approximately 
eight metres in height and corresponds to a full-
scale disposal hole was built under the testing hall’s 
floor. It is made of transparent material so that the 
installation work can be seen at all times.
Posiva planned to test and prove the perfor-
mance of the buffer installation vehicle as well as 
the canister transfer and installation vehicle in 
2014. Due to a variety of delays, the buffer could 
not be fully assembled in 2014, even though single 
blocks could be installed. A successful canister in-
stallation test into the test disposal hole was com-
pleted. The testing will continue with installation 
of buffer blocks into the test hole in 2015. In 2014, 
STUK oversaw preliminary field testing of tunnel 
floor levelling materials. STUK will oversee the 
testing at Onkalo in 2015.
STUK oversaw factory acceptance testing and 
field testing of Posiva’s installation equipment in 
2014. Compliance of the equipment with require-
ments and feasibility of the installation work were 
assessed during inspection visits. STUK oversees 
all demonstrations to assess the feasibility of the 
systems and concepts as well as remaining uncer-
tainties.
Monitoring and studies
In 2014, studies as part of Posiva’s hydrogeology, 
hydrogeochemistry, rock mechanics and foreign ma-
terial monitoring programmes took place in Onkalo. 
They were used to monitor the impact of the con-
struction of Onkalo. The purpose was to obtain more 
reliable and representative data for geoscientific in-
terpretations and modelling and the rock suitability 
classification (RSC) by means of surveys, measure-
ments and studies.
The total amount of seepage water into Onkalo 
varied from 29 to 35 l/min in 2014. The total 
amount of seepage water remained clearly below 
the action limit set by Posiva, which is 80 l/min, 
and the seepage in single shafts remained below 
the action limit of 5 l/min.
Posiva obtained more information about the 
consistency of the groundwater at the planned fi-
nal disposal depth with the help of hydrochemical 
measurements and sampling. Furthermore, Posiva 
obtained information about the impact of the con-
struction of Onkalo with the help of its hydrogeo-
chemistry monitoring programme. In the spring of 
2014, Posiva detected faults in multi-packer devic-
es installed in deep bore holes in the eastern part 
of Onkalo. The measuring results were correct but 
the results were linked to the wrong borehole sec-
tions during the automatic data collection. Accord-
ing to Posiva’s studies, no erroneous hydrogeologi-
cal data, modelling or conclusions were used in the 
background materials of the construction license 
application.
Exceeding of the hydrological and hydrogeo-
chemical action limits set by Posiva may influence 
the long-term safety of the final disposal of nu-
clear waste because the exceeding of the limits sug-
gests that the stable conditions of the bedrock at 
Olkiluoto (slow groundwater flow and favourable 
groundwater chemistry) have changed because of 
the construction of Onkalo.
In December 2014, the lowering of the ground-
water pressure head due to seepage of ground-
water into Onkalo exceeded the action limit set 
by Posiva at six research holes drilled from the 
ground level close to Onkalo. Posiva determined 
that the pressure head decreased because connec-
tions with low conductivity or local connections did 
not receive any water to substitute the water that 
is seeping into Onkalo.
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Posiva set the action limits for the hydrogeo-
chemical monitoring of Onkalo based on the nor-
mal state of the bedrock at Onkalo determined be-
fore the construction of Onkalo started. The action 
limits for different parameters vary according to 
depth because the hydrochemical conditions in the 
Olkiluoto bedrock clearly show that different water 
types are layered.
In 2014, Posiva detected exceeding of the hy-
drogeochemistry action limits at more than ten 
deep bore holes drilled from the ground level. The 
excesses varied from minor to tens of times the 
action limit. The following groundwater chemistry 
parameter values were exceeded: alkalinity, total 
salinity, chloride, ammonium, sulphate, sulphide, 
phosphate and organic carbon. Of these, ammo-
nium and phosphate are likely residues from the 
explosives used during the construction of Onkalo.
The action limits were exceeded in four of the 
groundwater samples taken at the groundwater 
stations in Onkalo or from research holes. The 
organic carbon, sulphide or pH action limits were 
exceeded in these samples.
STUK will continue to monitor and assess the 
data reported by Posiva and Posiva’s interpreta-
tions on the impact of Onkalo’s construction on the 
bedrock of Olkiluoto. It is important to see whether 
the changes remain within the limits set in the 
safety case of Posiva’s construction license applica-
tion.
STUK’s inspection activities
In 2014, STUK performed eight regulatory site in-
spections in Onkalo and at the Onkalo construction 
site above ground level. During these inspections, 
STUK focused on the planning and implementa-
tion of ongoing works and Posiva’s own quality 
assurance and quality control. The raise boring of 
shafts and all the work conducted in the demon-
stration area were monitored with special care.
In 2014, the construction inspection programme 
of Onkalo included three inspections that focused 
on issues critical to long-term safety. The results of 
the inspections are described in Appendix 7 to this 
report.
In 2014, Posiva conducted five construction 
readiness inspections of Onkalo. STUK participat-
ed in these inspections as an observer or verified 
the readiness to start construction from records 
submitted by Posiva. In February 2014, STUK car-
ried out one inspection on the readiness to start 
shotcreting in demonstration tunnels 3 and 4.
Reviewing Onkalo construction documents
In 2014, STUK processed 91 documents regarding 
the construction of Onkalo that were submitted 
to STUK for information or for approval. One of 
the most important documents was Posiva’s ap-
plication on updated Onkalo master drawings and 
a change in the scope of Onkalo. In the updated 
master drawings, the depth of the final disposal 
tunnels had been decreased by fifteen metres from 
the previously approved plan. Posiva also proposed 
the excavation of new vehicle tunnels 16 and 17 
that would create the connecting tunnel to the first 
final disposal panel. Posiva justified the excavation 
of the new facilities by the development of bedrock 
characterisation, RSC demonstration, the suitabili-
ty analysis method and excavation methods. STUK 
also processed excavation plans for a plug in DT4, 
as well as some plans pertaining to the supply air 
and personnel shafts and their raise boring.
4.6.3 Safeguards of nuclear materials
STUK has carried out safeguards of nuclear ma-
terials at Onkalo, which is currently under con-
struction and which will become part of the reposi-
tory. STUK’s regulatory activities have been im-
plemented in line with the national safeguards of 
nuclear materials plan. Finland is the first country 
in the world to implement safeguards of nuclear 
materials on a final disposal facility, which is why 
STUK holds a key position in the development 
and implementation of international safeguards 
of nuclear materials regarding geological reposito-
ries. In 2013, Posiva drafted the first notices of the 
basic technical characteristics of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility included in the construc-
tion license application design documentation and 
submitted these to the European Commission and 
the IAEA. Posiva updated the documents in 2014. 
Posiva also updated the handbook on regulatory 
oversight of nuclear non-proliferation in this con-
nection. It provides instructions on the safeguards 
of nuclear materials at the project’s Onkalo stage.
In November 2014, STUK, the Commission and 
the IAEA reviewed the technical basic characteris-
tics declaration of the repository at Onkalo to ver-
ify that Onkalo has been built in compliance with 
the declaration. The EU Joint Research Centre 
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(JRC/Ispra) assisted the IAEA and Commission by 
measuring and drafting an independent 3D model 
of Onkalo to use as the basis of future inspections 
by international organisations. The inspection and 
the related land surveying took seven days. A total 
of twelve people from the IAEA, the Commission 
and JRC participated in the work. Their combined 
workload was 65 man-days.
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5 Other uses of nuclear energy
5.1 Talvivaara
In 2014, Talvivaara Mining Company Plc practiced 
mining operations at Talvivaara in Sotkamo. The 
mine’s key products were nickel and zinc, and the 
ore also included smaller concentrations of other 
elements that can be utilised. The metals are sepa-
rated from the ore at the mine by means of bio-
heapleaching. In this process, uranium is dissolved 
from the ore in addition to other heavy metals. The 
uranium concentration at the Talvivaara deposit 
is low (17 ppm on average), but Talvivaara used 
to consider the recovery of uranium to be profit-
able because of the large volumes. For this reason, 
Talvivaara submitted an application to the Finnish 
Government on the recovery of uranium in 2010. 
If not recovered, the uranium will end up in the 
gypsum waste pond and part of it will end up in the 
mine’s nickel product. Talvivaara was granted a per-
mit from the Government by virtue of the Nuclear 
Energy Act to start recovery on 1 March 2012. The 
permit stated that the recovery of uranium could 
be started once STUK had approved several docu-
ments pertaining to the recovery process.
Talvivaara started construction of a uranium 
recovery plant after granting of the permit. STUK 
monitored progress of the construction project and 
prepared to start regulation of the uranium recov-
ery process. The poor financial status of Talvivaara 
postponed the completion of the recovery plant, 
and Talvivaara failed to submit the documents 
pertaining to the start of the recovery of uranium 
to STUK for processing. In the autumn of 2013, the 
Supreme Administrative Court returned, with its 
decision 3825/2013, the uranium recovery permit 
of Talvivaara to the Government for new round of 
processing. Talvivaara Sotkamo Oy filed for bank-
ruptcy in November 2014.
Environmental impact of leaks from the Talvi-
vaara mine in the winter 2012–2013 was continued 
in 2014 by virtue of the Radiation Act. Uranium 
contents in watercourses were monitored with spe-
cial care in the mine area and in waterways close 
to the mine.
5.2 Others
Small amounts of uranium are being extracted in 
the production processes of Freeport Cobalt Oy in 
Kokkola and Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy in Har-
javalta. STUK has reviewed their inventory reports 
on the production of uranium. Other inspected nu-
clear material inventories include those of the Hel-
sinki University Laboratory of Radiochemistry and 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. No 
remarks were made in the inspections.
In late 2014, VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland submitted to the European Commission 
and STUK preliminary design information on VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety that is currently under 
construction. The plan is to transfer some labora-
tory functions from VTT’s reactor building to the 
new building when it is completed in 2016.
The responsible manager for the nuclear safe-
guards at Aalto University and his debuty were 
approved in 2014.
STUK granted Fortum, Platom and VTT licens-
es to possess and transfer of nuclear information 
pertaining to the nuclear safeguards.
According to the new Guide YVL D.1, all op-
erators must prepare a nuclear material handbook 
that includes instructions on the implementation 
of the nuclear safeguards. The producers of ura-
nium, the parties in possession of small amounts 
of nuclear materials and the research facilities 
participating in the nuclear safeguards relevant 
research of the nuclear fuel cycle prepared these 
handbooks in 2014. They will be processed in 2015.
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6 Safety research
The purpose of publicly funded safety research is 
to ascertain that the authorities have adequate 
expertise available, including a concern for unfore-
seeable issues affecting the safety of nuclear power 
plants. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finnish 
safety research has typically taken the form of 
four-year research programmes. Safety research 
is divided into two research programmes: SA-
FIR2014 focuses on nuclear power plant safety and 
KYT2014 on the comparison of the practices and 
methods of nuclear waste management. The pro-
jects under the research programmes are selected 
annually on the basis of a public call for projects. 
The projects selected for the programmes must be 
Nuclear safety research in Finland
In general terms, nuclear safety research comprises 
two distinct areas of research: nuclear power plant 
safety and nuclear waste management safety. In 
Finland, nuclear safety research is conducted by re-
search institutions, universities and power companies 
operating nuclear power plants. In addition to the 
above-mentioned parties, research on the safety of 
nuclear waste management is conducted by Posiva Oy. 
Posiva’s research programme is the most extensive of 
all the research programmes.
Research programmes SAFIR2014 and KYT2014 
were launched in 2011. The purpose of these pro-
grammes is not only to provide scientific and 
technical results, but also to ensure the mainte-
nance and development of Finnish competence. 
Further information on the projects is avail-
able on the websites of the research programmes 
at http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2014/,  
http://www. ydinjatetutkimus.fi and   
http://kyt2014.vtt.fi/. Websites of the new re-
search programmes SAFIR2018 and KYT2018 
to be launched at the beginning of 2018 are   
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/safir2018/ and   
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/kyt2018/.
Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the parties with 
nuclear waste management obligations are unam-
biguously responsible for the design, implementation 
and costs of managing the waste they have produced, 
including the associated research and development 
work. The research and development work regard-
ing final disposal is carried out by Posiva Oy. Posiva 
also conducts research in different sectors linked to 
the final disposal of nuclear fuel in cooperation with 
international parties.
The Finnish actors contribute extensively to inter-
national nuclear safety research within the framework 
of the following programmes and organisations: the 
European Union’s framework research programmes 
(both fission and fusion research), the Nordic NKS 
safety research programme, the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the OECD, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within the UN family.
of a high scientific standard, and their results must 
be available for publication. The results must have 
a broader scope of applicability than the NPP of a 
single licensee. Funding will not be granted for any 
research which is directly connected with projects 
that licensees, or parties representing them, carry 
out for their own needs, or for research which is 
directly provided by the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear energy.
STUK controls this research by contributing to 
the work of the programmes’ steering and refer-
ence groups. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy annually verifies that the proposed set 
of projects meets the statutory requirements and 
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STUK’s nuclear safety research needs. STUK is-
sued statements on the SAFIR2014 and KYT2014 
programmes in February 2014.
STUK participated in the preparation of a 
national research strategy on the use of nuclear 
energy, which was managed by the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. The strategy was 
published in April 2014. According to the strat-
egy, nuclear safety research and nuclear waste 
management research will continue as separate 
programmes. After the completion of the strategy, 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
launched the preparation of new four-year re-
search programmes, SAFIR2018 and KYT2018.
The four-year research programme SAFIR2014 
was a continuation to the previous programme, SA-
FIR2010. It was more extensive than the previous 
programme because of the decisions-in-principle on 
new nuclear power plant units that were made in 
the summer of 2010. Following the decisions, funds 
for the research programme were also collected 
according to the maximum outputs defined in the 
license conditions for the new plant units (fund-
ing from the National Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund). The annual volume of the SAFIR2014 pro-
gramme was €9.9 million in 2014, of which the 
National Nuclear Waste Management Fund cov-
ered €5.4 million. The project programme launched 
at the beginning of 2014 provided funding for 45 
projects. The organisation providing the largest 
amount of funding was VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, whose share was €2.8 million. 
The SAFIR2014 research programme was di-
vided into nine competence areas, which mainly 
corresponded to the support group areas of the pre-
vious research programme. A new support group 
introduced at the beginning of 2011 was Support 
Group 9, Infrastructure, since the construction of 
significant arrays of test equipment was funded 
and guided at, for example, VTT and the Lap-
peenranta University of Technology. The areas of 
research under SAFIR2014 and their shares of the 
total funding are illustrated in Figure 18.
In the autumn of 2012, the call for projects for 
the 2014 project programme was updated with 
the additions to the SAFIR2014 framework plan 
considered necessary as a result of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident that took place in March 
2011. The 2014 research programme focuses on 
issues important to nuclear safety, such as reactor 
physics, accident analyses and material research. 
Accident management projects and expansions of 
earlier projects that dealt with the management 
of severe accidents and the provisions made for 
external threats that were launched in 2013 were 
continued. The call for projects for the 2014 project 
programme was updated with the additions of topi-
cal research needs on the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear safety, such as analyses used to prove com-
pliance of new regulations with the requirements 
and nuclear power plant quality management in a 
networked operating environment. No new projects 
on these subject matters were launched within the 
SAFIR2014 research programme.
The research programme involved extensive 
development of Finnish expertise for defining the 
design basis of nuclear power plants and for pro-
ducing safety analyses, as well as for managing ex-
pert work and organisations with a high standard 
of safety culture. A project on studying the cover-
age of the Finnish nuclear safety regulations by 
applying methods from the field of sociology that 
was launched in 2013 was continued. An issue that 
is still topical is the research on external threats 
where the potential impacts of climate change 
on the extreme weather conditions and seawater 
levels occurring in Finland were studied, along 
with the seismic requirements for NPPs. Another 
topical issue is the definition of the source term for 
an accident, and provisions for accidents of a long 
duration.
Figure 18. Research	areas	of	SAFIR2014	programme	
and their shares of the total funding in 2014.
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Management board
Programme director
Plant safety and  
systems engineering Reactor safety
Structural safety
and materials
SAFIR2018 REFERENCE GROUPS
Reference	groups	(1,...,N)	are	responsible	for	the	scientific
guidance of the projects
The research topics of a reference group may be related to one or more research areas
Reference group 1
Reference group 2
...
Reference	group	N:	Development	of	research	infrastructure
Figure 19. The	administrative	structure	of	SAFIR2018	research	programme.
Content and management of the SAFIR2018 
research programme  were determined under 
the management of STUK. The Ministry of Em-
ployment and the Economy appointed a planning 
workgroup in April 2014. The planning workgroup 
named by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy, which consists of nineteen people, chair-
persons of the SAFIR2014 programme support 
groups and other experts have actively partici-
pated in the drafting of the research programme 
framework plan. Representatives of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy, the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), the Finnish 
Funding Agency for Innovation (Tekes), Fennovo-
ima Oy, Fortum, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), 
the Aalto University, Lappeenranta University of 
Technology and VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland were involved. The organisations that par-
ticipated in the planning represent the end users 
of the final results and the parties participating in 
the research activities.
The SAFIR2018 research programme consists 
of three research areas: overall safety and man-
agement of planning, reactor safety, as well as 
structural safety and materials. Support groups 
that focus on scientific issues will be established to 
guide the research activities. The number of groups 
to be established and their focus areas will be 
determined based on the projects selected for the 
research programme. The SAFIR2018 framework 
plan introduces to the people drafting project pro-
posals the subject matters on which the research 
programme projects should focus and the planning 
workgroup’s views on key problems and research 
needs linked to these subject matters. The SA-
FIR2018 research programme will focus on issues 
important to nuclear safety, such as nuclear fuel, 
accident analyses and material research. Issues 
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Figure 20. Research areas of KYT2014 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2014.
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involving the assessment of overall safety and the 
management of planning are more prominent than 
before in the research programme framework plan.
The subject matters and research needs listed in 
the framework plan are based on issues of which the 
planning workgroup was aware in June 2014. The 
SAFIR2018 research programme will also take into 
account any changes that occur in the operating en-
vironment during the programme period: new pro-
jects that support the objectives of the programme 
may be launched during the programme period.
STUK participated in the assessment of the 
SAFIR2018 research programme projects and the 
preparation of the programme in the management 
group of the SAFIR2018 programme and in the 
steering groups of the research areas.
The four-year KYT2014 programme started in 
2011 and ended in 2014. The programme consisted 
of research issues important to national expertise. 
It aimed at extensive coordinated research pro-
jects. Such coordinated projects were formed in 
the following research areas: performance of buffer 
and backfilling materials, and the long-term dura-
bility of final disposal canisters.
The KYT management group provided funding 
recommendations to the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy based on assessments by the sup-
port groups, applicability of the subject matter and 
content of the research project. In 2014, the total 
funding of the programme was around €2.9 million, 
of which funding from the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund amounted to around €1.9 mil-
lion. In 2014, the research programme provided 
funding for 31 research projects representing new 
and alternative technologies for nuclear waste 
management (three projects), safety research on 
nuclear waste management (28 projects of which 
11 were combined into two coordinated projects) 
and social nuclear waste management research 
(one project). Figure 18 illustrates the relative 
shares of these projects of the total funding.
The KYT2018 research period will start in early 
2015, and the new programme period will be four 
years. There are representatives of Fennovoima, 
Fortum Power and Heat, Posiva, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, TVO, the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, the Ministry of the 
Environment and STUK in the planning work-
group. STUK chairs the group.
46 research project proposals were submitted 
for the year 2015. The research programme accord-
ing to the management group’s funding recommen-
dation includes 30 research projects.
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7 Oversight of nuclear power 
plants in figures
7.1 Processing of documents
A total of 3,045 documents were submitted to 
STUK for processing in 2014. Of these, 627 con-
cerned the NPP unit under construction and 410 
the repository for spent nuclear fuel. The reviewing 
process of a total of 2,930 documents was complet-
ed, including documents submitted in 2014, those 
submitted earlier and licenses granted by STUK by 
virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed 
in Appendix 4. The average document review time 
Figure 22. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 23. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 24. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 21. Number of documents received and 
reviewed as well as average document review time.
Figure 25. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Posiva.
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was 93 days. The number of documents and their 
average review times in 2010–2014 are illustrated 
in Figure 21. Figures 22–25 illustrate the review 
time distribution among documents from the vari-
ous plant units and documents about Posiva.
7.2 Inspections at nuclear power plant 
sites and suppliers’ premises
Periodic inspection programmes
A total of 24 inspections at the Loviisa plant and 23 
at the Olkiluoto plant were carried out under the 
2014 periodic inspection programme (Appendix 5). 
STUK carried out ten inspections within the Olki-
luoto 3 construction inspection programme (Ap-
pendix 6) and three inspections within the Onkalo 
construction inspection programme (Appendix 7). 
Nine inspections of the repository’s construction li-
cense application processing stage were conducted 
in 2014. The key findings of the inspections are 
presented in the appendices and the chapters on 
regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 1,340 inspections onsite or at suppliers’ 
premises were carried out in 2014 (other than in-
spections of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, of the nuclear non-proliferation con-
trol and of the construction inspection programme 
of the underground research facility at Olkiluoto, 
which are discussed separately). An inspection 
comprises one or more sub-inspections, such as a 
review of results, an inspection of component or 
structure, a pressure or leak test, a functional test 
or a commissioning inspection. Of the inspections, 
222 were related to the regulatory oversight of the 
plant under construction and 1,118 to that of the 
units in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 2,961. 
This number includes not only inspections pertain-
ing to the safety of nuclear power plants but also 
those associated with nuclear waste management, 
nuclear non-proliferation control, audits and in-
spection of the underground research facility at 
Olkiluoto. Four resident inspectors worked at Olki-
luoto NPP and three resident inspectors at Loviisa 
NPP. The numbers of onsite inspection days in 
2010−2014 are illustrated in Figure 26.
7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the regula-
tory oversight of nuclear power plants, with their 
costs charged to those subject to the oversight. 
Basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
Figure 26. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises. Luvut eivät 
sisällä tehtyjä ylitöitä.
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Figure 27. Income	and	costs	of	nuclear	safety	
regulation.
86
STUK-B 191
In 2014, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 19.6 
million. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were EUR 20.7 million. Thus, the share of activi-
ties subject to a charge was 94.7%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2014 was EUR 19.6 million. Of this, EUR 4.4 mil-
lion and EUR 10.0 million came from the inspec-
tion and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs, 
respectively. In addition to the operating units, 
the income from Olkiluoto NPP includes income 
derived from the regulatory oversight of the Olki-
luoto 3 construction project. The income from the 
regulatory oversight also includes costs of the 
safety assessments of the new NPP projects of TVO 
and Fennovoima. The regulation of Posiva Oy’s op-
erations yielded EUR 4.2 million. Figure 27 shows 
the annual income and costs from nuclear safety 
regulation in 2010−2014.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 17.5 man-years, 
i.e. 12.0% of the total working time of the regulato-
ry personnel. The time spent on the operating units 
of Olkiluoto NPP was 15.3 man-years or 10.5% of 
the total working time. In addition to the monitor-
ing of the operation of the NPPs, these figures in-
clude the safeguards of nuclear materials. The time 
spent on the inspection and review of Olkiluoto 3 
was 21.4 man-years or 14.7% of the total working 
time. Work related to new NPP projects amounted 
to 2.1 man-years or 2.1% of the total working time. 
A total of 14.3 man-years or 9.8% of the total work-
ing time was spent on inspection and review of 
Posiva’s operations, and that spent on the FiR 1 re-
search reactor was 0.4 man-years. Figure 28 shows 
the division of working hours of the personnel en-
gaged in nuclear safety oversight (in man-years) by 
subject of oversight during 2007–2014.
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of reg-
ulatory decision-making. Figures 29 and 30 illus-
trate the costs of such assignments in 2010–2014. 
Expenses in 2014 were mainly related to compara-
tive analysis, independent assessments and third-
party consultants’ inspection work concerning the 
unit under construction, as well as to assessment 
work concerning the safety documentation for final 
disposal of nuclear waste. Appendix 8 lists assign-
ments on the safety of nuclear power plants and 
the final disposal of nuclear fuel funded by STUK 
in 2014. Reviews of the safety documentation for 
the final disposal of nuclear energy are discussed 
in Chapter 4.6.1.
Distribution of the annual working time of the 
nuclear safety regulation personnel to the various 
duty areas is shown in Table 5.
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Figure 28. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight 
in 2007–2014. Until 2011 the nuclear waste management includes both the oversight of the operating 
nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 2012 only the 
oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management is 
combined with the oversight of the power plants.
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Figure 29. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 30. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table 5. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Basic operations subject to a charge 70.5 70.2 68.9 69.7 72.0
Basic operations not subject to a charge 7.8 8.8 5.6 5.0 3.5
Contracted services 1.9 1.7 2.2 1.6 2.9
Rule-making and support functions 38.2 43.0 46.3 45.3 41.8
Holidays and absences 24.3 24.7 24.7 25.1 25.3
Total 142.9 148.4 147.7 146.7 145.5
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8 Development of regulation
8.1 STUK’s own development projects
Changes in practices and organisation 
updated in quality manual
A total of 20 guides were updated in the quality 
manual for nuclear safety regulation, and 35 ap-
pendices to the guides were updated. The guides 
were updated following changes in procedures as 
well as changes in the personnel of the nuclear re-
actor regulation department and the nuclear waste 
and material regulation department.
Progress in development of 
requirement management
STUK continued the development of its require-
ment management procedures that was started 
in connection with the preparation of new YVL 
Guides. Definition of operating processes was 
continued and testing of the information system 
started in the summer of 2014. The system will be 
used when preparing YVL Guide implementation 
decisions.
Development of records management 
system and preparation for 
provision of electronic services
Planned development of workflows in the STUK 
records management system was delayed. The re-
quirement specifications that had been prepared 
before were further supplemented in late autumn 
but the implementation was postponed to 2015.
STUK launched a project on an electronic ser-
vice system that will offer licensees the opportu-
nity to submit applications to STUK for processing 
in electronic format. The system will be introduced 
into production use in early 2015.
8.2 Renewing and working capacity
Training on issues such as nuclear power plant ac-
cidents, nuclear power plant systems, safety culture, 
document management and regulatory activities 
was arranged for inspectors. A clear majority of the 
training events focused on STUK’s new YVL Guides. 
The training aims at ensuring consistent interpre-
tation of the new Guides.
New STUK inspectors participated in a na-
tional training programme in the field of nuclear 
safety (the YK course), which STUK organises 
together with other actors in the industry. The YK 
course consists of six study modules provided over 
the course of 20 working days. The three last study 
modules of YK11 were arranged in the spring of 
2014, and YK12 started in the autumn. Around a 
dozen STUK employees participated in both YK 
courses.
STUK was actively involved in the planning 
and execution of national nuclear waste manage-
ment training, now organised for the fifth time. The 
course lasted for six days and had around twenty 
participants. Lecturers included representatives 
of all the organisations providing the training. 
The course focused on the main themes of nuclear 
waste management, covering the entire nuclear 
fuel cycle. The latest addition was environmental 
impact assessment procedures.
STUK’s inspectors also participated in training 
provided by external companies, such as project op-
erations and media training. Furthermore, STUK’s 
inspectors participated in various Finnish and in-
ternational training events of the industry, both as 
participants and lecturers.
In 2014, two Master’s theses were complet-
ed in the nuclear reactor regulation department: 
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A method for reviewing structural systems relevant 
to nuclear safety and Occupational radiation doses 
and contributing factors at Finnish nuclear power 
plants.
On average, 11.5 days per inspector in the field 
of nuclear waste and materials regulation, and 7.9 
days per inspector in the field of nuclear reactor 
regulation, were spent on developing the expertise 
of STUK’s nuclear safety experts in 2014.
Five new employees were hired for nuclear 
reactor regulation in 2014. Their positions are in 
fields of water chemistry in nuclear power plants, 
radiation protection, development of competence, 
regulations and internal information management. 
In addition, two permanent posts were established. 
Some recruitments were postponed to 2015 be-
cause of new projects being delayed. One person 
was transferred to a position in safeguards of 
nuclear materials from another position within 
STUK.
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9 Emergency preparedness
The NPPs, the police and STUK develop the plan-
ning of emergency drills in case of threats. The 
planning scope covers both physical and informa-
tion security threats.
STUK actively participated in the work of the 
emergency response cooperation groups in both 
Eastern Uusimaa and Satakunta. Both groups 
include the most important operators of the early 
stages of an emergency: in addition to STUK, 
representatives from the power companies, the 
rescue services, the police and – as the latest addi-
tion – the Ministry of the Interior. The Satakunta 
group also includes the Finnish Border Guard; 
the Eastern Uusimaa group also involves the lo-
cal emergency care organisation. Issues such as 
emergency response training, experiences gained 
from drills, the update status of external rescue 
plans, the organisations’ development projects, and 
changes to legislation were discussed in meetings 
of the cooperation teams.
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10 Communications
STUK’s nuclear safety communications are based 
on active, immediate, open and honest communica-
tion and media services.
In addition to news about STUK’s own regula-
tory oversight and the NPP license process, STUK 
provides, as quickly as possible, information about 
any deficiencies observed at the Finnish NPPs for 
which the licensee must submit a special report to 
STUK or that are otherwise considered matters of 
public interest.
In 2014, STUK gave information on its website 
about five observations made during the inspec-
tions and oversight of the operating NPPs and the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, which is currently under 
construction. Even though the events did not put 
the safety of the NPPs or the environment at risk, 
STUK reported them without delay in accordance 
with its communications policy.
STUK published announcements about a total 
of 21 nuclear safety issues in 2014. Furthermore, 
nuclear safety experts gave several interviews to 
Finnish and foreign media.
In addition to its own website, STUK commu-
nicates with citizens via social media, such as Fa-
cebook and Twitter. STUK also answers questions 
that the public presents by telephone or e-mail, 
participates in public meetings and receives guest 
groups.
At the end of May and in the beginning of June, 
STUK’s directors and experts told the public at 
Loviisa and Eurajoki about the results of the over-
sight operations at the NPPs and their environ-
ment, and about topical issues related to nuclear 
safety. The public events were organised in coop-
eration with the municipalities.
STUK provides reports on the operation, events 
and oversight of the operating NPPs as well as 
the oversight of Olkiluoto 3 and nuclear waste 
management, on a quarterly basis. In its annual 
report published in April 2014, STUK reported the 
regulatory oversight of nuclear safety and related 
observations in 2013.
Communications about nuclear safety with 
stakeholders are mainly handled in connection 
with the daily work of the management of STUK, 
inspectors and other STUK employees. In late 
2014, STUK studied success of such stakehold-
er communications by surveying its reputation 
among its key stakeholders. One of the studied 
stakeholder groups consisted of nuclear power 
companies. According to the survey results, the 
power companies respect STUK and trust in it, and 
are satisfied with its ability to cooperate. The repu-
tation could be further improved, however, by bet-
ter sharing best practices with colleagues within 
STUK and thus standardising practices.
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International conventions
The International Convention on Nuclear Safety 
requires the submission of a report on how its ob-
ligations have been met every three years. STUK’s 
experts presented Finland’s report at the statu-
tory review meeting of the International Conven-
tion on Nuclear Safety in the spring of 2014. The 
most important issues that took place in Finland 
during the three-year reporting period included 
an overall safety requirement renewal process, a 
safety review of the Finnish NPPs due to the Fuku-
shima accident and an evaluation of regulatory 
activities by the IAEA. The report was well re-
ceived by the meeting. In the peer evaluation, good 
practices from Finland included procedures that 
aim at continuous improvement, a comprehensive 
national nuclear safety research programme, and 
instructions on action limits and practical operat-
ing methods in case of radiation danger drafted 
together with the other Nordic countries. Listed 
future challenges included the ageing of the NPPs, 
proving the reliability of digital I&C, as well as the 
management of competence and resources as the 
new NPP projects increase the workload and cur-
rent employees start to retire.
The meeting also discussed the development of 
the International Convention on Nuclear Safety 
and the related evaluation process, and approved 
some amendments of the instructions. Further-
more, the meeting voted on a proposal by Swit-
zerland on amending the actual International 
Convention on Nuclear Safety in terms of the 
management of severe accidents. Based on the 
voting results, the proposal will be discussed by 
a Diplomatic Conference to be arranged in early 
2015. Preparations for the Diplomatic Conference 
started in 2014 and STUK participated in a work 
meeting on the amendment proposal by Switzer-
land, for example.
STUK coordinated the drafting of the national 
report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of 
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Ra-
dioactive Waste Management, also called the Nu-
clear Waste Convention, and submitted the report 
to the IAEA in October 2014. Significant reporting 
themes included processing of the construction li-
cense application for the spent nuclear fuel reposi-
tory, development of nuclear waste management 
competence and preparation of the final disposal of 
small amounts of radioactive waste. A similar re-
view meeting will be arranged in May of next year. 
Finland also reviewed the reports of other coun-
tries, such as Sweden, the United States, France 
and Hungary, and submitted specifying questions 
to these countries.
Cooperation within international 
organisations and other countries
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established upon the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC).It involves fourteen 
countries with the objective of improving coopera-
tion in the field of the assessment of new nuclear 
power plants and developing convergent regula-
tory practices. In addition to the United States of 
America, the following countries participate in the 
programme: South Africa, India, Japan, Canada, 
China, Korea, France, Finland, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. In 
2014, Turkey also joined the programme. Partici-
pants in the programme include only those coun-
tries with new nuclear power plants at some stage 
of assessment by the regulatory authorities. The 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency functions as the 
secretariat for the programme.
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The MDEP’s work is organised in design-spe-
cific and issue-specific working groups. In addi-
tion, the MDEP has a management group and 
a steering group. There are five Design-Specific 
Working Groups: the EPR Working Group, the 
AP1000 Working Group, the APR1400 Working 
Group, the VVER Working Group and the ABWR 
Working Group. STUK has representatives in all 
of the above-mentioned working groups, except for 
the AP100 Working Group, because an EPR plant 
is under construction at Olkiluoto (the Olkiluoto 3 
project), APR1400 and ABWR are considered as al-
ternatives in the Olkiluoto 4 project and Fennovo-
ima is planning the construction of a VVER plant.
The EPR Working Group’s work was originally 
a continuation of cooperation between the Finnish 
and French authorities concerning safety assess-
ment of EPR power plants. The other countries in 
the EPR Working Group are France, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, In-
dia and Sweden. The EPR Working Group has 
four subgroups dealing with I&C, accidents and 
transients, severe accidents and probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRAs). STUK’s representative chairs 
the PRA subgroup.
The MDEP Working Groups independent of 
plant design dealt with the following three sub-
jects: plant and plant supplier inspections and 
reviews, pressure equipment standards and pro-
grammable I&C. STUK participated in the activi-
ties of all three Issue-Specific Working Groups. The 
objective of the Working Group dealing with plant 
and equipment supplier inspections and reviews 
is to establish the procedures and requirements 
applied to inspections and reviews by the partici-
pating countries and to create the procedures and 
goals for joint inspections and reviews. In 2014, the 
Working Group implemented its first joint inspec-
tion at a company that manufactures mechanical 
pressure equipment. Jointly developed criteria on 
assessing manufacturer’s operations were utilised 
in the inspection.
The objective of the Working Group dealing 
with pressure equipment is the harmonisation of 
requirements in different standards. The Work-
ing Group on programmable I&C aims to promote 
the coordinated development of the IEC and IEEE 
standards, among others. Some individual issues 
have also been selected, on which common posi-
tions have been drafted.
Co-operation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory guides 
on nuclear safety. STUK had a representative on 
the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) man-
aging the preparation of the regulatory guides as 
well as in the committees dealing with the content 
of the regulatory guides, i.e. the Nuclear Safety 
Standards Committee (NUSSC), the Waste Safe-
ty Standards Committee (WASSC), the Radiation 
Safety Standards Committee (RASSC), the Nucle-
ar Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) and the 
Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANS-
SC). STUK issued statements on the IAEA regula-
tory guides under preparation. STUK also partici-
pated in the composition of regulatory guide drafts 
in small expert groups.
STUK’s representatives participated in IAEA 
expert groups; the groups reviewed the operations 
of regulatory authorities in the France and Korea.
STUK is the Finnish contact organisation for 
the following nuclear energy information exchange 
systems maintained by the IAEA:
•	 International	 Reporting	 System	 for	Operating	
Experience (IRS)
•	 Incident	Reporting	System	 for	Research	Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
•	 International	Nuclear	Event	Scale	(INES)
•	 Power	Reactor	Information	System	(PRIS)
•	 Nuclear	 Fuel	 Cycle	 Information	 System	 (NF-
CIS)
•	 Net	 Enabled	 Waste	 Management	 Database	
(NEWMDB)
•	 Illicit	Trafficking	Database	(ITDB)
•	 Database	 on	 Events	 that	 have	 arisen	 during	
Transport of Radioactive Material (EVTRAM)
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for co-operation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 Nuclear	 safety	 regulation	 (CNRA,	 Committee	
on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safe-
ty of Nuclear Installations)
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•	 Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
Cooperation within the EU
WENRA
STUK actively participated in an update of the 
nuclear safety reference levels of the Western Eu-
ropean Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) 
where the Fukushima accident was taken into ac-
count. The updated reference levels were published 
in September 2014.
ENSREG
STUK participated in the activities of the EU 
member states’ nuclear safety regulators’ co-oper-
ation group (ENSREG, European Nuclear Safety 
Regulators Group) and in two of its subgroups (on 
nuclear safety and nuclear waste management). In 
July 2014, STUK submitted to the European Com-
mission a report in compliance with the Nuclear 
Safety Directive on compliance with the Directive 
in Finland.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, the EU 
launched stress tests for existing nuclear power 
plants and for those under construction. The pur-
pose of these tests was to establish how the NPPs 
would cope with exceptional external events and 
other situations associated with the simultaneous 
loss of operability of several safety systems. In late 
2014, STUK updated the national action plan of 
Finland, which will be reviewed by a review meet-
ing arranged by the ENSREG in Brussels in April 
2015.
Other international cooperation
STUK participated in the cooperation between 
the regulatory authorities of countries with VVER 
power plants (such as the Loviisa power plant) 
via the VVER Forum. The annual meeting of the 
VVER Forum was arranged in June 2014 by STUK. 
STUK’s representatives participated in the work of 
two VVER Forum working groups. The Probabilistic 
Risk Analyses Working Group (PRA) meet in Jere-
van in June. Another working group of the VVER 
Forum, one that focuses on experiences on construc-
tion and commissioning of VVER plants, met at 
STUK’s office in November 2014.
STUK’s representative was a member of the 
supporting committee to the Swedish nuclear safe-
ty authority, and a reactor safety expert group 
called by the Swiss nuclear safety authority.
STUK participated in the work of the Euro-
pean Safeguards Research and Development As-
sociation (ESARDA). The purpose of ESARDA is 
to promote and harmonise the European research 
and development work on nuclear safeguards. In 
2014, STUK participated in the Executive Board 
of ESARDA and was among the presiding officers 
of the NA/NT Working Group which develops new 
technologies and the VTM Working Group which 
develops verification methods.
International operating experience feedback
STUK’s operations
STUK has a working group for monitoring and as-
sessing international operating experience events 
and reports from nuclear power plants. The work-
ing group includes STUK experts from various 
fields of technology. In 2014 in its monthly meet-
ings, the working group assessed a total of approxi-
mately a hundred reports received from the IAEA’s 
operating experience database. Of the assessed 
reports, 92 required no measures at the Finnish 
NPPs. With regard to five events, the practices and 
arrangements in place at the Finnish NPPs were 
found to be adequate to prevent similar events. In 
the case of 15 event reports, the working group de-
cided that the status of the Finnish NPPs should be 
assessed in more detail in connection with STUK’s 
inspections or the issue should be studied in con-
nection with other oversight activities.
Four new reports were drafted in the Interna-
tional Reporting System for Operating Experience 
(IRS) maintained by the IAEA regarding events 
at the Finnish NPPs. Furthermore, information 
on the current status or procedures of the Finnish 
NPPs was added as feedback to five events report-
ed by other countries in the IRS.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of NPPs. The power companies and STUK evaluate 
and oversee the safety and operation of the plants 
in many ways. Along with inspections and safety 
assessments, indicators are a method of acquiring 
information on the safety level of the NPPs and on 
any changes to the safety level.
The objective of the indicator system is to recog-
nise changes in plant safety as early on as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the underlying factors 
influencing the development must be determined 
and changes to plant operation and STUK’s over-
sight of the area must be considered. Indicators 
can also be used to monitor the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of corrective measures. Furthermore, the 
information yielded by the indicators is used when 
communicating nuclear safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is di-
vided into three sectors: 1) operation and main-
tenance, 2) operational events and 3) structural 
integrity. STUK began the development of its own 
indicator system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator 
information has been managed in STUK’s INDI 
(INdicator DIsplay) information system. Nomi-
nated STUK representatives are responsible for 
the maintenance and analysis of the indicators. In-
dividual indicators, their maintenance procedures 
and the interpretation of results are presented at 
the end of this summary. A brief summary of the 
safety status of each plant in 2014 is presented 
below, followed by the detailed results by indicator.
Nuclear safety
A.I Operation and maintenance of 
a nuclear facility A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2014
Summary of indicator results for Loviisa NPP
In the indicator system, nuclear safety has been 
divided into three categories as illustrated below. 
The assessments given in the paragraphs below 
are based solely on conclusions made based on the 
indicators. An actual overall safety assessment is 
given in Chapter 4.1.1 of this annual report.
Operation and maintenance
There were no essential changes when compared 
to previous years in the total number of mainte-
nance tasks on components subject to the OLC in 
2014. However, the number of immediate operation 
restrictions due to faults in components subject to 
the OLC has constantly decreased over the past 
four years. The ratio of preventive maintenance to 
fault repairs was 7.2 in 2014, which is 25% higher 
than the average of the four previous years. The 
ratio means that the share of preventive mainte-
nance of all maintenance work has remained high. 
The average repair times of faults that caused in-
operability of components have also systematically 
decreased at Loviisa NPP since 2009. No faults 
with a significant impact on plant safety have oc-
curred and zero common-cause failures were iden-
tified at Loviisa NPP in 2014.
The main purpose of the OLC exemption proce-
dure is to enable modifications and maintenance 
that will improve safety and plant availability 
with the approval of STUK. In 2014, Loviisa NPP 
submitted six exemption applications to STUK for 
approval. This is a normal number of applications. 
Furthermore, the NPP was in a state that was non-
compliant with the OLC six times in 2014. Fortum 
analysed all events and defined corrective meas-
ures to prevent similar events from recurring.
In the STUK indicator system, the functionality 
of safety systems is monitored on the basis of the 
unavailability of the high-pressure safety injection 
system, emergency feedwater system and emer-
gency diesel generators. In 2014, the condition and 
availability of the former two were good and the 
availability of the emergency diesel generators re-
mained acceptable. No changes in the availability 
of these three systems have occurred in the past 
few years.
Operation and maintenance of a nuclear fa-
cility is assessed on the basis of information con-
cerning the radiation protection and the operation 
and maintenance of the plant. The operation and 
maintenance of the plant is monitored using the 
failure and maintenance data for the components 
with an effect on the safe operation of the plant, as 
well as by monitoring compliance with the opera-
tional limits and conditions (OLC). The success of 
radiation protection is monitored on the basis of 
the employees’ radiation doses and radioactive re-
leases into the environment. Attention is also paid 
to investments to improve the plant and to the up-
to-dateness of the plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety 
of the plant, the personnel or the environment. A 
special report is required for any special situa-
tions. Correspondingly, a disturbance report must 
be prepared for any significant disturbances oc-
curring at a plant unit. Such disturbances include 
reactor and turbine trips, and other operational 
transients leading to a forced reduction of more 
than 5% in the reactor power or average gross 
power. Risk indicators are used to monitor the 
safety effect of the equipment’s unavailability pe-
riods and the development of the plant’s risk level. 
The results provide insight into the operational 
activities at the plant and the efficiency of the op-
erating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control primary and second-
ary circuit integrity. The monitoring is done by 
indices depicting water chemistry control and by 
following selected corrosive impurities and corro-
sion products. The integrity of the containment is 
monitored by testing the leak tightness of isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
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The main part of the radiation doses is received 
during outages. Due to improvements in radiation 
safety, the collective occupational dose of employ-
ees at Loviisa 1 was the lowest ever recorded and 
the collective occupational dose at Loviisa 2 was 
low even though a four-year annual outage was 
implemented. The radiation doses for NPP em-
ployees at Loviisa remained below the individual 
dose limits. The average of the ten largest doses 
was slightly lower than the average even though a 
larger four-year annual outage was implemented 
at Loviisa 2. The doses during previous similar 
annual outages have been clearly higher than the 
doses in 2014. In 2014, the radioactive releases 
into the air and water from Loviisa NPP were of 
the same magnitude as in previous years. Releases 
into the environment remained clearly below the 
limits set. Releases of noble gases into the air from 
Loviisa NPP were of the same magnitude as in pre-
vious years while releases of particulate aerosols 
were clearly lower than normal.
Operational events
No reactor trips occurred at Loviisa NPP in 2014. 
The number of transient reports remained at the 
normal level and the number of events warranting 
a special report was around the same as during the 
previous year.
The indicator for risk-significance of component 
unavailability is an increase of the conditional core 
damage probability (CCDP) in connection with 
each event. In 2014, this indicator was of the same 
magnitude as in the previous year when taking 
into account events that are most or least signifi-
cant in terms of the risk. The number of risks due 
to operational activities has continued to decrease 
over the past four years, however.
In 2014, a little over half (54%) of the core dam-
age frequency originated from power operation: 
fires during power operation comprise one quarter, 
weather phenomena around one sixth, internal 
initiating events around 5%, floods 2% and seismic 
events 0.4% of the total risk. Less than half (42%) 
of the core damage frequency originates from cold 
shutdowns. One third of the risk assessments for 
standard cold operating modes are caused by oil 
spills and one quarter by drops of heavy loads. 
Primary leaks caused by human errors are also 
among the most significant risks. The Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) model for the Loviisa NPP 
used to describe the plant unit Loviisa 1. In 2014, 
Fortum completed a separate PRA model for Lovi-
isa 2. The key differences between the plant units 
involve loss of ventilation in the instrumentation 
facilities and fires. No events classified as fires oc-
curred at Loviisa NPP or outside the plant area in 
2014. The number of fire detection system faults 
at Loviisa NPP has remained at the same level for 
the past ten years.
Structural integrity
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of the 
Loviisa units in 2014, which means that the maxi-
mum iodine (I-131) activity values associated with 
shutdowns have been restored to the level pre-
ceding leaks. In 2014, the impurity and corrosion 
product levels in the reactor coolant system and 
the secondary circuit, followed in STUK’s indica-
tor system, were in keeping with the OLC limits. 
In the past few years, the chemistry index has 
also remained at a good level at the Loviisa plant 
units. In 2014, the maximum Co-60 activity levels 
associated with shutdowns were around the same 
as in the previous years, which indicates successful 
compliance with the ALARA principle. All of the 
chemistry indicators show that the integrity of the 
reactor coolant systems at the Loviisa plant units 
was good in 2014.
Total leakage of the outer isolation valves at 
Loviisa 1 compared to the maximum allowed total 
leakage remained unchanged. The total leakage at 
Loviisa 2 clearly decreased from the previous year. 
The percentage of isolation valves that passed the 
leaktightness test at first attempt increased at 
both Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. The indicator describ-
ing the overall as-found leakage of the personnel 
airlock, material airlock, emergency personnel air-
lock, reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable pen-
etrations and bellows seals is good for both plant 
units and remains clearly below the limit set.
Summary of indicator results for Olkiluoto NPP
Operation and maintenance
Functionality of safety systems is monitored on 
the basis of the unavailability of the containment 
spray system, the auxiliary feedwater system and 
the emergency diesel generators. The condition and 
availability of the systems and emergency diesel 
generators were good in 2014.
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The indicators describing the condition of com-
ponents subject to the OLC show that the main-
tenance of equipment important to safety and the 
repairing of faults occurring in them remain at an 
appropriate level.
Radiation doses received by employees and re-
leases into the environment remained low and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations. In 
2014, the collective occupational radiation dose of 
Olkiluoto employees was the lowest ever recorded 
during the operation of the NPP. The previous 
record was from 2013. The radiation doses have 
clearly decreased after the installation of new mois-
ture separators at the plant units in 2005–2007. The 
radiation level in the turbine buildings has contin-
ued to decrease after the installation of the moisture 
separators, which has also decreased the collective 
occupational dose. Furthermore, improvements aim-
ing at reducing the employees’ radiation doses have 
also been made in radiation protection of the NPP.
The releases of substances with gamma activ-
ity into the sea from Olkiluoto NPP have been 
decreasing in recent years, reaching their lowest 
value ever in 2014. In 2014, releases of radioactive 
materials into the air were of the same magnitude 
as in the preceding years. Releases into the envi-
ronment were low, well below the set limits.
Operational events
No reactor trips occurred at Olkiluoto NPP in 2014. 
The number of events warranting a special report 
(ten in total) was around the average for the past 
ten years while the number of events warranting a 
transient report (seven in total) was slightly above 
the average. In all of the cases warranting a special 
report, the plant was non-compliant with the OLC 
without an advance safety analysis and STUK’s 
permission. TVO analysed the events and defined 
corrective measures to prevent their reoccurrence.
At Olkiluoto NPP, the most important factors 
affecting the overall accident risk include internal 
events during power operation (component fail-
ures and pipe ruptures leading to an operational 
transient). In 2014, the risk caused by operational 
activities remained at around the same level as 
in the past ten years. The annual probability of a 
severe reactor accident calculated for Olkiluoto 1 
at the end of 2014 was 0.84 × 10-5 and for Olkiluoto 
2 1.41 × 10-5. The key reason behind the difference 
between the plant units and the decreased core 
damage frequency at Olkiluoto 1 from the level 
of 2013 was a modification made in the auxiliary 
feedwater system that reduced the system’s de-
pendence on seawater cooling. A similar modifica-
tion has not been implemented at Olkiluoto 2 yet.
No events classified as fires occurred in the 
Olkiluoto plant area in 2014. One event classi-
fied as a fire occurred outside the plant area. The 
fire event was minor and no fire extinguishing 
measures were necessary. No fire detection system 
faults were observed at Olkiluoto NPP in 2014. 
There were slightly more actual fire detection sys-
tem alarms in 2014 than in 2013. The number of 
alarms has continued to decrease over the past ten 
years, however.
Structural integrity
Based on water chemistry indicators, integrity of 
the reactor coolant systems at the Olkiluoto plant 
units was good in 2014. The impurity and corro-
sion product levels in reactor water and feedwater, 
monitored in the STUK indicator system, were in 
keeping with the guideline values set by the li-
censee at Olkiluoto 2. At Olkiluoto 1, the chloride 
content was momentarily high due to a condenser 
circulating water leak in April, and the limit value 
laid down in the operational limits and conditions 
(OLC) was exceeded. Fuel integrity of both plant 
units was good during the 2013–2014 fuel cycle, 
and no fuel leaks were detected. Several fuel leaks 
have occurred in the 2000s at the Olkiluoto plant 
units, particularly at Olkiluoto 2. The main reason 
for the leaks has been small foreign objects en-
tering the reactor during maintenance operations. 
These objects can get caught in the fuel assembly 
structures. The coolant flow may cause the loose 
objects to vibrate and break the fuel cladding. To 
prevent this, fuel assemblies with new sieve struc-
tures for foreign objects were loaded into the reac-
tor of Olkiluoto 2 in 2012. The sieve profiles were 
changed to make the grid denser.
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at both plant units continued to remain 
clearly below the limit set in the OLC. The percent-
age of isolation valves that passed the leak test 
at first attempt has remained high for both plant 
units. The total as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations, in which TVO includes leak-
ages in the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the 
maintenance dome and the containment dome, has 
remained small for both plant units.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Operation and maintenance
A.I.1 Faults and repairing them
A.I.1a Faults in components subject to the OLC
Definition
The number of faults causing the unavailability of 
components during load operation defined in the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) is moni-
tored as an indicator. The faults are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction, and faults causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to assess NPP lifecycle man-
agement and development of the condition of com-
ponents.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of faults causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2014 was 154. The average number of faults during 
the four previous years was 180, which means that 
there was no significant change in the number of 
faults in 2014 or in the fault trend.
The number of faults per year remained stable. 
Any variation therein has been caused by the ran-
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on plant safety, and the management of component 
availability has been successful.
Based on the above, it can be stated that the 
indicator or the underlying fault data do not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component lifecycle management 
and component maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of faults occurring during load opera-
tion and causing the unavailability of components 
subject to the OLC has been increasing since 2009. 
In 2011, the number of faults was nearly double 
the number of faults in 2009. In 2012, the number 
of faults decreased back to the level of 2010, and 
the number of faults did not change in 2013 or 
2014. The number of faults indicates that mainte-
nance has been successful.
The unavailability times of OLC components 
in OL1 during all four quarters of 2014 were brief. 
The number of faults leading to an immediate 
operation restriction at OL1 somewhat increased 
from the previous years. Faults did not occur in a 
particular system alone, however.
In OL2, most of the unavailability times of 
OLC components were brief in 2014. Most of the 
observed OLC component faults occurred in emer-
gency diesel generators and related systems.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components 
subject to the OLC
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the NPP work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and fault repairs are retrieved.
Purpose
The indicator describes the volumes of fault repairs 
and preventive maintenance, and illustrates the 
condition of the NPP and its maintenance strategy. 
The indicator is used to assess the maintenance 
strategy implemented at the NPP.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance jobs, the scheduling 
of various annual outages (refueling outage, short 
annual outage, four-year annual outage, eight-year 
annual outage) included in the maintenance strat-
egy of Loviisa NPP during a four-year cycle should 
be considered, since it can have a significant im-
pact on the annual figures. In 2014, a short annual 
outage was implemented in LO1 and a four-year 
annual outage in LO2.
According to the data on which the indicator is 
based, the year 2014 showed no major deviation 
from the average numbers of fault repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance volumes of the four previous 
years. In 2014, the number of maintenance tasks 
on components subject to the OLC was 9% higher 
than the average. Similarly, the volume of preven-
tive maintenance was 11% higher than the aver-
age, and the number of fault repairs 14% lower.
The ratio of preventive maintenance to fault re-
pairs was 7.2. The ratio is 25% higher than the 5.8 
average of the four previous years, which means 
that the share of preventive maintenance of all 
maintenance work has remained high.
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The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of maintenance works causing inop-
erability of components, included in the indicator, 
decreased in 2007–2009 due to the lower number 
of fault repairs. In 2010, the number of faults re-
paired increased while the number of preventive 
maintenance operations decreased.
In 2014, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components remained at the level 
of 2011–2013. The number of preventive main-
tenance tasks slightly increased, improving the 
ratio of preventive maintenance and fault repairs 
from 2011. The number of faults repaired at OL2 
decreased and the relative number of preventive 
maintenance tasks increased more than at OL1, 
and thus the maintenance ratio increased at OL2 
to 2.25.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and an 
assessment of the work on which the figures are 
based, the maintenance strategy can be considered 
successful.
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A.I.1c Repair times of components 
subjectto the OLC
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of faults 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. With each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. In the case of a fault that 
causes an immediate operation restriction, it is cal-
culated from the detection of the fault to the end of 
the repair work. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repairs, only the time it takes to 
complete the repairs is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the NPPs’ work order 
systems as well as maintenance and operation doc-
umentation.
Purpose
The indicator shows how quickly failed components 
subject to the OLC are repaired when compared to 
the repair time allowed in the OLC. The indicator 
is used to assess the strategy, resources and effec-
tiveness of NPP maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The OLC define the maximum allowed repair times 
for components based on the components’ safety 
significance. The times vary from four hours to 21 
days. Furthermore, faults in OLC components are 
to be repaired within the allotted time without 
undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring 
operation restrictions and the varying allowed 
repair times, an individual operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator, even if it is com-
pleted within the allotted time. This aspect of the 
indicator is taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of the indicator by evaluating the significance 
of individual long-term fault repairs in terms of 
maintenance strategy, resources and efficiency of 
operations.
The average repair times of faults causing una-
vailability of components have remained stable at 
Loviisa NPP for several years. In 2008, the aver-
age repair time for the plant units was 20.4 hours, 
while the average of the four previous years was 
24.6. In 2014, the average repair time of OLC com-
ponent faults that had an allowed repair time of 72 
hours or less was 12.7 hours at Loviisa 1 and 7.7 
hours at Loviisa 2.
Based on the 2013 indicators and the underlying 
data, the plant’s maintenance operations can be con-
sidered appropriate. Despite the positive develop-
ment in repair times, attention still needs to be paid 
to the NPP’s maintenance on having the necessary 
resources available for fault repairs, and for carry-
ing out the repairs without unnecessary delays.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The repair time allowed in 
the OLC is usually 30 days for faults concerning 
one train and three days for faults concerning two 
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trains. Depending on the system and the compo-
nent, other allowed repair times may also be de-
fined in the OLC.
In the long term, the average repair time has 
varied between six to ten hours. In 2014, the aver-
age repair time of faults causing inoperability of 
components subject to the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) at Olkiluoto 1 was around 10 h 
and at Olkiluoto 2 around 7 h. In the case of both 
plant units, the average repair time of faults caus-
ing inoperability of components subject to the OLC 
was at around the same level as in the previous 
years, except that the time increased to the level of 
2009 at OL1.
On the basis of the 2014 indicators and the un-
derlying data, the NPP’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.1d Common-cause failure
Definition
As the indicator, the number of common-cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the op-
erational limits and conditions (OLC) is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the power companies of works causing an opera-
tion restriction.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When a fault is observed in a safety-critical sys-
tem, component or structure in connection with 
maintenance, inservice testing or other monitoring 
operations, the corrective measures include an in-
vestigation of whether the fault is a single fault, or 
whether there might be other similar faults in the 
system. No common-cause failures were identified 
at Loviisa NPP in 2014.
Olkiluoto
One fault that was identified as a common-cause 
failure occurred at Olkiluoto in 2014. It concerned 
a software fault detected in the Gardel system that 
is used in reactor monitoring.
The number of common-cause failures has var-
ied a great deal over the years. There were only a 
few common-cause failures in 2005–2010 (six in 
total),
while there were plenty of common-cause fail-
ures in 2011–2013 (15 in total).
In the past few years, most common-cause 
failures have been detected in emergency diesel 
generators and the relief train. TVO has launched 
a project on replacing the emergency diesel genera-
tors. The new emergency diesel generators will be 
installed in 2017–2021.
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A.I.1g Production losses due to faults
Definition
As the indicator, the loss of production caused by 
faults in relation to rated power (gross) is moni-
tored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the significance of 
faults from the point of view of NPP production.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Production losses due to faults have been small at 
both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, which is also indicated 
by the NPPs’ high load factors.
Loviisa
In 2014, Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 experienced more 
faults resulting in production losses than in the 
previous year. The number of faults was restored to 
the level prior to 2012.
Most of the faults resulting in production losses 
(two out of three) at Loviisa 2 in 2014 were caused 
by observations made during the commissioning 
tests of the main steam line safety valves that 
were replaced during the annual outage and study-
ing of these observations. A little less than one 
third were caused by the maximum allowed fuel 
element power that restricted the restoration into 
full power after the annual outage. The production 
losses at Loviisa 1 were caused by several faults 
of different types and their repairs; there was no 
single predominant cause.
Olkiluoto
There were only a few faults resulting in produc-
tion losses at both Olkiluoto plant units in 2014; 
the number of faults resulting in production losses 
has not been so low since 2009. There were no long-
term repair outages caused by faults at neither of 
the plant units.
Most production losses at Olkiluoto 1 were 
caused by the replacement of a relief train control 
valve in March, the repair of a circulating water 
leak in a condenser in April and a partial reactor 
trip during a preheater bypass test in December.
Most production losses at Olkiluoto 2 were 
caused by the replacement of two generator carbon 
brushes in July.
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the OLC
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-conformances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders by the power companies 
and from event reports.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the power compa-
nies’ activities in accordance with the operational 
limits and conditions: compliance with the OLC 
and identified situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from the OLC; conclusions regard-
ing the appropriateness of the OLC can also be 
made based on this data.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable modifications and maintenance that 
will improve safety and plant availability.
Non-conformance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the NPP or a system or component of 
the NPP is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
to have zero non-conformance events at the NPPs. 
The licensee must always prepare a special report 
on each non-conformance and any corrective meas-
ures, and submit it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
Based on the last ten years (2004–2013), Loviisa 
NPP applies for STUK’s approval for exemptions 
from the OLC six times per year on average. The 
number of applications in 2014 (six applications) 
was in line with the average. Three of the applica-
tions concerned modifications and three concerned 
the enabling of the plant unit’s startup after the 
annual outage. As the planned deviations had no 
significant safety implications, STUK approved the 
applications.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2014, six events during which the plant did not 
comply with the OLC without an advance safety 
analysis and approval were detected at Loviisa 
NPP. There have been more such events in the 
past three years than in the previous years. Such 
events have occurred three times per year on aver-
age during the past ten years (2004–2013). The in-
crease may have been caused by the development 
of the event detection and reporting procedures or 
a decrease in operations. For more information on 
an assessment of this issue and a related improve-
ment project, please see Chapter 4.1.7 of the 2013 
and 2014 annual reports (a project started by a 
special reporting committee). All events that were 
non-compliant with the OLC in 2014 are described 
in Chapter 4.1.2 of this annual report and Appen-
dix 3.
Loviisa NPP analyses all non-conformances 
with the OLC within a month of detection. The 
analysis includes finding out the underlying caus-
es, assessing the safety significance of the event 
and determining corrective measures to prevent 
reoccurrence of the deviations. The results of the 
analysis are documented in a special report (in-
dicator A.II.1). One key issue is identifying the 
possibility of reoccurrence, i.e. studying whether a 
similar event has occurred in the past and whether 
the corrective measures implemented at the time 
were sufficient. One issue in common to several of 
the events in 2012–2014 (observed in connection 
with seven events in total) was non-compliance 
with the OLC during the changing of a plant unit’s 
operating mode, i.e. either when switching the unit 
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from load operation to a shutdown or from a shut-
down to load operation. The shutdown or startup 
of a plant unit is implemented in stages. Before 
moving on to the next stage, it must be verified 
that all the requirements for the next stage have 
been met. These inspections were not fully suc-
cessful in the case of these events. One must make 
sure that there are no defects that could lead to 
an inadvertent deviation in people’s knowledge of 
the OLC, procedures related to compliance with 
the OLC or the formatting of the OLC themselves. 
Fortum studied the events at the turn of the year 
2013/2014 and drafted a root cause analysis. All 
of the measures listed in the analysis report will 
be implemented by the 2015 annual outages. Ef-
fect of the measures can be verified during future 
annual outages and any other future outages. The 
applications for exemptions from the OLC concern-
ing startup that were mentioned above are also 
an indication that attention has been paid to this 
issue and the changing of operating mode has been 
properly managed in these cases.
Olkiluoto
Based on data from the last ten years (2003–2014), 
Olkiluoto NPP applied for STUK’s approval for 
exemptions from the OLC seven times per year on 
average. The number of applications in 2014 (nine 
applications in total) was slightly higher than the 
average. Three of the applications concerned in-
stallation of a recirculation line in the auxiliary 
feedwater system of Olkiluoto 1 and three con-
cerned the expansion and modernisation of the 
interim storage facility for spent fuel. STUK ap-
proved all the applications, except for one. STUK 
refused TVO’s application to increase the trip limit 
for high circulating water temperature that starts 
the cooling circuits of the condensate pool because 
TVO did not provide sufficient justification on the 
operation of the unit being safe at the proposed 
condensate pool temperature.
In 2004 and 2005, the number of deviations was 
increased by work and installations related to the 
modernisation of OL1 and OL2 and the construc-
tion of OL3. Similarly, major modifications were 
carried out in 2010 and 2011.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2014, TVO reported three events during which 
the NPP was non-compliant with the OLC without 
an advance safety analysis and STUK’s permis-
sion. This number of events complies with the av-
erage number of events during the past ten years 
(three). Both measuring channels of the radioac-
tivity monitoring system were simultaneously de-
tached at Olkiluoto 2 due to a human error during 
calibration of the system. Some of the covers that 
protect the pools in the interim storage facility 
from an airplane crash were lifted with an unap-
proved hoisting device. A generator grounding car-
bon brush was replaced at Olkiluoto 1 in a manner 
that violated the NPP’s administrative procedures. 
Special reports on all three deviations from the 
OLC were submitted to STUK. In these reports, 
TVO analysed the causes of the events and deter-
mined corrective measures to prevent their reoc-
currence.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored separately for each plant unit. 
The systems monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are the containment spray system 
(322), the auxiliary feedwater system (327) and the 
emergency diesel generators (651–656). Those fol-
lowed at the Loviisa nuclear power plant are the 
high-pressure safety injection system (TJ), emer-
gency feedwater system (RL92/93, RL94/97) and the 
emergency diesel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavail-
ability hours and its required availability hours 
is used as the indicator. Unavailability hours are 
the combined unavailability of redundant trains 
divided by the number of trains.
Annual plant criticality hours are the avail-
ability requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL 
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systems. For diesel generators, the requirement is 
continuous, i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
The unavailability hours of a train include 
the time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to faults. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to fault detection. If a fault is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test but to have 
escaped detection, the time between inservice tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a fault has 
occurred between tests but its date of occurrence 
is unknown, half of the time period lapsed between 
tests will be added to the unavailability time. If the 
fault clearly occurred during an operational, main-
tenance, testing or other event, the time between 
the event and the defection of the fault is added to 
the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensee’s representatives submit 
the necessary data to the relevant person in charge 
at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The indicator is used to track the condi-
tion of safety systems and any identifiable trends.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems of the plant units 
in 2014 and their background information shows 
that two faults, the repairs for which caused the 
system to be unavailable for 8.25 hours, occurred 
at Loviisa 1. No faults causing unavailability oc-
curred at Loviisa 2.
The unavailability of the high pressure safety 
injection systems was low in 2014, i.e. their condi-
tion and availability were good.
RL system
At Loviisa 1, the total unavailability time of the 
emergency feedwater systems was 474 hours, of 
which unavailability of 383 hours was caused by 
the repair of a seized bearing of a pump in the 
emergency feedwater system RL94. No other faults 
were repaired at Loviisa 1, and the rest of the 
unavailability (91 hours) was caused by the peri-
odic maintenance of a diesel generator of the emer-
gency feedwater system RL94 during the annual 
outage of Loviisa 1.
The total unavailability time at Loviisa 2 was 
109 hours, which was caused in its entirety by 
periodic maintenance of the emergency feedwater 
system RL97 during the annual outage.
Unavailability of high pressure safety injection system (TJ), 
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The unavailability of the emergency feedwater 
systems was low in 2014, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2014, the unavailability time of the eight emer-
gency diesel generators was 723 hours, compared 
to 526 hours in 2013. The increase in the unavail-
ability time was mostly caused by the replacing 
of auxiliary relays in the diesel generator control 
circuits: relays with a programming option were 
replaced with approved relay types. The four-
teen separate relay replacements took 242 hours 
total. There were a total of 73 diesel generator 
faults causing unavailability of the generators. 15 
of these caused immediate operation restrictions 
while 58 caused operation restrictions from the be-
ginning of the repair work. Most of the faults were 
caused by the normal ageing of components and 
did not have any serious implications.
Unavailability of the emergency diesel genera-
tors was 1.13% in 2014, which is somewhat higher 
than the average for the past four years, 0.91%. 
Taking into account the impact of the above-men-
tioned replacement of relays, the unavailability of 
diesel generators remained low, i.e. availability of 
the emergency diesel generators was acceptable.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability times of the containment spray 
system have been decreasing since 2005. In 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013, the unavailability was 
zero for both plant units, and almost zero in 2009 
and 2012.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
system increased significantly after 2004, when 
the unavailability was practically zero. The in-
creased unavailability of Olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was 
due to faults in the recirculation and safety valves 
in system 327. There were no significant faults in 
2007, 2008 or 2009, and the unavailability of the 
auxiliary feedwater system decreased to nearly 
zero in 2009 at both plant units. In 2010, unavail-
ability of OL1 was still zero but unavailability of 
OL2 increased slightly from the previous year, 
mainly as a result of several new faults discovered 
during the outage. In 2011, the figure for OL1 was 
multiplied many times over as the result of a la-
Unavailability of containment spray system (322), 
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tent fault in one auxiliary feedwater system valve 
that remained inoperable for 504 hours (cf. Section 
A.II.3). In 2013, the unavailability of the auxiliary 
feedwater system was restored to the level prior to 
2011, and the unavailability remained at this level 
in 2014.
The unavailability of the diesel generators has 
decreased since 2005, and was very low in 2006 
and 2007. In 2008, the value increased by nearly 
95% compared to the previous year. The increase 
was due to latent faults in the compressed air mo-
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tors of the diesels in both plant units. In 2009, the 
unavailability of the diesel generators decreased 
considerably from the 2008 figures. In 2010, una-
vailability increased somewhat from the previous 
year as a result of faults occurring in connection 
with inservice testing. At OL1, the stator winding 
of a diesel generator failed in connection with a 
periodic test in August 2010, and the generator 
was replaced with an overhauled unit. In 2011, the 
unavailability of the emergency diesel generators 
was more than four times higher than in 2010, the 
highest figure ever recorded while the parameter 
has been monitored. The reason for the increase 
was the above-mentioned generator fault, which 
may have lasted as long as from August 2010 to 
May 2011. In addition, there were faults in exhaust 
manifolds and exhaust pipes in 2011. In 2012, the 
unavailability of the emergency diesel generators 
was zero. The unavailability of the diesel genera-
tors slightly increased in 2014 but still remained 
very low.
A.I.4 Radiation exposure
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
NPP employees by plant site and plant unit is 
monitored, together with the annual average of the 
ten highest occupational doses.
Source of data
The data on the collective occupational dose is re-
ceived from the quarterly and annual reports of 
the NPPs as well as the national dose register. The 
data on individual radiation doses is obtained from 
the national dose register.
Purpose
The indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. In addition, compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculated threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective occupational dose averaged over 
two successive years is monitored. The threshold 
value, 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electri-
cal power, means a radiation dose of 1.24 manSv 
for one Loviisa plant unit and 2.20 manSv for one 
Olkiluoto plant unit. The collective occupational 
doses describe the success of the NPP’s ALARA 
programme. The average of the ten highest doses 
indicates how close to the 20 manSv dose limit the 
individual occupational doses at the NPPs remain. 
It also indicates the effectiveness of the NPP’s ra-
diation protection unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Antti Tynkkynen
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. Both 
Loviisa plant units have more extensive annual 
outages every four and eight years (the four-year 
annual outage and the eight-year annual outage) 
so that both plant never have a major annual out-
age during the same year. Four-year and eight-year 
outages have been held in even years and normal 
annual outages in odd years. The effect of annual 
outages on collective occupational doses can be 
seen in the Collective occupational dose, Loviisa 
graph. In 2014, an eight-year annual outage took 
place at Loviisa 1 and a four-year annual outage 
at Loviisa  2. Due to improvements in radiation 
safety, the collective occupational dose of employ-
ees at Loviisa 1 was the lowest ever recorded and 
the collective occupational dose at Loviisa 2 was 
low even though a four-year annual outage was 
implemented.
The radiation doses for NPP workers at Loviisa 
remained below the individual dose limits. The 
average of the ten largest doses was slightly lower 
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than the average even though a larger four-year 
annual outage was implemented at Loviisa 2. The 
doses during previous similar annual outages have 
been clearly higher than the doses in 2014. The 
Radiation Decree (1512/1991) stipulates that the 
effective dose for a worker from radiation work 
may not exceed the 20 manSv/year average over 
any period of five years, or 50 manSv during any 
one year.
The threshold set for the collective occupational 
dose was not exceeded either in 2013. If, at one 
plant unit, the collective occupational radiation 
dose average over two successive years exceeds 
2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical power, the 
power company is to report to STUK the causes of 
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this and any measures required to improve radia-
tion safety (Guide YVL 7.9).
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. The 
annual outages of Olkiluoto plant units are di-
vided into two groups: refueling outages and main-
tenance outages. The refueling outage is shorter 
in duration (approximately 7 days). Length of the 
maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work to be done (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are 
scheduled so that in the same year, one plant unit 
undergoes a maintenance outage and the other a 
refueling outage. In 2014, Olkiluoto 1 underwent 
a maintenance outage and Olkiluoto 2 a refueling 
outage.
In 2014, the collective occupational radiation 
dose of Olkiluoto employees was the lowest ever 
recorded during the operation of the NPP. The pre-
vious record was from 2013. The radiation doses 
have clearly decreased after the installation of 
new moisture separators in 2005–2007. The radia-
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity 
averaged over two succesive years,
Olkiluoto NPP
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tion level in the turbine buildings has continued 
to decrease after the installation of the moisture 
separators, and this has also decreased the col-
lective occupational dose. Furthermore, improve-
ments aiming at reducing the employees’ radiation 
doses have also been made at the NPP.
In 2014, the average of the ten largest doses 
was the lowest ever recorded during the operation 
of the NPP. The ten largest doses have continued to 
decrease during the past ten years. The prescribed 
dose limits (Radiation Decree 1512/1991) were not 
exceeded.
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A.I.5 Releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the air from the NPPs are monitored, together 
with the calculated dose due to releases to the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the NPP.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the NPP 
is defined.
Purpose
The indicator is used to monitor the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Antti Tynkkynen
A.I.5a Releases into the air
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2014, the radioactive releases into the air from 
Loviisa NPP and Olkiluoto NPP were of the same 
magnitude as in previous years. Releases into the 
environment were low, well below the set limits.
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Kreq), 
Loviisa NPP
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Releases of noble gases from Loviisa NPP were 
of the same magnitude as in previous years, while 
releases of particulate aerosols were clearly lower 
than normal. The releases of particulate aerosols 
were higher in 2013 because more rapidly decaying 
As-76 (arsenic) than normal was released over the 
course of the year from both plant units. Releases 
of iodine isotopes decreased from the previous year.
No releases of radioactive noble gases into 
the environment were detected at Olkiluoto NPP 
(meaning that the releases remained below the 
detection limit). Releases of iodine isotopes were 
very low because there were no fuel leaks during 
the fuel cycle. The releases of particulate aerosols 
were also very low.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, from 
the minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication 
and from reactor surface contamination from ear-
lier fuel leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, there 
have been very few leaking fuel rods and the leaks 
have been small. No fuel leaks were observed at 
the NPPs in 2014. The indicator A.III.1 describes 
fuel integrity. The releases of radioactive noble 
gases from Loviisa power plant are dominated by 
argon-41, the activation product of argon-40 origi-
nating in the air space between the reactor pres-
sure vessel and the main radiation shield. Aerosol 
nuclides (including activated corrosion products) 
are released during maintenance work.
Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq), 
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A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gam-
ma radiation into the environment from Loviisa 
NPP and Olkiluoto NPP remained clearly below 
the set limits. In 2009 and 2013, Loviisa NPP re-
leased low-activity evaporation bottom into the 
sea as planned. Consequently, the releases of sub-
stances with gamma activity were larger than the 
average in those years. The releases of substances 
with gamma activity into the sea from Olkiluoto 
NPP have been decreasing in recent years, reach-
ing their lowest value ever in 2014.
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Interpretation of the indicator
The doses of the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity, calculated on the basis of the NPP’s re-
lease data and meteorological measurement data, 
remained below the set limit at Loviisa and Olki-
luoto. The calculated dose of the most exposed in-
dividual in the vicinity of Loviisa NPP was at the 
normal level in 2014. Larger radiation doses in 
2004 and 2009 were caused by the discharge of 
evaporator bottom into the sea. The calculated dose 
of the most exposed individual in the vicinity of 
Olkiluoto NPP was also normal.
The radiation doses of both NPPs were less 
than 0.1% of the limit of 100 microsieverts that is 
established in the Government Decree (733/2008).
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A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
Investments in NPP maintenance and modifica-
tions in the current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
The indicator demonstrates the relative fluctua-
tion of investments. The amounts given in euro are 
confidential information of the power companies 
involved, and not to be published here. Further-
more, the scales of the investment and modernisa-
tion graphs for Loviisa NPP and Olkiluoto NPP are 
not mutually comparable.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctua-
tions.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The variation of the indicator clearly shows the 
investments related to the power upgrades and 
modernisation projects of the NPPs. Both NPPs 
have paid great attention to lifecycle management, 
which also shows as continuous long-term invest-
ment plans. The renewal of the operating license 
of Loviisa NPP in 2007 and the intermediate as-
sessment carried out at Olkiluoto in 2008 have also 
had an impact on the investment plans.
Loviisa
Many modification projects and other projects span 
over the course of several years, which means that 
their total costs are also divided between several 
years. For example, investments in the Loviisa I&C 
renewal started in 2007. Other major investments 
in 2014 included modernisation of the reactor cool-
ant system pressure control system, a reheater up-
grade, a turbine modernisation project, an upgrade 
of a maintenance data system and modernisation 
of the service water system piping.
Olkiluoto
Slightly more investments and refurbishment 
projects than in the two previous years were im-
plemented in 2014. Investments have clearly de-
creased from the level of 2010 and 2011, during 
which years the LP steam turbines of both units 
were replaced, for example.
Major investments in 2014 included expansion 
of the interim storage facility for spent nuclear 
fuel, replacement of low voltage switchgear and 
auxiliary transformers, and construction of a re-
mote shutdown station. A major project started 
during the year was the replacement of reactor 
coolant pumps and their frequency converters. An-
other ongoing major investment is the replacement 
of the emergency diesel generators.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicators, the number of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL  1.5 is monitored 
(events warranting a special report, reactor trips 
and reports on operational events).
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from the STUK 
document management system (SAHA).
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Suvi Ristonmaa (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No reactor trips occurred at Loviisa NPP in 2014.
Based on data from the last ten years (2004–
2013), the average number of annual events war-
ranting a special report is three to four per year, 
while the average number of events warranting 
a transient report is five per year. The number of 
events warranting a special report was higher than 
the average in 2014 (six in total) and the number 
of events warranting a transient report (four in 
total) was slightly below the average. All of the 
events that warranted a special report in 2014 are 
described in Chapter 4.1.2 of this annual report 
and Appendix 3. Events classified as operational 
transients are described in brief in Chapter 4.1.2 of 
this annual report.
The number of events warranting a special re-
port has increased over the past few years. STUK 
discussed the issue of the increased number of 
events with the management of Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy (hereinafter referred to as “Fortum”) in 
the autumn of 2012. The licensee studied the un-
derlying causes of the changed trend and specified 
corrective measures. Fortum submitted an action 
plan on this issue to STUK for information at the 
end of 2013. The improvement project and its pro-
gress are described in more detail in Chapter 4.1.7 
of the annual reports for 2013 and 2014. Many 
of the events warranting a special report are de-
viations from the operational limits and conditions 
(OLC). The development of events non-compliant 
with the OLC is considered under indicator A.I.2.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Loviisa 1 alone. 
In 2014, one event warranting a special report con-
cerned both plant units.
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Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at Olkiluoto NPP in 2014. 
Based on the data from the last ten years, an aver-
age of zero to one reactor trips per year occurs at 
Olkiluoto NPP. During the previous decade (1993–
2001), an average of almost three to four reac-
tor trips occurred each year. The larger number of 
trips is explained by the fact that it also includes 
reactor trips during annual outages that occurred, 
for example, in connection with testing of the reac-
tor protection system.
Based on data from the last ten years, the aver-
age annual number of events warranting a special 
report or a transient report is five. The number of 
events warranting a special report (three in total) 
was slightly lower than the average in 2014, while 
the number of events warranting a transient re-
port (seven in total) was slightly above the average. 
Events warranting a special report were replace-
ment of generator grounding brushes at Olkiluoto 
1 in a manner that violated the NPP’s administra-
tive procedures, erroneous detachment of radiation 
measuring systems at Olkiluoto 2 and the use of an 
unapproved hoisting device at the interim storage 
facility for spent nuclear fuel. Events warranting a 
transient report included, for instance, switching of 
a reactor coolant pump to its minimum rpm due to 
a grid fault; this fault occurred four times in 2014.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give the correct 
idea of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, reports that concern both plant 
units or the interim storage facility for spent nu-
clear fuel have been entered for Olkiluoto 1 alone.
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A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
An increase in the conditional core damage prob-
ability (CCDP) associated with each event is used 
as the measure of a risk. CCDP takes the dura-
tion of each event into consideration. Events are 
divided into three categories: 1)  unavailability 
due to component faults, 2) planned unavailability 
and 3)  initiating events. Furthermore, events are 
grouped into three categories according to their 
risk-significance (CCDP): the most risk-significant 
events (CCDP>1E–7), other significant events (1E-
8 ≤ CCDP < 1E–7) and other events (CCDP < 
1E–8). The indicator is the number of events in 
each category.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. Any non-conformances with the OLC that can be 
applied to this indicator are included in category 
1. Non-conformances with the OLC are also dealt 
with under indicator A.I.2.
Calculations concerning Olkiluoto NPP have 
been made with FinPSA software and those con-
cerning Loviisa NPP with RiskSpectrum software. 
For Loviisa NPP, calculations of a simultaneous 
fault in several components are solely based on 
the load operation model, which means that the 
results are not as exact as for single faults which 
have been calculated for all operating modes. The 
modelling of simultaneous faults across all operat-
ing modes (17 of them) would be possible, but the 
calculation time would be too long when compared 
to the benefits gained. This year, no simultaneous 
faults of several components with the highest risk-
significance occurred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators is col-
lected from the power companies’ reports and ap-
plications for exemptions.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause faults, simultaneously occurring 
faults and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi 
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) 
(fault data)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risks is provided below.
Loviisa 1:
1. On 25 August 2014, the maintenance of the 
startup and shutdown pump system of LO2 
took 108.9 hours during the annual outage of 
LO2. This caused a risk for the unit LO1 that 
was in power operation because the startup and 
shutdown pump system of LO2 can also be used 
to cool LO1. The calculated CCDP was 1.4E-7.
2. On 24 September 2014, it was observed during 
an inservice inspection that the startup and 
shutdown pump system RL94D001 was stuck. 
When the fault was studied, it was noted that 
the cause was a seized journal bearing. The 
fault had been hidden for 48 hours, and the 
pump’s total unavailability time was 431 hours. 
The calculated CCDP was 6.34E-7.
STUK-B 191
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Most risk-significant events
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3. On 6 October 2014, emergency diesel genera-
tor EY02 did not start during inservice testing. 
The fault was studied, and it was noted that it 
was caused by a defective solenoid valve in the 
starting system. The fault had been hidden for 
321 hours and the total unavailability time was 
351 hours. The calculated CCDP was 3.2E-7.
4. The unavailabilities caused by events 2 and 3 
were simultaneously valid for 44.9 hours. The 
CCDP calculated for this simultaneous fault 
was 1.1E-7.
Loviisa 2:
1. On 31 July 2014, the maintenance of the start-
up and shutdown pump system of LO1 took 
83.5 hours during the annual outage of LO1. 
This caused a risk for the unit LO2 that was in 
power operation because the startup and shut-
down pump system of LO1 can also be used to 
cool LO2. The calculated CCDP was 1.1E-7.
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Most risk-significant events
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A brief description of the significant events is given 
below.
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
train C took 159 h. CCDP: 1.6E-07.
2. On 6 April 2014, switch 653G201 of a diesel 
generator in train B did not close. A hidden 
fault. Unavailability time 377 h. CCDP: 1.6E-7.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
train C took 107 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
It should be mentioned that there were several 
faults in the ultrasound flow detection of several 
trains of the service water system 712, which cools 
the emergency heat transfer chain. Since the op-
eration of the service water system can also be 
verified with the temperature measurements in 
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
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the emergency heat transfer chain, it was consid-
ered that the service water systems were operable 
regardless of the flow detection faults.
The combined total CCDP of all three cat-
egories divided by the probability of a severe ac-
cident gives an overview of the risk-significance 
of operational events. To facilitate analysis, risk 
calculation is based on conservative assumptions 
and simplifications, which materially weakens the 
applicability of the results for trend monitoring. If 
the risk-significance remains at the same average 
level year after year, the annual fluctuation does 
not warrant particular attention.
At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, the risk caused 
by operational activities remained at around the 
same level as in the past years.
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A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear facilities
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is monitored. The accident risk 
is presented per plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilistic 
risk assessments (PRA) of the NPPs. The PRA is 
based on detailed calculation models, which are 
continuously developed and complemented. A total 
of 200 man-years have been used at Finnish NPPs 
to develop the models. The basic PRA data includes 
globally collected reliability information of compo-
nents and operator activities, as well as operating 
experience from Finnish NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the NPP’s accident risk. The objective is to operate 
and maintain the NPP in such a manner that the 
accident risk decreases or remains stable. Proba-
bilistic risk assessments can assist in detecting a 
need to make modifications to the NPP or revise 
operating methods.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi 
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (fault data)
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, one must keep in 
mind that it is affected by both the development 
of the NPP and the development of the calcula-
tion model. Plant modifications and changes in 
methods, carried out to remove risk factors, will 
decrease the indicator value. An increase of the 
indicator value may be due to the model being ex-
tended to new event groups, or the identification of 
new risk factors. Furthermore, developing more de-
tailed models or obtaining more detailed basic data 
may change the risk estimates in either direction. 
For example, an increase in the Loviisa indicator 
in 2003 was due to the PRA being extended to 
cover exceptionally harsh weather conditions and 
oil accidents at sea during a refueling outage. In 
the following year, the indicator value decreased, 
partly as a result of a more detailed analysis of 
these factors.
Loviisa NPP’s accident risk has continued to 
decrease over the last ten years, and new risk fac-
tors, discovered as the scope of the PRA has been 
extended, have been efficiently removed. The in-
dicator decreased in 2007 due to the new service 
water line completed during the period. The new 
line allows for the alternative intake of seawater 
from the outlet channel to cool the NPP when it 
is at a shutdown. The change decreases the risks 
in situations where algae, frazil ice or an oil spill 
endangers the availability of seawater via the con-
ventional route. The decrease of the indicator in 
2008 and in the following years result from more 
detailed assessments performed in conjunction 
with the renewal of the operating license, as well 
as changes at the NPP planned to be carried out 
earlier or in connection with the license renewal. 
Such changes include a decrease in the probability 
of a criticality accident using, for example, boron 
analysers, modernisation of a refueling machine 
and a decrease in the probability of an external 
leak.
 In 2014, a little over half (54%) of the core dam-
age frequency originated from power operation: 1.2 
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× 10-5/a. Fires during power operation comprise one 
quarter, weather phenomena around one sixth, in-
ternal initiating events around 5%, floods 2% and 
seismic events 0.4% of the total risk. Less than half 
(42%) of the core damage frequency originates from 
cold shutdowns. One third of the risk assessments 
for standard cold operating modes are caused by oil 
spills and one quarter by drops of heavy loads. Pri-
mary leaks caused by human error are also among 
the most significant risks. The risk assessment for 
standard cold annual maintenance outage operat-
ing modes is 9.7 × 10-6.
The PRA model for the Loviisa NPP used to 
describe the plant unit Loviisa 1. In 2014, Fortum 
completed a separate PRA model for Loviisa 2. The 
key differences between the plant units involve 
loss of ventilation in the instrumentation facilities 
and fires. The instrumentation facility ventilation 
system of LO2 is inferior to that of LO1, and the 
spreading of fires via fire doors is more unlikely at 
LO1 than at LO2.
The indicator for Olkiluoto NPP decreased by 
approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previ-
ous years’ relatively stable values. The decrease 
was mainly due to the more detailed modelling of 
earthquake events and changes carried out at the 
NPP to improve seismic qualification. The increase 
in 2009 was due to the fact that a heat exchanger 
in the screening system could not be used for re-
sidual heat removal after all, contrary to earlier 
assessments. The decrease of the risk in 2010 was 
due to changes in the modelling of DC systems 672 
and 679 (inclusion of battery diversity), while the 
increase in 2011 resulted from reassessment of fire 
frequencies. At Olkiluoto NPP, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient).
TVO has introduced separate risk models for 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The annual probability 
of a severe reactor accident calculated for Olkiluoto 
1 at the end of 2014 was 0.84 × 10-5 and for Olki-
luoto 2 1.41 × 10-5. The key reason behind the de-
creased core damage frequency at Olkiluoto 1 from 
the level of 2013 was a change made in the auxil-
iary feedwater system that reduced the system’s 
dependence on seawater cooling. A similar change 
has not been implemented at Olkiluoto 2 yet.
A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the NPPs.
Responsible unit/person
Civil engineering and fire protection (RAK)
Pekka Välikangas
Interpretation of the indicator
No events classified as fires occurred at Loviisa 
NPP (LO1/LO2) or outside the plant area in 2014. 
The number of fire detection system faults and the 
number of actual alarms made by fire detectors at 
Loviisa NPP have remained stable for the past ten 
years. Alarms from the fire detection systems have 
also remained at a relatively low level. Most of the 
alarms were caused by dust, smoke or humidity.
No events classified as fires occurred at Olki-
luoto NPP (OL1/OL2) in 2014. One event classified 
as a fire occurred outside the plant area: an electric 
heater got overheated to an extent that its painted 
surface started to smoke at the OL3 construction 
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site. The employees detached the heater from 
the power grid and called the TVO fire brigade. 
The fire petered out by itself at this point, and no 
extinguishing measures were necessary. The fire 
brigade ventilated the premises. No fire detection 
system faults were observed at Olkiluoto NPP 
(OL1/OL2) in 2014. No faults were observed dur-
ing the five past years, either. There were slightly 
more correct fire detection system alarms in 2014 
than in 2013. The number of alarms has decreased 
over the past ten years, however.
The fire detection system of Loviisa NPP was 
renovated in 2000 and the fire detection system 
of Olkiluoto NPP in 2001. After the renovation of 
the fire alarm systems, the number of alarms in-
creased at both NPPs due to more sensitive detec-
tors. Advance alarms issued by the fire detection 
system are no longer included in these statistics.
Fire safety at Loviisa and Olkiluoto remained 
at around the same level as before. There have 
been four events classified as fires in the Loviisa 
plant area in the past ten years. The trend for 
Olkiluoto is slightly decreasing: the last event 
classified as a fire occurred four years ago.Fire 
detection systems are not always disconnected in 
a wide enough area during maintenance work. The 
number of alarms from the fire detection system 
is also affected by the amount of maintenance and 
repair work performed at the NPPs.
A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (startup operation or load opera-
tion for Loviisa and load operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
in conjunction with shutdowns or reactor trips, 
as well as the number of leaking fuel assemblies 
removed from the reactor, is also followed as an 
indicator.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available 
in the quarterly reports submitted by the power 
companies.
Purpose
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the fuel cycle. The indica-
tors for shutdown situations also describe the suc-
cess of the shutdown in terms of radiation protec-
tion.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Dina Solatie
A.III.1a Reactor coolant system activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reactor 
of Loviisa 1 in 2014. The last time a leaking fuel as-
sembly was removed from the Loviisa 1 reactor was 
in 2013 and the last time a leaking fuel assembly 
was removed from Loviisa 2 was during the annual 
outage of 2013. As a result of these measures, the 
maximum activity (I-131) of the primary coolant 
has remained low. After removal of the leaking fuel 
assemblies, the maximum activity values associated 
with shutdowns also returned to the level before 
the leaks. The actual reason for the fuel leak in 
Loviisa  2 is still unknown, as examination of the 
damaged fuel assemblies has not been possible due 
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 Automated failures       Actual automated alarms         Actual fires
STUK-B 191
127
APPENDIX 1 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for nppS in 2014
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 3.89E+02 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02 3.80+02 3.90E+02 3.70E+02 4.00E+02 3.50E+02
2.91E+02 2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04 1.20+03 8.50E+02 4.71E+03 5.40E+03 4.60E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 5.60E+04 6.70E+02 7.06E+02 6.30E+02 7.60E+02
 4.10E+02 1.40E+03 4.10E+03 3.41E+05 5.00E+03 
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 2.20E+03 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03 4.97E+04 1.49E+03 2.80E+03 8.50E+02 2.43E+03
5.90E+02 5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85E+06 3.20E+03 6.64E+03 1.27E+04 3.41E+05 1.58E+04
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
to problems with the pool inspection equipment. All 
in all, the fuel integrity at both Loviisa plant units 
was good in 2014.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reac-
tor of Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. Thus, the primary cool-
ant activity caused by iodine-131 at Olkiluoto  1 
has continued to decrease since 2010. On the basis 
of other inspections carried out during the annual 
outage, the fuel types at both plant units have 
mostly behaved normally. Several fuel leaks have 
occurred in the 2000s at Olkiluoto 2. Most of the 
leaks have been caused by small loose objects en-
tering the reactor during maintenance operations. 
The coolant flow may cause the loose objects to vi-
brate and break the fuel cladding. To minimise the 
problem, new Triple Wave+ foreign object sieves 
have been adopted at Olkiluoto 2.
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 5.90E+01 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01 3.12E+04 1.40E+02 6.76E+01 5.90E+01 3.16E+01
 6.52E+03 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02 2.01E+04 4.84E+03 9.45E+02 9.51E+01 2.53E+01
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 1.03E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
 1.61E+05 3.93E+03 6.19E+04 1.00E+06 0.00E+00
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
5.80E+01 2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01 2.45E+03 5.50E+01 5.58E+01 3.92E+01 2.55E+01
4.00E+03 4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01 1.87E+03 1.46E+03 3.03E+02 3.43E+01 2.13E+01 
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
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A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
All leaking fuel assemblies are removed during an-
nual outages. Both licensees use an external party 
when identifying leaking assemblies. This means 
that a subcontractor handles the actual equipment 
and provides the operators, but the NPP’s own 
radiochemistry laboratory analyses the water sam-
ples from the reactor. The leaking fuel assembly is 
identified based on the analysis results.
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of Loviisa 
1 or Loviisa 2 during the period under review.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of Olki-
luoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 during the period under 
review.
A.III.2 Reactor coolant system integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
As indicators, the water chemistry conditions for 
each plant unit are followed.
The water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
licensees, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
PWRs and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The 
chemical conditions in the secondary circuit of 
a pressurized water reactor affect the integrity 
of the interface between the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The indicator for 
Loviisa is a new index developed at the NPP to 
be used together with the international index. 
The new index describes the water chemistry 
conditions in the secondary circuit at Loviisa 
with a higher degree of sensitivity than the 
corresponding international index for VVER 
plants. The indicator for Olkiluoto is the inter-
national index used by the NPP. The Loviisa 
index observes corrosive factors and the concen-
trations of corrosion products in the steam gen-
erator blowdown and the feedwater. For steam 
generator blowdown, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentra-
tions and acid conductivity. For feedwater, it 
includes the iron, copper and oxygen concentra-
tions. The chemistry index of Olkiluoto consists 
of the chloride and sulphate concentrations of 
the reactor water and the iron concentration in 
the feedwater. The indices for both NPPs only 
cover the aforementioned parameter values 
during load operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown at the Loviisa plant 
units and the reactor water at the Olkiluoto 
plant units during operation compared with the 
OLC limit in the monitoring period. At Olki-
luoto, the maximum sulphate content of reactor 
water during steady-state operation is also fol-
lowed.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor coolant system and the second-
ary circuit into the coolant. For Loviisa NPP, 
the iron concentration of the reactor coolant 
and the secondary circuit feedwater (maximum 
values for the monitoring period) are followed. 
For Olkiluoto NPP, the iron concentration of 
feedwater (maximum value for the monitoring 
period) is followed. In addition, the maximum 
Co-60 activity concentration in the reactor cool-
ant while bringing the plant to a cold shutdown 
or after a reactor trip is followed for both NPPs.
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
0
1
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 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0
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Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
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Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The approximate concentration lev-
els of corrosive substances and corrosion products 
can also be obtained from quarterly reports sub-
mitted by the licensees.
Purpose
The water chemistry indicators are used to monitor 
and control the integrity of the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The monitoring is 
done by indices depicting water chemistry control 
and by following selected corrosive impurities and 
corrosion products. The water chemistry indices 
combine a number of water chemistry parameters 
and thus give a good overview of the water chem-
istry conditions. STUK’s indicators are also used 
to monitor the fluctuation of certain parameters in 
more detail. The corrosive substances monitored 
include chloride and sulphate. The corrosive prod-
ucts followed are iron and radioactive Co-60. The 
activity concentration of Co-60 isotope while bring-
ing the NPP to cold shutdown is used to describe 
the access of cobalt-containing structural materials 
into the reactor circuit and the success of the water 
chemistry control and the shutdown procedures. 
In addition to the parameters described here, the 
licensees use several other parameters to monitor 
the water chemistry conditions of the plant units.
Responsible units/persons
Reactor and safety systems (REA),  
Dina Solatie
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In 2014, the impurity and corrosion product levels 
in the reactor coolant system and the secondary 
circuit, followed in STUK’s indicator scheme, were 
0.90
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Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 1.08 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.13 1.03 1.03
 1.18 1.11 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.08 1.02
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator blow-down 
(µg/kg) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 7.80E+00 1.93E+01 1.98E+01 1.36E+01 1.81E+01
 9.10E+00 1.10E+01 3.19E+01 4.30E+01 3.00E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l) 
(RL30 / RL70) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fe-tot µg/l) 
in power operation, Loviisa NPP
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Integrity of primary circuit: 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 8.21E+03 5.26E+03 7.48E+03 8.10E+03 5.40E+03
 8.60E+03 9.88E+03 7.90E+03 1.40E+04 9.10E+03
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
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in keeping with the OLC limits. In the past few 
years, the chemistry index has remained at a good 
level at the Loviisa plant units. The Loviisa 1 index 
for 2014 was lower than in 2013 because of im-
proved startup procedures introduced during the 
2013 annual outage and more specific adherence to 
related procedures that aim to optimise the chemi-
cal parameters. The blowdown water chloride con-
tent and iron content of the secondary circuit feed-
water were normal in 2014. The figures show that 
the most clearly discernible change from previous 
years is the high iron concentration in the second-
ary side feedwater at Loviisa 2. This was a brief 
transient (one measuring result) and thus it does 
not have a major impact on the corrosion behav-
iour of the steam generator pipes in the long term 
or the integrity of the reactor coolant system. The 
iron concentration in the secondary side feedwater 
returned to normal in 2014. The maximum Co-
60 activity levels associated with shutdowns were 
measured during shutdowns for annual outages. In 
2014, the concentrations were around the same as 
in the previous years, which indicates successful 
compliance with the ALARA principle. The indica-
tor shows that the integrity of the reactor coolant 
systems of the Loviisa plant units was acceptable 
in 2014.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The impurity and corrosion product levels in reactor 
water and feedwater, followed in STUK’s indicator 
scheme, remained below the OLC limits at Olki-
luoto 2. At Olkiluoto 1, the chloride content was 
momentarily high due to a condenser circulating 
water leak in April, and the OLC limit value was 
exceeded. The leak was located and repaired. In 
2014, the chemistry index for Olkiluoto 2 was the 
best possible: 1. The chemistry index for Olkiluoto 
1 was higher due to the condenser circulating wa-
ter leak. In 2014 the iron, sulphate and chloride 
concentrations of reactor coolant did not deviate 
from their regular values, which is also shown by 
the achieved chemistry index value. The monitor-
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Integrity of primary circuit: Chemistry index, 
Olkiluoto NPP
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 OL2
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.39
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum sulphate concentration in primary coolant (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 7.0 4.9 1.9 2.8 6.3 
 4.6 4.8 1.8 1.9 3.9
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20
OLC limit 20 µg/kg (since II/2011)
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in reactor feed water (µg/l) 
in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration (kBq/m³) in 
primary coolant related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
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Maximum chloride concentration in primary coolant (µg/kg) 
in power operation. Olkiluoto NPP
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ing and optimisation of Olkiluoto 2 water chemistry 
was also successful in 2014. At both plant units, the 
shutdown-related maximum value of Co-60 activity 
content occurred during shutdowns for annual out-
ages. There were no essential changes in the Co-60 
activity content compared to previous years, which 
indicates successful compliance with the ALARA 
principle. The indicator shows that reactor coolant 
system integrity was good at the Olkiluoto plant 
units in 2014.
A.III.2b Reactor coolant system 
leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
The indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified reactor coolant system leakages 
at the Olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3) of identified (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the con-
trolled floor drainage system, 345 T33) internal 
leakages in the containment during the fuel 
cycle.
•	 Highest	 daily	 internal	 leakage	 volume	 in	 the	
containment during the fuel cycle in relation to 
the leakage volume allowed in the OLC (outflow 
water volume of water condensing in the air 
coolers of the containment cooling system 725/
OLC limit).
Source of data
The licensee submits data on reactor coolant sys-
tem leakages at Olkiluoto NPP to the person re-
sponsible at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator describing reactor coolant system 
leakages is used to follow and monitor the leak 
rate of the reactor coolant system within the con-
tainment.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), Jukka Kallionpää
Interpretation of the indicator, 
fuel cycle 2013–2014
One of the purposes of controlled leakage K352 is 
to collect leakages from valves, pumps and other 
similar components. The drains from the seal boxes 
of the valves within the containment are equipped 
with temperature sensors to locate any leaks. Tem-
perature sensors installed in the drains above the 
main lines will detect any leakage in the line. Oth-
er methods must then be used to locate the actual 
leaking object. Identified leaks within the contain-
ment increased to some extent at OL1 in 2009, 
2010 and 2011. They decreased in 2012, continued 
to decrease in 2013 and remained at the 2013 level 
in 2014. The number of identified leaks at OL2 
somewhat increased in 2014. The leakage volumes 
do not include the drainage of process systems dur-
ing annual outages and other outages. The identi-
fied leaks include sampling flows of approximately 
100–1,500 m³ from the reactor building.
At the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit T33, which collects the 
drain water from the containment drywell floor 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Identified leakages of primary circuit (352T1, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
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Unidentified leakages of primary circuit (345T33, m³), 
Olkiluoto NPP
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The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the OLC limit, 
Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
 OL2
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 0.23 0.21 0.21 1.27 2.20 0.35 1.38 0.17 1.16
 0.35 0.09 0.16 1.97 2.08 0.35 0.69 0.40 3.48
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drains and any leakage from the control rod ac-
tuator seals. The volumes of unidentified reactor 
coolant system leaks during the operating cycle 
2010–2011 decreased at both plant units. In 2012, 
they increased slightly from the 2011 level at both 
plant units, only to fall back to the previous level in 
2013. Unidentified leaks at OL1 remained at the 
2013 level in 2014, but unidentified leaks at OL2 
increased to the level of 2010.
One of the purposes of containment gas cooling 
system 725 is to remove moisture from the contain-
ment atmosphere. Moisture may originate from 
steam leaking from the reactor coolant system. 
During the fuel cycle of 2013–2014, the ratio of the 
containment’s largest internal daily leak volume to 
the maximum allowable volume, as specified in the 
OLC, was low at both plant units.
The reactor coolant system was relatively leak-
proof during the 2013–2014 fuel cycle.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the following parameters are moni-
tored:
•	 Total	as-found	leakage	of	outer	 isolation	valves	
following the first integrity tests compared with 
the maximum allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves.
•	 Percentage	of	isolation	valves	tested	during	the	
year in question at each plant unit that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt (i.e. as-found 
leakage smaller than the acceptance criteria of 
the valve and no consecutive exceeding of the 
attention criteria of a valve without repair).
•	 Combined	as-found	leakage	rate	of	containment	
penetrations and airlocks in relation to their 
maximum allowed total leakage. The combined 
leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes leaks from 
personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome and 
the containment dome. At Loviisa, the combined 
leakage rate comprises the leak test results from 
personnel airlocks, the material airlock, cable 
penetrations of inspection equipment, contain-
ment maintenance ventilation systems (TL23), 
main steam piping (RA) and feedwater system 
(RL) penetrations; seals of blind-flanged penetra-
tions in ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is obtained from the power companies’ leak-
tightness test reports that are submitted by the 
licensees to STUK for information within three 
months from the completion of an annual outage. 
STUK calculates the total as-found leakages, since 
the reports give total leakages as they are at the 
end of the annual outage (i.e. after the completion 
of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose
This indicator is used to monitor the integrity of 
containment isolation valves, penetrations and air-
locks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and safety systems (REA),
Päivi Salo
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The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt, 
Olkiluoto NPP
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Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks 
compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Total leakage of the outer isolation valves at Lovi-
isa 1 compared to the maximum allowed total 
leakage remained unchanged. The total leakage 
at Loviisa 2 has clearly decreased. The as-found 
leakage of both units remains clearly below the set 
limit.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leaktightness test at first attempt has in-
creased at both Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2.
Overall as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations and airlocks is low at both plant 
units.
Olkiluoto
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at Olkiluoto 1 have increased but are still 
low and remain clearly below the below the limit 
set for overall as-found leakage in the OLC.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves at Olkiluoto 2 decreased from the previ-
ous year, and was below the limit set in the OLC.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt remained high for 
both plant units.
The total as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations, in which TVO includes leak-
ages in the upper and lower personnel airlocks, 
the maintenance dome and the containment dome, 
remained small for both plant units.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared 
with the highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, 
Olkiluoto NPP 
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APPENDIX 2 Occupational radiation dose distribution 
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in 2014
According to the Radiation Decree, the annual ef­
fective dose from radiation work for a worker must 
not exceed 50 mSv while the average over any pe­
riod of five years must remain below 20 mSv.
The highest individual dose incurred at Finnish 
nuclear power plants was 9,2 mSv. This dose was 
accumulated from work at the Loviisa nuclear pow­
er plant. The highest individual dose for a Finnish 
nuclear power plant worker in the five­year period 
from 2010–2014 oli 47,2 mSv. The dose was accu­
mulated at the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
dose range 
(mSv)
number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,1 923 1364 2240
0.1–0.19 66 193 260
0.2–0.49 121 249 361
0.5–0.99 120 181 293
1.00–1.99 106 126 227
2.00–4.99 110 70 191
5.00–9.99 33 3 44
10.00–14.99 0 0 0
15.00–19.99 0 0 0
> 20 0 0 0
*  The data in this column include Finnish workers who have 
received doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same 
person may have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants 
and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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APPENDIX 3 Exceptional operational 
events at nuclear power plants in 2014
Loviisa NPP
Relay faults in emergency diesel 
generators of Loviisa NPP
In December 2013, malfunctions of the control cir­
cuit relays of the emergency diesel generators were 
detected. The malfunctions were caused by devia­
tions of relay quality. The relays that were caus­
ing problems were replaced by Loviisa NPP. When 
the relays had been replaced, it was observed that 
the new relays included programmable technology, 
which meant that the official approval for the relay 
types was no longer valid. The relay quality devia­
tions caused unavailability of the emergency diesel 
generator control systems and the fact that unquali­
fied programmable relays were used increased the 
risk of a common­cause failure caused by a software 
fault.
Both Loviisa plant units have four emergency 
diesel generators that start when necessary to 
supply power to the safety systems. The diesel 
generators are equipped with dedicated control, 
protection and monitoring systems that include, 
for instance, plenty of relays (electrically controlled 
electromechanical switches) of different types. Op­
erability of the diesel generators is verified by 
means of inservice testing every four weeks. In 
addition to the emergency diesel generators, the 
NPP includes other emergency power sources to 
maintain the safety functions in case of the loss of 
the regular electric power supply.
The malfunctions of the relays in the diesel 
generator control circuits, which were observed 
during normal inservice testing of Loviisa NPP 
in December 2013, mostly caused jamming of the 
relays or slowness or relay functions. It was noted 
that the cause of the malfunctions was a mechani­
cal manufacturing defect (a tolerance defect) of the 
relay types used. The relay manufacturer stated 
that such a quality deviation had only occurred in 
specific production batches. As a corrective meas­
ure, Loviisa NPP made a decision to replace all 
of the relays that were causing problems, which 
had been installed in 2011 and 2012 (15 relays per 
diesel generator or a total of around 120 relays). 
When the relays of one of the diesel generators at 
Loviisa 1 and one of the diesel generators at Lovii­
sa 2 had been replaced, the replacement work was 
discontinued in January 2014 because the relay 
manufacturer announced that the new relays could 
also cause problems. At the turn of January and 
February, the relay manufacturer submitted new 
flawless relays to the NPP. They were installed in 
all of the diesel generators.
In late February, the relay manufacturer an­
nounced that relays of the types that had been 
installed in the diesel generators include program­
mable technology. The programmable technology is 
used to control the coil. Since it was not known that 
the relays include programmable technology when 
applicability and acceptability of the relay types 
were being assessed in 2011, the official approval 
(qualification) for the relay types was no longer 
valid. In early March, Fortum submitted a suit­
ability analysis of a substitutive analog relay type 
(that does not include any programmable technol­
ogy) and a plan of corrective measures to STUK 
for approval. Half of the programmable relays in 
both units of Loviisa NPP were replaced with the 
approved analog relay type by the end of March. 
The rest of the relays will be replaced at the latest 
during the annual outages in 2014. Similar relays 
(24 pcs) in the motor control circuits of the reactor 
coolant pumps will also be replaced during the an­
nual outages, but the safety significance of these 
relays is not as high.
The relay quality deviations caused malfunc­
tions in the diesel generator control circuits and 
thus led to unavailability of the diesel generators. 
The fact that unqualified programmable technol­
STUK-B 191
135
ogy was used in the relays increased the risk of a 
common­cause failure in case of a software fault, 
which cannot be overruled. Such an event could 
have made the emergency power supply systems 
unavailable and thus compromised plant safety in 
case of a transient or accident.
The relay quality deviations mostly caused 
the control systems to function more slowly than 
normal. Furthermore, there were some temporary 
malfunctions. No errors have been detected in the 
software components of the programmable relay 
types that are currently in use in the control sys­
tems. The substitutive emergency power sources 
that are to be used instead of the emergency diesel 
generators at Loviisa NPP do not include any of 
the problematic relay types.
One can state that the root cause of the relay 
quality deviations was the lack of operating experi­
ence feedback from the malfunctioning relays. In 
addition, the procedures used by the NPP to iden­
tify relays that contain programmable technology 
have been proven defective.
In addition to replacing the relays, Fortum will 
update its guidelines on management of compo­
nent ageing and the drafting of electrical/I&C suit­
ability analyses.
Fortum has submitted information about the 
relay problems to Olkiluoto NPP and the Swedish 
NPPs.
On the International Nuclear Event Scale 
(INES), the event was rated as Level 1 due to the 
risk of a common­cause failure.
Out of date operational limits and 
conditions of Loviisa 2 with respect to 
thermal load of the spent fuel storage pool
In March 2014, it was observed that the opera­
tional limits and conditions (OLC) of Loviisa NPP 
are not up to date in all respects. The pool­specific 
maximum thermal load value for the spent fuel 
storage facility had not been updated when modifi­
cations were implemented in the 1990s and denser 
fuel racks were introduced in the early 2000s.
When the fact that the OLC had not been up­
dated was observed, Loviisa NPP studied again the 
pool­specific thermal loads in the spent fuel storage 
facility and noticed that the thermal load of one of 
the storage pools at Loviisa 2 had exceeded the max­
imum thermal load limit laid down in the OLC by 
approximately 1% in December 2013. The thermal 
load remained above the limit for approximately 
two weeks. Spent fuel had recently been transferred 
to the storage pool from the refueling pool in the 
reactor building of Loviisa 2, and the new fuel intro­
duced into the pool increased the thermal load. The 
exceeding of the limit value was not detected when 
transferring the fuel because a new limit value that 
had been determined after the modification was 
being followed. The new pool­specific thermal load 
limit value was approximately 20% higher than the 
limit value laid down in the OLC.
The event did not compromise the cooldown or 
integrity of spent nuclear fuel because the limit 
value was only exceeded by a small amount and 
for a short time. Furthermore, according to Loviisa 
NPP the new pool­specific maximum thermal load 
is higher than the old value that was not changed 
in the OLC.
The operational limits and conditions lay down 
prerequisites and limit values for safe operation of 
the NPP. The OLC must be kept up to date and fol­
lowed at all times. Other information that is not up 
to date in the OLC has also been detected over the 
past few years at Loviisa NPP. Corrective meas­
ures to improve OLC maintenance procedures and 
keeping the OLC up to date have been determined. 
In addition, Loviisa NPP will update the OLC with 
the new pool­specific maximum thermal load.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at Level 0.
Non-compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions at Loviisa 1 
The annual outage of Loviisa 1 started on 20 July 
2014. During the shutdown of the unit on 21 July 
2014, leak tests of the isolation valves of the fuel 
pool cooling system were performed. When the 
tests were still ongoing, the unit’s operating mode 
was changed from hot shutdown to cold shutdown. 
Because the operating mode was changed, temper­
ature and pressure of the reactor coolant system 
did not reach the set limits.
The operational limits and conditions state that 
both cooling circuits of the fuel pool cooling sys­
tem must be operable when the operating mode is 
changed. One of the circuits was inoperable due to 
the isolation valve leak testing, however. 
The unit is shut down in stages. The transfer 
to the next stage may not occur before it has been 
checked that all of the safety requirements for the 
next stage are met. In this case, one of the safety 
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requirements was not met, i.e. the administrative 
procedures were not fully successful. The event did 
not compromise the cooldown of spent fuel, howev­
er, since the other cooling circuit was in operation. 
One circuit alone is capable of handling the cool­
ing of the spent fuel pool. Furthermore, the unit 
reached the allowed state right after the change of 
operating mode: at that time, the operational limits 
and conditions require operability of one cooling 
circuit only. 
Loviisa NPP determined corrective measures 
to prevent recurrence of the event. The corrective 
measures include further training on changing 
operating modes and reassessment of the related 
safety requirements. 
On the INES scale, the event is rated at Level 0. 
Brief malfunction of Loviisa 2 containment 
ventilation system during annual outage
The annual outage of Loviisa 2 was implemented 
from 16 August to 20 September 2014. Once the nu­
clear fuel had been replaced, the rest of the reactor 
pressure vessel internals were lifted back into place. 
During the lifting on 8 September 2014, control 
valves of the ventilation system of the containment, 
which surrounds the reactor pressure vessel, closed, 
which reduced the differential pressure between the 
interior of the containment and the outdoor air. The 
differential pressure no longer complied with the 
requirements laid down in the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The containment itself re­
mained leak tight, however. According to the NPP, 
the valves closed because of maintenance work be­
ing carried out at a switchboard.
The containment must be kept leak tight and 
negative pressure ventilation must be maintained 
during heavy lifting because of the risk that the 
object being lifted drops on top of the spent nuclear 
fuel and damages it.  A leak tight containment 
guarantees that any leaks from the containment 
will be minimal and negative pressure ventilation 
guarantees that any radioactive materials released 
into the air will not be able to leak in an uncon­
trolled manner from the containment due to minor 
faults in sealing. Integrity of the spent fuel was not 
compromised by the event, and thus there was no 
danger of a release of radioactive materials.
Loviisa NPP has determined corrective meas­
ures to prevent recurrence of the event. The correc­
tive measures included assessing the scope of the 
containment monitoring system and related soft­
ware as well as studying whether there is any need 
to further specify the duties of the people involved 
and job descriptions. All of the measures will be 
completed by the 2015 annual outage.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at Level 0.
Safety injection system valve 
erroneously closed at Loviisa 2
A modification of the reactor coolant system pres­
sure control system was implemented during the 
2014 annual outage of Loviisa 2 (16 August ­ 20 
September 2014). When the modification was com­
plete, the pressure control functions were tested 
and approved. However, an emergency cooling 
valve in a pressurizer spray line was accidentally 
closed after the testing. The valve is to be used af­
ter an accident. The valve is in a pipeline that was 
constructed in connection with the modification.
According to the operational limits and condi­
tions (OLC), the valve must be left open. It hav­
ing been erroneously closed was noticed during a 
normal inspection on 12 November 2014. The valve 
was opened immediately after this.
Since the valve was closed, one of the pressur­
izer spray lines, which should be used after an acci­
dent, was unavailable. The spraying system would 
have been operable regardless of this, however, 
since the other pipeline was normally available. 
The safety significance of the spraying function 
was decreased by the modifications made during 
the annual outage.
STUK rated the event as a Level 0 event on the 
International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), i.e. as 
an event that has no nuclear or radiation safety 
significance.
Some inservice inspections of Loviisa 
weather mast not performed
The four temperature sensors in the weather mast 
were not subjected to an inservice inspection in the 
manner laid down in the OLC in 2013. This was 
a deviation from the OLC because the OLC state 
that an inspection must be performed annually, 
and the maximum allowed excess of this inspection 
deadline is 30%. The weather mast temperature 
sensors had undergone a calibration inspection 
in September 2012 and they were inspected the 
next time in May 2014. The event was observed 
by STUK in November 2014 during an inspection 
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included in the periodic inspection programme that 
covered operability of the weather mast.
Fortum submitted a special report of the event 
to STUK, describing the underlying reasons and 
corrective measures for the event. The calibration 
inspections of the temperature sensors were not 
implemented due to occupational safety reasons: 
first, the equipment needed when climbing the 
mast was not in order and later on climbing the 
mast was no longer possible because of the weather 
conditions. An exemption from the OLC was not 
applied because of a human error. The event was 
classified at INES Level 0.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Repair outage of Olkiluoto 1
On Sunday 9 March 2014, a fault was observed 
in one of the reactor relief train control valves of 
Olkiluoto 1. To study the fault, the unit’s power was 
decreased to 90% of full power for approximately 
one hour on 10 March 2014. TVO was able to locate 
the fault: it was in a position indication unit of the 
valve, which is inside the reactor containment. The 
unit was shut down to repair the fault. The unit’s 
repair outage started on Saturday 15 March 2014 at 
3:00 am. The work was performed according to plan. 
The position indication unit was replaced, operation 
of the valve was tested and approved, and startup 
of the unit was started. The unit was synchronized 
with the national grid by the following afternoon.
Simultaneous detaching of radiation 
measuring channels in the reactor 
building of Olkiluoto 2
On 7 April 2014, TVO observed at Olkiluoto 2 that 
a radiation measuring channel had been detached 
despite the requirements of the operational lim­
its and conditions (OLC) in connection with cali­
bration of the radiation measuring system. The 
calibration of the radiation measuring channel was 
erroneously started even though the parallel meas­
uring channel had been detached a minute ago 
to be sent out for calibration. This was an OLC 
non­conformance because the OLC requires that 
at least one of these parallel measuring channels 
must be operable at all times. When the OLC non­
conformance was detected, TVO restored operabil­
ity of one of the measuring channels. The deviation 
lasted for three minutes.
The measuring channels of the radioactivity 
monitoring system monitor the general radiation 
level in the reactor building. No control commands 
to components are sent based on the measuring 
results; instead, the system issues a local alarm 
to warn people working in the hall of an abnormal 
radiation level. No work that could have increased 
the radiation level, such as fuel handling, was be­
ing carried out when the event occurred. The radia­
tion measuring systems that monitor the exhaust 
air from the reactor building were operable.
The event caused no risk to the plant, people 
or the environment. On the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES), the event was rated as Level 0.
Crack in a feedwater nozzle at Olkiluoto 2
The crack in a feedwater nozzle at Olkiluoto 2 is 
located in a weld in between the reactor pressure 
vessel nozzle butt weld and its joint (safe­end) on 
the inside of the nozzle. The crack may be a manu­
facturing fault that was originally left undetected 
and whose actual depth could not be determined 
until with the new inspection techniques. On the 
other hand, the crack may also be a fault caused by 
stress corrosion that has grown over time and may 
continue to grow.
The crack was detected in 2003 and has been 
monitored ever since. During the 2013 annual out­
age, TVO had the area of the crack inspected from 
the outside by means of phased array ultrasonic 
testing. The depth of the internal crack was de­
termined as 23 mm (wall thickness 33 mm). The 
inspection result was a surprise: the depth of the 
crack was given as 23 mm compared to the 10–15 
mm that had been determined with the inspection 
techniques used before. During the 2013 annual 
outage, STUK approved a strength analysis sub­
mitted by TVO and a procedure where the crack 
would be monitored for the next three years.
According to inspections made during the 2014 
annual outage, the crack has not grown. TVO in­
stalled a leak detection system that is based on 
temperature in the area during the annual outage. 
TVO has already made preparations for repair­
ing the crack. According to the submitted repair 
plan, the feedwater nozzle will be plugged from the 
reactor side and the feedwater piping will be cut 
at a pipe bend outside the biological shield before 
repairing the crack.
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Cracks at pipeline mixing points
In an inspection implemented during the 2014 an­
nual outage of Olkiluoto 2, several cracks were 
detected in feedwater line 1 and one crack in feed­
water line 2. Several cracks at a similar mixing 
point were also observed during an inspection of 
feedwater line 2 at Olkiluoto 1. These pipeline mix­
ing points were replaced in 1986.
The cracks are at points where pipelines con­
nect and flows at different temperatures mix. The 
mixing flows cause continuous temperature fluc­
tuation of the structural material when the unit 
is in hot standby or low power feedwater control 
mode. This means that the mixing point is subject­
ed to fatigue. STUK made a decision that required 
amendment of the operating method and replace­
ment of the cracked pipe sections during the 2015 
annual outages.
Only the mixing point with fewer cracks may be 
used during operating modes that will stress the 
cracked mixing point (hot standby or low power 
feedwater control) at both units during the next 
fuel cycle. The mixing points with more cracks at 
both units (line 2 of Olkiluoto 1 and line 1 of Olki­
luoto 2) must be replaced during the 2015 annual 
outages. A decision on whether the other T joints 
are to be replaced will be made annually based on 
the inspection results. STUK will oversee the plan­
ning of the replacement, manufacture and instal­
lation.
Using an unapproved hoisting device at 
the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage facility
A local STUK inspector observed on 13 August 2014 
that a hoisting device that did not include the prop­
er markings was being used to lift new protective 
covers of the fuel pools at the Olkiluoto interim 
storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. The inspector 
noted that the hoisting device had been safety clas­
sified but had not been subjected to a commission­
ing inspection by STUK. The hoisting device was 
decommissioned until a proper approval procedure 
has been completed.
Safety classified hoisting devices are governed 
by the Government Decree on Safety of Machines 
(VNA 400/2008), the Government Decree on the 
Safe Use and Inspection of Work Equipment (VNA 
403/2008) and the YVL Guides. According to the 
Government Decree on the Safe Use and Inspec­
tion of Work Equipment, a hoisting device must 
include a marking showing the maximum allowed 
load and a CE marking as an indication of its 
compliance with personnel safety requirements. 
According to Guide YVL 5.8, a safety classified 
hoisting device must be subjected to a two­stage 
commissioning inspection by STUK.
TVO drafted a special report on the event, in­
dicating defects in goods reception that occurred 
when the interim storage facility for spent nuclear 
fuel was expanded and defects in processing of the 
deviation. The event started when it was noted dur­
ing a commissioning inspection by TVO that the 
dimensions of the first hoisting device to be used did 
not comply with the plan. The hoisting device was 
returned to the manufacturer. There was a material 
deviation in the manufacture of the new hoisting 
device and defects in processing this deviation led to 
the new hoisting device being manufactured, deliv­
ered and even taken into use incorrectly.
The hoisting device is part of the new protective 
cover system, and the entire system has been pro­
cessed as a steel structure in compliance with Guide 
YVL 4.2. The construction plan was processed and 
approved in compliance with Guide YVL 4.2, which 
is why none of the involved parties (the client or the 
licensee TVO, the designing organisation, the manu­
facturer and STUK) identified the hoisting device at 
any point as a component that is also subject to the 
Government decrees mentioned above, the hoisting 
device design standard and Guide YVL 5.8. There 
are no references to legislation or norms on hoist­
ing devices, nor any instructions on hoisting device 
markings in the design documentation. The special 
report by TVO does not mention this problem, even 
though it was the error that initiated the entire 
event. Had there been no dimension problems or 
material deviations, the original hoisting device 
could have been taken into use without the proper 
markings or the proper commissioning inspection.
By the end of the quarter, TVO had not submit­
ted to STUK a plan on how the different regulatory 
requirements will be met, compliance will be proven 
and approval will be sought.
On the INES scale, the event is rated at Level 0.
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Replacing carbon grounding brushes of 
the generator during power operation
After the annual outages of Olkiluoto NPP in May 
and June of 2014, it was observed that the main 
generator carbon grounding brushes were being 
worn through faster than normal. The worn out 
components of Olkiluoto 2 were replaced in the 
summer during an extra outage so that occupa­
tional safety and radiation protection issues could 
be taken into account.
The plan was to inspect the grounding brushes 
of Olkiluoto 1 on 30 September 2014 when the 
unit was in power operation. It had been observed 
in connection with an inspection that the carbon 
brushes could be simultaneously replaced. How­
ever, the shift supervisor of the unit (Olkiluoto 1) 
was not informed of the replacement of the carbon 
brushes and there was no work permit for the re­
placement of the brushes. The task took place in a 
room that has been classified in the OLC, based on 
the radiation level, as a room where work may not 
be performed without a radiation work permit but 
there was no such permit for the task.
The event did not influence the unit’s nuclear 
security or nuclear safety but it was still classified 
as a Level 1 event on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale (INES) due to the fact that the OLC 
was not followed and the event indicated defects in 
the safety culture.
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APPENDIX 4 Licenses and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act by STUK in 2014
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 3/C42214/2014,	 3	 September	 2014,	 import	
of nuclear fuel manufactured from uranium 
equipped with Euratom obligation code “S” from 
Germany (OL1 e 37). Last date of validity 31 
December 2015.
•	 4/C42214/2014,	 12	 September	 2014,	 import	
of nuclear fuel manufactured from uranium 
equipped with Euratom obligation code “S” from 
Sweden (OL2 e 35, part of a batch). Last date of 
validity 31 December 2015.
•	 5/C42214/2014,	 12	 September	 2014,	 import	
of nuclear fuel manufactured from uranium 
equipped with Euratom obligation code “P” from 
Sweden (OL2 e 35, part of a batch). Last date of 
validity 31 December 2015.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 1/Y42214/2014,	 3	 February	 2014,	 possession	
and transfer of nuclear information concerning 
the Fennovoima NPP to Fennovoima Oy, Platom 
Oy and VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin­
land. Last date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 3/A42214/2014,	 26	 September	 2014,	 import	
from Sweden of radioactive waste generated 
when processing contaminated metal waste. 
Last date of validity 31 January 2015.
Fennovoima Oy
•	 2/J42214/2014,	24	October	2014,	 import	of	nu­
clear information from JSC Rusatom Overseas 
from Russia and possession of said data. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 3/J42214/2014,	24	October	2014,	 import	of	nu­
clear information from JSC TVEL or a legal 
person included in the same group of companies 
as JSC TVEL from Russia and possession of 
said data. Last date of validity 31 December 
2023.
•	 4/J42214/2014,	24	October	2014,	possession	and	
transfer of nuclear information submitted by 
JSC Rusatom Overseas to Platom Oy, Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy, VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland and ÅF­Consult Oy. Last date 
of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 5/J42214/2014,	24	October	2014,	possession	and	
transfer of nuclear information submitted by 
JSC TVEL to Platom Oy, Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy, VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin­
land and ÅF­Consult Oy. Last date of validity 
31 December 2023.
Others
•	 2/F42214/2014,	10	March	2014,	VTT	Technical	
Research Centre of Finland; possession and 
transfer of nuclear information submitted by 
JSC Rusatom Overseas to Fennovoima Oy, For­
tum Power and Heat Oy and Platom Oy. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 8/Y42214/2014,	27	June	2014,	Aalto	University;	
possession, processing, use and storage of a 
maximum of 5 g of nuclear fuel for a subcritical 
pile.
•	 2/Y42214/2014,	 3	 July	 2014,	 Platom	 Oy;	 pos­
session and transfer of nuclear information 
concerning the Fennovoima NPP to Fennovoima 
Oy, Fortum Power and Heat Oy and VTT Tech­
nical Research Centre of Finland. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2023.
•	 12/Y42214/2014,	19	December	2014,	University	
of Jyväskylä Department of Physics; possession, 
processing, use and storage of nuclear materi­
als. A maximum of 15 g of special fissionable 
materials and a maximum of 200 g of source 
materials.
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APPENDIX 5 Periodic inspection programme 
of nuclear power plants 2014
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the 
technical acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, op-
erations, maintenance and protection activities (radiation protection, fire pro-
tection and security) with the requirements of nuclear safety regulations are 
verified by the inspections.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2014, Loviisa
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety culture 
(nuclear security), 8–9 October 2014
In the management and safety culture inspection, 
STUK studied how the security arrangements 
(both nuclear security and information security) 
and the safeguards of nuclear materials are linked 
to the Loviisa NPP management system and safety 
management. The inspection focused on how pro­
cesses related to nuclear security and the safe­
guards of nuclear materials are described in the 
management system, how nuclear security and the 
safeguards of nuclear materials have been taken 
into account in the risk management process and 
how these issues influence duties of the involved 
employees. Furthermore, discussions on how nu­
clear security has been taken into account when 
assessing and developing the organisation’s safety 
culture were conducted. In addition to manage­
ment interviews, the inspection interviews focused 
on the employees’ knowledge of their responsibili­
ties and obligations regarding nuclear security, 
communication channels used for issues pertaining 
to nuclear security, adequacy of information and 
how the employees react to deviations.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 14–15 May 2014
In the personnel resources and competence inspec­
tion, STUK assessed the management of compe­
tence at Loviisa NPP, refresher training provided 
to employees important to safety, training on the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC), person­
nel planning process, as well as goals and the role 
of the training team in the implementation of the 
strategy of Loviisa NPP. Based on an internal au­
dit implemented at the NPP, the employees feel 
that issues such as their workload impede their 
personal development. Furthermore, the employ­
ees find identifying competence needs based on 
their job descriptions challenging. The NPP could 
not provide any proof of the management having 
assessed the key personnel competence areas as 
stated in the plant procedures. The management 
and the training team failed to react to an observa­
tion made during an internal audit on the strategy 
and training focus areas not being consistent. In 
addition, some of the employees important to safe­
ty had not attended all of the mandatory refresher 
training courses. STUK demanded that the NPP 
ensure that all employees important to safety per­
form their refresher training in compliance with 
the requirements and that the NPP improve its 
related monitoring procedures. Furthermore, the 
content of refresher training courses must be as­
sessed in terms of overall safety and the refresher 
training plan must be updated based on the as­
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sessment results. The NPP must also study why 
the employees feel that they do not have enough 
time to attend training and improve their compe­
tence. The NPP must submit to STUK a report on 
how the management annually assesses the key 
personnel competence areas and justification for 
the management having determined in its self­
assessment that management of competence is a 
key improvement opportunity of the NPP. Further­
more, underlying reasons for the deficiencies in 
implementation and monitoring of OLC training 
must be studied.
A3 Functionality of management system 
and quality assurance, 2–3 April 2014
The inspection of the functionality of the man­
agement system and quality assurance focused on 
updating of instructions for operation and mainte­
nance units, implementation of a development ac­
tion monitoring system, assessment of the impact 
of actions and the supplier audit process. The NPP 
has streamlined the updating of instructions for 
operation and maintenance units, which has better 
ensured that instructions are up to date. The NPP 
has developed the management of non­conform­
ances and instructions on impact assessments. 
Furthermore, the NPP’s supplier audit process as 
well as the required competence and tools have 
been updated in the past few years.
Plant safety and its improvement
B2 Plant safety functions, 
13–14 November 2014
The plant safety functions inspection at Loviisa 
NPP focused on the management of severe reactor 
accidents (Severe Accident Management or SAM). 
The inspection included assessments of the meas­
ures and systems pertaining to the SAM strategy 
as well as Fortum’s resources and the maintenance 
of competence. Fortum’s SAM strategy is based 
on retaining and cooling melted fuel within the 
pressure vessel and ensuring the integrity of the 
containment by means of external cooling and the 
management of hydrogen. Based on the inspec­
tion results, Fortum’s resources, SAM competence 
and SAM training are adequate. Fortum develops 
its measures and renews its systems in the long 
term but currently focuses on the reforms deter­
mined after the Fukushima accident. In the future, 
Loviisa NPP will improve residual heat removal 
from the fuel pools, fuel pool measurements and 
the management of severe accidents during out­
ages. Furthermore, a future modification of diesel 
fuel containers and the distribution of diesel fuel 
will ensure that the emergency diesel generators, 
which are needed when managing severe acci­
dents, can stay in operation for 72 hours without 
any fuel supplied from outside the NPP.
B3 PRA and safety management, 
6 November 2014
The inspection concerning the use of probabilistic 
risk assessment (PRA) in safety management fo­
cused on current status of PRA updates, key chang­
es and impact of improvements in the PRA. Other 
issues studied during the inspection included pro­
cesses and operation of the organisation imple­
menting the PRA and personnel planning. A PRA 
model for Loviisa 2 was drafted in 2014. There are 
differences in the PRAs of the Loviisa plant units 
in terms of the service water systems and the cool­
ing systems of some rooms, for example. In addi­
tion to the plant’s own reliability data, supporting 
analyses – such as service water level frequen­
cy estimates, damage caused by dropping heavy 
loads, spurious dilution of the boron content of the 
coolant, human error analyses and common­cause 
failure analyses – have been updated. Releases of 
the fuel in the reloading pool have been added to 
the scope of the analysis used when assessing the 
frequency of major releases. Based on the inspec­
tion results, Fortum’s PRA operations are on a 
good level in general. The PRA resources have not 
changed much from the previous year. Component 
faults are efficiently processed and classified dur­
ing the annual reliability data updates. The PRA 
is used as planned to support the management of 
safety, and no major deficiencies were observed in 
the inspected issues.
B4 Operating experience 
feedback, 28 May 2014
The operating experience feedback inspection fo­
cused on processes and their organisation as well 
as related software and procedures in internal 
operating experience feedback operations. The 
requirement on reliable monitoring of corrective 
measures as well as assessing the impact and reli­
ability of measures that was made during previous 
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inspections could not be fully removed yet. STUK 
demanded that Fortum ensure adequacy of its op­
erating experience feedback resources to enable 
high­quality reporting and action on time without 
delay. Furthermore, STUK demanded that Fortum 
submit to STUK a report on the adequacy of the 
resources of the operating feedback organisation 
during annual outages.
Operational safety
C1 Operational activities, 11 
March and 13 March 2014
The inspection of operational activities focused on 
training and competence of control room opera­
tors. Based on the inspection results, STUK found 
that adequately many competent employees are 
available for the training of operators and opera­
tor trainers as well as that the responsibilities 
and procedures used when planning, implement­
ing, assessing and improving the training have 
been described in the NPP’s instructions. No major 
deficiencies in the instructions or deviations from 
the instructions were observed in the inspection. 
Based on the inspection results, the development of 
operator competence has been ensured, the compe­
tence of operators is being monitored and training 
needs are identified with a variety of methods at 
Loviisa NPP.
C2 Plant maintenance, 21–22 October 2014
The plant maintenance inspection focused on the 
management of spare parts for components impor­
tant to safety at Loviisa NPP. The NPP has started 
to draft inspection instructions to ensure operabil­
ity of spare parts. The early stages of the develop­
ment project will focus on spare parts for electrical 
and I&C components. Since warehouses may con­
tain very old products, even ones dating back to the 
commissioning of the NPP, STUK demanded that 
the NPP assess the operability of all spare parts, 
and particularly those that are susceptible to age­
ing. The NPP will survey the spare part stock, con­
sumption and fault history of each component to 
be able to assess the adequacy of spare parts and 
their quantities as well as the correct time to order 
spare parts. The survey will be done separately for 
each criticality class, which means that in addition 
to the probability of core damage, production issues 
will be studied. The plan is to focus this survey on 
components with a high criticality class. However, 
lower criticality classes include some higher safety 
class components that, based on their classifica­
tion, are significant to nuclear safety and that may 
be left out of the survey if the proposed procedure 
is used. This is why STUK demanded that the 
licensee supplement the spare part survey by in­
cluding all safety class 1 and 2 components that 
can be replaced.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
(electricity), 4–5 November 2014
The electrical inspection focused on battery bank 
loads and condition management, commissioning 
inspection activities of a notified body, mainte­
nance of low­voltage unit transformers, monitoring 
of the ageing of electricity systems and compo­
nents, maintenance of electricity systems in case of 
severe reactor accidents, as well as the spare part 
acquisition process. Based on an inspection of the 
maintenance of the emergency diesel generators, 
STUK demanded from Fortum a report on mainte­
nance inspections and measurements of the diesel 
generators during the 2014 annual outage. STUK 
also issued a requirement concerning the improve­
ment of battery bank load management.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
(I&C), 4–5 November 2014
The I&C system inspection focused on possible 
construction inspection of I&C components, renew­
al of I&C modification work process, development 
of qualification and the management of ageing, 
identifying of programmable devices in connection 
with acquisition, as well as the role of notified body 
during commissioning inspections. Fortum devel­
ops the modification work process of Loviisa NPP, 
the management of ageing at Loviisa and related 
instructions. This work is still underway, mostly 
because of changes to be made due to reformed 
YVL Guides. Fortum is also preparing instructions 
on the identification of programmable devices and 
Fortum’s role in commissioning inspections.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
4–5 November 2014
In the mechanical engineering inspection, STUK 
assessed the reliability of the emergency diesel 
generators, which supply emergency power to 
important components. The diesel engines of the 
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emergency diesel generators date back to their in­
stallation year, and Loviisa NPP no longer plans to 
replace them. Spare parts are still available and 
their operability has been ensured by means of 
maintenance and inspection programmes for which 
the NPP has the required competence. They are 
subjected to mechanical stress, particularly dur­
ing sequence tests that are annually implemented 
at each unit. There are plans to arrange these 
tests less often or simulate them. Their mechani­
cal components have required more repairs in the 
past few years, but reduced operability has never 
been determined as the cause for a failure of the 
unit to start during testing. STUK requested in the 
inspection that the licensee specify faults causing 
unavailability in more detail based on whether 
they were actual faults that caused inoperability 
or repair needs that caused minor deterioration of 
performance.
C5 Structures and buildings, 9–10 April 2014
The inspection on structures and buildings at Lovi­
isa NPP focused on maintenance procedures for 
seawater cooling structures, the steel containment, 
spent fuel storage and handling pools, containers 
of the reactor safety injection system, steel clad­
ding in container rooms, fuel racks and pipeline 
supports. The scope of the inspection also included 
the organisation of the power company, inspection 
procedures issued by the power company, inser­
vice inspections by the power company, repairs and 
modifications, supplementary construction works 
onsite and other inspections within the area of 
responsibility. STUK issued three requirements 
during this inspection. They involved inspection 
instructions, reporting and the delivery of a repair 
plan.
C7 Chemistry, 8–9 May 2014
The chemistry inspection focused on chemical con­
ditions at the NPP and migration of activity. The 
chemical laboratory has handled all of the obliga­
tions posed by STUK within the given deadlines. 
There is no official process description for the labo­
ratory but its operation is being measured and as­
sessed by various means and any non­conformanc­
es in its operations are addressed in a systematic 
and well­documented manner. The laboratory is 
currently assessing sampling during an accident: 
which samples would actually be needed and how 
they would be taken. The assessment also aims at 
creating estimated sample sizes for the sampler. 
Alternative sampling routes are annually tested.
In addition to the laboratory’s own personnel, 
other people bring samples to the laboratory. In 
such cases, the laboratory must make sure that the 
samples have been correctly taken. In addition to 
theoretical training, training on sampling onsite 
should be provided. No requirements were imposed 
by STUK Based on the inspection results.
C8 Annual outage, 18 July - 1 October 2014
In the inspection during the annual outage, STUK 
studied whether Loviisa NPP has provided instruc­
tions on regularly repeated work on the steam gen­
erators and a one­time modification (the replace­
ment of six safety valves in the Loviisa 2 fresh 
steam piping), whether plans and instructions are 
followed when implementing the work, and wheth­
er the instructions are up to date. Other inspection 
areas included monitoring by the licensee as well 
as general order and cleanliness of worksites.
STUK made several similar observations re­
garding both inspection objects. The observations 
involved activities that do not comply with the 
instructions and plans, defective orientation or 
instructions for the employees, communications, 
supervision of work or monitoring of measures, 
as well as defective documentation and decision­
making. The significance of these observations 
must be assessed in more detail after the annual 
outage: were they isolated incidents or do the ob­
servations suggest a more extensive need to im­
prove the operations? STUK considers important 
that Loviisa NPP complete this assessment of 
its own activities and organisation so that it will 
be able to determine whether any measures are 
needed and if so, which measures will be efficient 
and sufficient. STUK will monitor the progress of 
the development work based on the action plan 
required from Loviisa NPP and a status report on 
implementation of planned measures. STUK also 
issued detailed requirements based on four obser­
vations made. The improvement measures must be 
completed by the NPP’s 2015 annual outage.
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Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 22–23 October 2014
The radiation protection inspection covered the 
nuclear power plant’s radiation protection, ra­
diation measurements, emission monitoring and 
environmental monitoring. Special attention was 
paid to radiation measuring. Inspection focus ar­
eas included the representativeness of radiation 
measurements and analyses, for example. The 
new YVL Guides by STUK require more specific 
descriptions of the locations of radiation measur­
ing instruments. Based on the inspection results, 
STUK determined that the radiation measuring 
results are representative. However, STUK still 
demanded a detailed report from Fortum on the 
locations of the measuring probes used in radia­
tion measuring. Fortum has identified a need to 
update descriptions as well as specify descriptions 
and instructions in connection with the periodic 
safety review of Loviisa NPP. The environmental 
monitoring programme has reached all of the goals 
set. STUK found during the inspection that a tech­
nical description of the equipment base should be 
included in the final safety analysis report on the 
NPP systems.
D2 Fire protection, 6–7 March 2014
The fire protection inspection assessed effective­
ness of the Loviisa power plant’s fire protection ar­
rangements and the operations of the power plant, 
as well as inspecting the implementation of plans 
on modifying the fire protection arrangements. Fo­
cus areas included processes and operations. The 
inspection also included studying changes made in 
the protection unit organisation as well as a review 
of fire extinguishing and fire detection system in­
spections and the processing of non­conformances 
observed in these inspections. Requirements by 
STUK on updating maintenance instructions and 
a form on managing service life that were made 
in 2013 were closed in this inspection. A fire water 
system condition evaluation required by STUK in 
its previous inspection had not been performed yet. 
Fortum will arrange a competitive bidding on the 
condition evaluation project by the end of 2014.
D3 Emergency preparedness, 
28–29 October 2014
The emergency preparedness inspection focused 
on emergency preparedness at Loviisa NPP, emer­
gency preparedness instructions, emergency pre­
paredness training and emergency preparedness 
equipment, particularly the renewed automatic 
environmental radiation monitoring system and 
the weather observation system that is currently 
being modified. An additional focus area was the 
drafting of spreading forecasts in case of an acci­
dent. Furthermore, STUK assessed in the inspec­
tion personnel planning, the processing of non­con­
formances and work processes. STUK found during 
the inspection that the calibration interval of the 
meteorological measurements exceeded the time 
limits laid down in the OLC and requested from 
Fortum a special report on this event. In terms of 
the drafting of spreading forecasts, STUK issued a 
requirement on assessing the adequacy of support­
ing materials included in the instructions. Further­
more, Fortum must test the audibility of popula­
tion alarms in the accommodation village. During 
the inspection, STUK found that the emergency 
preparedness of Loviisa NPP is fine, the plant or­
ganisation has received the necessary training in 
compliance with the emergency response plan, and 
the plant’s emergency response plan and related 
instructions are up to date. Even though emergen­
cy preparedness has not been determined as a pro­
cess by Loviisa NPP, related quality assurance is 
fine. Any non­conformances and requirements are 
processed in compliance with agreed procedures.
D4 Nuclear security, 26 March 2014
The nuclear security inspection of Loviisa NPP 
verified the implementation of nuclear security 
particularly in the final disposal facility and also 
partially due to modified fences and modified reac­
tor building access arrangements. A remark made 
during the inspection will have significance in 
the assessment of the application of the new YVL 
Guides and design basis threat.
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Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operational waste, 10–11 June 2014
The operational waste inspection focused on waste 
management processes, personnel planning and 
the occupational radiation dose. The condition of 
facilities in which waste is processed and stored, 
radiation levels in these facilities, as well as their 
classification and their markings were inspected 
during the inspection visit. No major non­conform­
ances or development needs were detected in the 
inspection. A good practice observed during the 
inspection was an indicator system that had been 
developed for the packaging of waste: it is used to 
assess activity measuring, cleanliness, order, etc. 
as well as to monitor and develop packaging op­
erations. Nuclear waste management reporting of 
Loviisa NPP is being developed based on updated 
waste records in order to make it compatible with 
the reporting system of STUK. The occupational 
radiation dose is incurred when employees pro­
cess waste during annual outages, transport waste, 
package waste and test the solidification facility 
for liquid radioactive waste. The radiation doses 
have remained low when compared to the NPP’s 
total radiation doses. They have remained clearly 
below the individual dose limits set for employees 
doing radiation work.
Special issues
F1 Assessment of operating license and 
new YVL Guides, 13 October 2014
With its inspection, STUK verified some of the 
licensee’s actions that are included in the scope 
of the implementation process of the YVL Guides. 
The new YVL Guides, published by STUK in No­
vember 2013, will be ratified for the operating 
NPPs with a separate implementation decision by 
STUK. For STUK to be able to make this decision, 
Fortum must submit an assessment on compliance 
with the all of the requirements of the new YVL 
Guides, references to verifying plant documenta­
tion and, if necessary, improvement measures and 
their justification, and submit the guide­specific 
assessments to STUK for approval. In the inspec­
tion, STUK verified Fortum’s assessment process 
and its status. The information obtained in this 
inspection will assist STUK in the preparation for 
the processing of the assessments.
F2 Renewal of main control 
room ceiling, 5–6 June 2014
STUK implemented an extra periodic inspection 
programme inspection to verify that Fortum has 
properly designed and will properly implement 
haulage and installation work included in the main 
control room ceiling renewal project. The current 
ceilings of the main control rooms at Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2 are not watertight. Fortum will construct 
new watertight ceilings to protect the main control 
rooms from any process leaks. The modification 
will be implemented first at Loviisa 1 and then at 
Loviisa 2. The work at Loviisa 1 started with the 
construction of a protective level. In the inspec­
tion, STUK verified that Fortum has studied the 
safety risks connected to the work, has determined 
procedures to eliminate or minimise the risks, and 
will follow these procedures in practice. STUK im­
plemented the inspection before the starting of 
the haulage and installation of the main control 
room ceiling at Loviisa 1, but after construction of 
the protective level. Some development areas con­
nected to possible bypassing of the safety ventila­
tion system, the ability to detect an alarm related 
to discontinuation of the work, fire detectors in the 
main control room below the protective level, orien­
tation for contractors, haulage and construction in­
spections were observed. Observed good practices 
included daily meetings between the contractor 
and the shift supervisor to discuss the current sta­
tus and documentation of these meetings.
F3 Studying whether the OLC is 
up to date, 2 December 2014
In December, STUK implemented an unannounced 
inspection to verify with the help of spot tests the 
implementation of corrective measures and the de­
velopment of operations after expiration of dead­
lines. The measures were connected to inspecting 
whether the currently valid OLC is up to date 
and development of OLC maintenance procedures. 
The operational limits and conditions (OLC) are 
an operating license document mentioned in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. It must be kept up to date 
at all times. Based on the inspection results, STUK 
stated that Loviisa NPP has not started sufficient­
ly extensive, speedy and effective measures based 
on the requirement posed by STUK in 2013. STUK 
demands that the director in charge of the NPP 
take action to perform these duties.
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Periodic inspection 
programme 2014, Olkiluoto
Management, management 
system and personnel
A1 Management and safety 
culture, 4–5 March 2014
The inspection of the management and safety cul­
ture focused on TVO’s processes and development 
projects, as well as self­assessment of the safety 
culture. In the inspection, STUK interviewed the 
process owners and people who drafted process 
descriptions, and TVO presented its safety culture 
self­assessment from 2013 and recommendations 
made based on the assessment. TVO presented the 
current status of its operating processes and the 
status of ongoing development projects on develop­
ing the management process and the management 
of resources. TVO has described the operating pro­
cesses as charts and continues the development of 
process indicators. A business model development 
project involves the introduction of scorecard indi­
cators that measure changes at the company and 
department level. The goals of the development 
of the management of resources include resource 
management rules, a competence centre model and 
a description of centralised resource management, 
and TVO states that the key results of the develop­
ment measures will be completed by 30 June 2014. 
People in charge of the measures that were deter­
mined based on the safety culture self­assessment 
report have been named in the operative commit­
tee. A requirement made in the previous inspection 
on taking into account organisational changes in 
risk assessments when preparing for the operation 
of Olkiluoto 3 is still active. Based on the inspec­
tion results, STUK stated that TVO actively devel­
ops its operations and processes, and the develop­
ment is systematic enough.
A2 Personnel resources and 
competence, 24–25 September 2014
The inspection on personnel resources and compe­
tence focused on TVO’s personnel resource man­
agement process (REHA), duties and resources of 
the Personnel Development office and TVO’s train­
ing. Furthermore, employees who work in the pro­
ject office that was established in May 2014 were 
interviewed. The REHA project aims at streamlin­
ing operations by means of resource management 
at the Group level and a competence centre model. 
According to TVO, the project has ended and the 
final results determined in the project plan have 
been assessed. However, a final report on the re­
source management rules, the use of consultants 
and the competence centre model has not been 
drafted yet. According to TVO, development of re­
source management at the Group level is not pos­
sible because the ERP tool TVO uses is not well 
suited for this purpose. Based on the inspection re­
sults, the competence centre operations have been 
launched, but there are still some expectations and 
uncertainties regarding the competence centres in 
the TVO organisation. STUK demanded that TVO 
make an official decision about the competence 
centre’s role as part of TVO’s operations, update its 
management system accordingly and offer its em­
ployees more information on the competence centre 
model and its use. It was noted in a competence 
management audit in 2013 that external training 
is being monitored with the help of course feedback 
but separate systematic monitoring of the quality 
of training has not been arranged. TVO plans to 
arrange project training for project engineers and 
project managers. The preliminary training time is 
the beginning of 2015. Based on the inspection re­
sults, development of project activities and launch­
ing of a project office are still in the early stages. 
Assessing long­term effectiveness of training has 
been found challenging. In the future, TVO must 
submit an annual report on the training provided.
A3 Functionality of management system 
and quality assurance, 29–30 October 2014
The inspection of the functionality of the man­
agement system and quality assurance focused on 
assessments regarding TVO’s operations (the in­
ternal audit programme in particular) as well as 
resources, job descriptions and development pro­
jects of the Quality and Environment Office. STUK 
assessed TVO’s supplier audit procedures by inter­
viewing people who implement the supplier audits. 
TVO’s renewed internal audit programme aims 
at more comprehensive coverage of all operations. 
STUK demanded that TVO submit a report on how 
the renewed internal audit programme supports 
assessment of the process­based management sys­
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tem. Several parties within TVO are in charge of 
the development of processes, and it is unclear 
who carries the overall responsibility for the de­
velopment. TVO must submit to STUK a status 
report on development of the management system 
processes and a report on who is in charge of the 
development of the processes.
Plant safety and its improvement
B2 Plant safety functions, 30–31 October 2014
The plant safety functions inspection at Olkiluoto 
NPP focused on the management of severe reactor 
accidents (Severe Accident Management or SAM). 
In the inspection, STUK assessed the measures 
and systems pertaining to the SAM strategy as 
well as TVO’s resources and the maintenance of 
competence. TVO’s SAM strategy is based on flood­
ing of the lower plenum of the containment to cool 
melted fuel and thus ensure integrity of the con­
tainment. Based on the inspection results, TVO’s 
resources, SAM competence and SAM training are 
adequate. TVO develops its operations and renews 
systems in the long term. At present, key plant 
modifications include the reforms determined after 
the Fukushima accident, such as ensuring fuel pool 
cooling.
B3 PRA and safety management, 
9 September 2014
STUK assessed the use of the Probabilistic Risk 
Analysis (PRA) in the management of safety in 
an inspection that focused on the current update 
status of the PRA, the current status of planned 
improvements of seismic supports and the impact 
of these measures on the PRA. Processes and op­
erations of the organisation in charge of the PRA 
and personnel planning were also assessed. The 
PRA update schedule has been speeded up from 
the previous plans: all parts of the PRA will be 
updated at least once before the operating license 
is renewed. TVO has sufficient resources to follow 
the update schedule. The PRA is used as planned 
and in a versatile manner to support the man­
agement of safety, and no major deficiencies were 
observed in the inspected issues. Potential develop­
ment areas identified in training utilising the PRA 
included simulator training and the training of 
maintenance personnel.
B4 Operating experience 
feedback, 8–9 October 2014
The operating experience feedback inspection fo­
cused on the NPP’s operating experience processes 
and activities, and verified with the help of exam­
ple cases implementation of operating experience 
feedback activities and the processing of external 
operating events and experiences. STUK found 
that TVO’s operating experience feedback opera­
tions are very well organised and the related in­
structions are excellent. The instructions and pro­
cedures are developed in compliance with the YVL 
Guides and organisational changes. High­quality 
event reports have been submitted at the right 
time. There is still some room for development in 
annual reporting and the assessment of the impact 
of corrective measures, however. Operating experi­
ence feedback during the construction of Olkiluoto 
3 has been developed and standardised together 
with the operating plants.
Operational safety
C1 Operational activities, 19–20 March 2014
The inspection of operational activities focused on 
training and competence of control room operators. 
Based on the inspection, STUK issued two require­
ments, one of them about the updating of a couple 
of instructions and the other about the need for the 
licensee to clarify the process description on opera­
tor training. Based on the inspection results, STUK 
found that sufficiently many competent employ­
ees are available for operator and operator trainer 
training at Olkiluoto NPP, and that the develop­
ment of operator competence is properly ensured. 
The competence of operators is being monitored and 
training needs are being identified with a variety 
of methods. The inspection results also show that 
the effectiveness of training is being monitored and 
further developed.
C2 Plant maintenance, 2–3 April 2014
The plant maintenance inspection focused on 
the management of spare parts and supplies at 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. The inspection cov­
ered procurement, reception, storage and hando­
ver from warehouse of spare parts and supplies. 
Responsibilities, instructions, resources and data 
systems pertaining to these sectors of spare part 
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management were studied. Furthermore, operation 
of the incoming goods unit and the storage facili­
ties were verified. An increased risk of fake goods 
could not be excluded in the inspection, since the 
supply chains are longer than before and suppliers 
are changed often. A fake product cannot usually 
be detected using normal quality assurance proce­
dures that are based on mutual trust. The risk of 
fake products can, however, be mitigated by adding 
more quality assurance measures at the spare part 
procurement and reception stage, as well as by pro­
viding more training. Measures pertaining to the 
prevention of fake products, in particular, was an 
issue that could not be verified during the inspec­
tion. STUK demanded that TVO study means it 
could use to identify forgeries. Based on the inspec­
tion results, TVO needs to add more precaution­
ary measures to its spare part procurement and 
inspection instructions in order to avoid a situation 
where fake spare parts or supplies are used at the 
plant. This requirement applies in particular to 
mechanical, electrical and I&C components that 
are serially produced and of the commercial grade 
as well as commercial supplies that influence the 
operability of a safety classified system, structure 
or component.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
(electricity), 19–20 March 2014
The electrical inspection focused on ensuring and 
monitoring power supply during annual outages, 
setting of the parameters of electrical components, 
maintenance and repairs of valve actuators, moni­
toring of the ageing of electrical components, bat­
tery banks and earth faults in DC systems. Based 
on the inspection results, STUK demanded from 
the power company reports on development of 
the procedures used when setting the parameters 
of electrical components, testing and settings of 
thermal relays, prevention of earth faults in DC 
systems and quality assurance during the mainte­
nance of actuators.
C3 Electrical and I&C systems 
(I&C), 19–20 March 2014
The I&C system inspection focused on calibration 
requirements for measurements listed in the oper­
ational limits and conditions (OLC), compliance of 
the I&C design and implementation process with 
requirements, coverage of accident I&C qualifica­
tion, correctness of the dimensioning of installed 
components and management of the ageing of I&C 
components. A requirement issued by STUK in its 
inspection in 2012 on updating I&C design and 
implementation instructions is still valid. STUK 
demanded further reports on the calibration of 
measurements and qualification of accident I&C.
C4 Mechanical engineering, 
19–20 March 2014
The mechanical engineering inspection focused on 
operations pertaining to ensuring integrity of the 
reactor pressure vessels at Olkiluoto 1 and Olki­
luoto 2 as well as operations pertaining to the 
management of ageing. Ensuring the sufficiency of 
expert resources at Olkiluoto NPP is challenging 
because the organisation is currently undergoing 
a transfer to the next generation simultaneously 
with ongoing construction projects and the draft­
ing of reports pertaining to the extension of the 
operating license. STUK found in the inspection is­
sues to be developed: the time needed to maintain 
the reactor pressure vessels, operation, condition 
monitoring and management of basic data dur­
ing modifications. STUK required from the power 
company a more detailed report on the monitoring 
programme used to monitor the long­term effect of 
neutron radiation on the properties of the reactor 
pressure vessel materials. The ageing mechanism 
linked to the internals of the reactor and weld 
joints of pipe nozzles that causes the most concern 
is stress corrosion cracking. TVO has prepared for 
it by applying extended inspection programmes 
and ensuring the readiness to calculate the me­
chanics of failure. A deep crack in a feedwater noz­
zle at Olkiluoto 2 that has been monitored since 
2003 may have been caused by this mechanism, 
and TVO has drafted a repair plan for it. STUK 
demanded more specific information from TVO on 
stresses to which the reactor pressure vessel cover 
is subjected because of temperature fluctuations of 
the flange connection and the screws in it at differ­
ent speeds during transients.
C5 Structures and buildings, 
29–30 October 2014
In the inspection of the structures and buildings at 
Olkiluoto NPP, STUK focused on the maintenance 
procedures and management of ageing of the struc­
tures, buildings, seawater channels and tunnels, 
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spent fuel storage and handling pools, condensate 
pools, fuel racks and piping supports. The inspec­
tion covered the power company organisation, the 
power company’s inspection instructions, the power 
company’s inservice inspections, repairs and modi­
fications, as well as other inspections within the 
area of responsibility. STUK verified the execution 
and results of the power company’s own inspec­
tions and related reporting. STUK made remarks 
on requirement entries, specifying the requirement 
specification for steel and concrete structures, the 
delivery method of renewed instructions, the clari­
fication of supplier classification and the reporting 
on ageing management in compliance with the new 
YVL Guide.
C6 Information security, 
16–17 September 2014
The information security inspection focused on 
technical and administrative information security 
of the operating Olkiluoto units and TVO’s prepa­
rations for the operation of Olkiluoto 3. In the 
inspection, deadlines for implementation of previ­
ous requirements were set, two requirements were 
closed and three new requirements were issued. 
TVO must draft a follow­up report on implementa­
tion of the requirements to monitor the status of 
all open requirements and observations from pre­
vious inspections as well as the implementation of 
information security inspection visits. Information 
security inspection visits are a new concept from 
the viewpoint of the continuous oversight of plants.
C7 Chemistry, 5–6 November 2014
The chemistry inspection focused on quality assur­
ance at the laboratory, chemical conditions at the 
plant units and the migration of activity. According 
to an internal audit of the laboratory, the labora­
tory has properly performed regular self­assess­
ments, drafted sufficient instructions on self­as­
sessments and provided its employees with train­
ing on self­assessments. There is still some room 
for improvement in the updating of instructions 
and the implementation of supplier audit approv­
als, however. The laboratory’s results in chemistry 
and radiochemistry reference measurements were 
fine, but the analyses of the reference measure­
ment samples could also be used in identifying 
training needs. STUK demanded that TVO study 
how and how regularly radiochemistry reference 
measurements could be performed with known 
standards in the future.
C8 Annual outage, 11 May – 9 June 2014
The annual outages at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 
2 took place from 11 May to 9 June 2014. During 
the annual outage, STUK implemented an inspec­
tion on the operations of the NPP to maintain 
safety and manage operations during annual out­
ages. Nearly twenty sectors and jobs were verified 
during the inspection. The inspection focused on 
shoe boundaries, monitoring and management of 
contamination, heavy lifting in the reactor build­
ing, shift change routines, maintenance of the re­
actor coolant pumps, nuclear security, supply of 
electric power during annual outages, processing 
of observed faults and modification of an auxil­
iary feedwater system recirculation line. During 
this inspection, STUK monitored the work done 
onsite, conducted inspection visits and interviewed 
employees. Good operations and examples of con­
tinuous improvement were observed during the in­
spection. Nothing or nothing major to remark was 
observed in most of the inspection objects. STUK’s 
requirements based on the inspection mostly in­
volved the updating of different instructions to de­
velop the operations and documents. For example, 
clear instructions on what to do if the set test lim­
its are exceeded must be added in the instructions 
on trip tests that are performed during the startup 
of a unit. One of the requirements involved com­
missioning inspections after modification of pres­
sure equipment. TVO must draft clear instructions 
on the related procedures and offer the persons in 
charge of the trial runs proper training regarding 
the instructions.
Personal and plant protection
D1 Radiation protection, 18–19 March 2014
A radiation protection inspection covers the nu­
clear power plant’s radiation protection, radiation 
measurements, emission monitoring and environ­
mental monitoring. In 2014, special attention was 
paid to radiation measuring. Inspection focus areas 
included the representativeness of radiation meas­
urements and analyses, for example. STUK found 
that the environmental monitoring programme has 
reached the set goals but there is still room for 
improvement in keeping instructions up to date. 
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STUK demanded that the power company supple­
ment its description of the power company’s role 
in acquisition of components and during reviews of 
subcontracted sampling. Furthermore, a description 
of the instruments used when collecting samples 
from the environment should be added, as a single 
entity, in the final safety review report of the NPP. 
STUK did not find anything to remark in the condi­
tion monitoring of fixed radiation measuring instru­
ments. Many of the instruments have been replaced 
over the past few years, and the instruments have 
been fully functional.
D2 Fire protection, 18–19 September 2014
The organisational oversight of the fire protection 
at Olkiluoto focused on processes and operations. 
STUK demanded that TVO submit a survey report 
to STUK on the coverage of the VIRVE network that 
is used in communications between authorities once 
the report is completed. Furthermore, observations 
regarding the entering of inspections into the TEHA 
system and the acquisition of a boat to be used in 
oil prevention were made. These observations, as 
well as the status of TVO’s active fire protection, are 
issues that will be monitored in future inspections.
D3 Emergency preparedness, 
23–24 April 2014
The emergency preparedness inspection at Olki­
luoto covered emergency preparedness of the NPP, 
instructions on emergency preparedness and emer­
gency preparedness training. A special focus area 
was the drafting of spreading forecasts in case of 
an accident. Among emergency preparedness equip­
ment, special attention was paid in the environ­
mental monitoring system that is to be used in the 
case of an accident to assess the scope of releases, 
for example. Over the years, measuring stations 
have been moved due to construction activities, 
for instance. STUK demanded that TVO calculate 
new release assessment curves for the rearranged 
measuring stations. Furthermore, the NPP must 
test the audibility of population alarms indoors in 
the accommodation village. STUK also assessed in 
the inspection personnel planning, the processing of 
non­conformances and work processes.
D4 Nuclear security, 12–14 May 2014
The nuclear security inspection focused on nuclear 
security at the NPP in general and nuclear secu­
rity during annual outages. Other issues covered in 
the inspection included the status of requirements 
from previous inspections, nuclear security events 
(special events) during the previous period, train­
ing for the safety organisation, drills, as well as 
access control management procedures for TVO’s 
archiving facilities and electronic archives. During 
the inspection visit, STUK assessed access control 
arrangements of a new work permit office and on­
call activities at the alarm centre, and interviewed 
the safety organisation shift supervisor. Based on 
the inspection, STUK demanded that a couple of de­
tails be updated in the safety organisation’s security 
instructions.
D4 Nuclear security as part 
of the management system, 
30 September – 1 October 2014
The inspection on nuclear security as part of the 
management system focused on the risk manage­
ment process, procedures used to manage the risks 
caused by illegal activities as part of the company’s 
comprehensive risk management process, the pro­
cessing of nuclear security non­conformances and 
observations, as well as the processing of nuclear 
security issues in management reviews. The inspec­
tion covered both nuclear security and information 
security. TVO has developed its risk management 
in the past few years based on the inspection re­
sults, and risk management is now systematic. Non­
conformances and observations are processed in an 
established manner and continuous development 
occurs. STUK demanded that TVO take into ac­
count the development areas in identifying risks 
pertaining to illegal activities in all of the organisa­
tion’s operations and responsibility areas as well as 
the management of non­conformances and observa­
tions pertaining to nuclear security and information 
security as a whole that were identified during the 
inspection.
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Nuclear waste and its storage
E1 Operational waste, 7–8 October 2014
The inspection on the processing and final disposal 
of radioactive operational waste at Olkiluoto NPP 
focused on waste management processes, person­
nel planning and occupational radiation doses. The 
condition of facilities in which waste is processed 
and stored, the condition of final disposal facili­
ties, radiation levels in these facilities, as well as 
their classification and their markings were stud­
ied during the inspection visit by STUK. TVO is 
about to introduce a new system for measuring 
the activity of barrels and bales, and the develop­
ment of a new bag monitor is underway. Nuclear 
waste management reporting of Olkiluoto NPP is 
being developed based on waste records in order 
to make it compatible with the reporting system of 
STUK. The occupational radiation dose is incurred 
when employees process waste during annual out­
ages, transport waste, package waste and solidify 
liquid radioactive waste. The radiation doses have 
remained low when compared to the NPP’s total 
radiation doses. They have remained clearly below 
the individual dose limits set for employees doing 
radiation work. No major non­conformances or de­
velopment needs were detected in the inspection.
E2 Final disposal facilities, 
25–26 September 2014
STUK assessed the final disposal of radioactive 
operational waste at Olkiluoto NPP in an inspec­
tion that focused on TVO’s organisation, processes 
and operations of the low­ and intermediate­level 
waste repository, condition of concrete and rock 
structures in the repository and monitoring of the 
bedrock. The monitoring scope covers hydrologi­
cal and rock­mechanical monitoring measurements 
in the repository. Several long­term tests are also 
being performed at the repository. The inspection 
included a visit to the repository. TVO was unable 
to answer all the questions about rock monitoring 
posed by STUK, and TVO did not know how the 
subcontractor had processed or assessed some of 
the rock monitoring results. STUK’s requirements 
involved the determination of criteria for assess­
ing the monitoring results, collecting groundwa­
ter chemistry and hydrology measurement results, 
measured variables and measuring instruments, 
as well as competence of the people in charge of 
monitoring. STUK also encouraged TVO to pay at­
tention in the monitoring of subcontractors’ work.
Special issues
F1 Assessment of new YVL 
Guides, 30 October 2014
With its inspection, STUK verified some of the li­
censee’s actions that are included in the scope of the 
implementation process of the YVL Guides. STUK 
published new YVL Guides (40 of them in total) in 
November 2013. The Guides will be ratified for the 
operating NPPs with a separate implementation 
decision by STUK. For STUK to be able to ratify 
the Guides, TVO must first submit its own assess­
ment of compliance with the requirements of the 
new YVL Guides. STUK will then review TVO’s 
guide­specific suitability analyses and make imple­
mentation decisions on ratifying the Guides. STUK 
has requested that the guide­specific suitability 
analyses be submitted by the end of December 2014. 
In the inspection, STUK verified TVO’s assessment 
process and its status. The information obtained in 
this inspection will assist STUK in the preparation 
for the processing of the suitability analyses. TVO 
implemented the assessment as a separate project. 
Based on the inspection results, TVO’s project was 
well planned and executed, and project manage­
ment seems to have been successful. No require­
ments were imposed in the inspection.
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APPENDIX 6 Construction inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 3 in 2014
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction in­
spection programme is to verify that the operations 
required by the construction of the unit ensure a 
high quality implementation according to the ap­
proved plans and in compliance with official regu­
lations, without compromising the operating units 
within the site. The inspection programme assess­
es and oversees the licensee’s operations in con­
structing the unit, implementation of procedures in 
various technical areas, the licensee’s competence 
and use of expertise, the processing of safety is­
sues, as well as quality assurance and control. The 
inspection programme of Olkiluoto 3 was launched 
in 2005 when construction of the unit started. The 
number of annual inspections has varied between 
nine and fifteen.
In 2014, ten inspections included in the con­
struction inspection programme were implement­
ed, three of which were targeted at the main 
operations of the Olkiluoto  3 project, and seven 
at practical work processes. Special focus areas of 
the construction inspection programme included 
quality assurance, commissioning procedures and 
activities at the construction site. Issues pertain­
ing to Olkiluoto 3 are also covered in inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme if 
this is appropriate due to the nature of the issue. 
Issues pertaining to Olkiluoto 3 covered in inspec­
tions of the periodic inspection programme in 2014 
included personnel resources and competence, as 
well as chemistry operations. Below is a brief de­
scription of the inspection findings for which STUK 
required improvements from TVO. On the whole, 
the inspections have led to the conclusion that the 
procedures and resources of TVO’s organisation 
are adequate.
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Main functions
Quality management and safety culture 27–28 March 2014
Project management and management of safety 25–26 June 2014
Quality management – Restart of the construction site operations 19–20 November 2014
Work processes
Commissioning – Readiness to start containment pressure and  
leak tightness tests
22–23 January 2014
Radiation protection 19 February 2014
I&C – Assessment of the protection system requirement specification 6–7 May 2014
Installation supervision – storage and maintenance 22–23 October 2014
Electrical engineering 30–31 October 2014
Commissioning – preparation for operation 19–21 November 2014
Utilisation of PRA 3 December 2014
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The construction inspection programme inspec­
tions on quality assurance assessed TVO’s pro­
cedures on maintaining and developing the safety 
culture of the Olkiluoto 3 project, taking into ac­
count nuclear security and information security as 
part of the safety culture, and the impact of TVO’s 
organisational reform on ensuring safety. On the 
basis of the inspection, it is not self­evident that 
all observations on information security deviations 
will be communicated to all the parties involved 
in the assessment of the safety culture or saved 
into all the systems that will be used as the data 
sources during the assessment. Furthermore, the 
safety culture assessment has not taken into ac­
count the possible need to collect observations 
regarding special situations, such as the reduction 
of personnel from the construction site. Based on 
these observations, STUK required TVO to submit 
a plan on development measures.
The inspection on management and process-
ing of safety issues focused on actions by project 
management in order to identify and monitor 
safety issues, risk management, and preparation 
for restarting operations at the construction site 
after a slower period. It was noted that TVO drafts 
inspection memorandums for all issues important 
to safety. This is a good practice, but the memoran­
dums are not saved into the system that is used 
when commenting on the issue and monitoring 
its progress. STUK required during the inspection 
that tracking inspection memorandums in the sys­
tem must be possible. On the basis of the inspec­
tion, it is not self­evident that TVO has a plan on 
restarting the construction site. STUK required 
that the plant supplier and TVO draft a plan that 
covers the orientation of all organisations and em­
ployees entering the construction site for the first 
time, supervision, risks involved in restarting the 
operations, and measures to be used to mitigate 
these risks.
The quality assurance inspection focused on 
starting of the construction site operations and 
related proactive measures to avoid problems, as 
well as impact of the organisational reform and the 
management system as the construction project is 
concluded and operation of the unit starts. In the 
inspections, it was not possible to fully determine 
the relationship between subprojects and the line 
organisation. The content and status of subprojects 
will be described in more detail in subproject plans 
that must be submitted to STUK for information.
During an inspection on the readiness 
tostart containment pressure and leak tight-
ness tests, which are part of commissioning, 
it was observed that the prerequisites laid down 
for the containment pressure and leak tightness 
tests had been met and STUK was of the opinion 
that there were no open issues that would prevent 
successful testing. The readiness of TVO and the 
plant supplier to perform the tests was found good. 
STUK required during the inspection that the 
commissioning inspection of the containment in­
strumentation system would have to be completed 
before starting the testing in the containment.
The inspection on radiation safety focused on 
planning of the radiation protection organisation 
personnel, their training, commissioning inspec­
tions in the controlled area, experiences obtained 
by TVO during the construction stage on the unit’s 
radiation protection solutions, and radiation meas­
uring system licensing. STUK required that TVO 
draft a plan on commissioning of the controlled 
area of OL3 and implementation of the commis­
sioning inspection by the licensee. The plan must 
include requirements on implementing radiation 
protection and the procedures that will be used to 
verify compliance with these requirements.
The I&C inspection focused on assessment of 
the protection system requirement specification. 
TVO is currently assessing the reactor protec­
tion system requirements in order to ensure that 
the protection system that will be implemented 
in compliance with the requirements will be able 
to perform the indicated tasks. Correctness, com­
pleteness and consistency of the requirements are 
assessed. In connection with this inspection, STUK 
required that the scope of the assessment be ex­
panded and requested that TVO determine criteria 
it can use when ensuring that the requirements 
are correct, consistent and complete.
The inspection on storage and maintenance 
was an unannounced inspection. Compliance with 
plans and more detailed instructions on specific 
components, as well as documentation of mainte­
nance measures were studied during the inspec­
tion. No cause for any remarks regarding the prac­
tices was found during the inspection.
The electrical  inspection focused on the licen­
see’s procedures and actions on ensuring compli­
ance of the electricity systems during the systems’ 
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design, installation and commissioning stages. Fol­
lowing the inspection, STUK required that TVO 
continue the mapping of software­based compo­
nents and draft a report on acceptability of cables 
that have been damaged on the outside. In addi­
tion, STUK demanded that TVO review and correct 
a document on the settings of protective relays.
The second commissioning inspection fo-
cused on preparation for operation, particu­
larly in terms of the current status of unit proce­
dures and operator training. No requirements were 
imposed by STUK following the inspection.
The PRA inspection focused on keeping the 
PRA model, documentation and applications up to 
date and taking them into account in plans drafted 
in order to conclude the project. TVO’s own inspec­
tion and monitoring activities were also studied. 
No requirements were imposed by STUK follow­
ing the inspection. However, STUK noted that the 
proposed schedule for updating the PRA model and 
the materials does not optimally support STUK’s 
inspection activities.
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Subject of inspection Inspection date
Management system
ONP-A1 Management system –
Planning and management
ONP-B1 Project management and control –
ONP-B2 Safety management –
ONP-B3 Project quality management –
ONP-B4 Planning and management of the research and monitoring programme –
ONP-B5 Design of Onkalo –
Implementation
ONP-C1 Site inspection and monitoring procedures –
ONP-C2 Drilling and modelling –
ONP-C3 Foreign materials 3–4 April 2014
ONP-C4 Excavation and EDZ 6–8 May 2014
ONP-C5 Seepage water and injecting 1–2 October 2014
ONP-C6 Monitoring and research methods –
“–” denotes that the inspection was not carried out during the Onkalo construction inspection programme 2014 because the subject matter was 
included in the scope of Posiva’s inspection programme during processing of the construction license.
APPENDIX 7 Construction inspection 
programme of Onkalo in 2014
The objective of the construction inspection pro­
gramme is to verify that high­quality implemen­
tation of approved plans is ensured in the con­
struction of the underground research facility, in 
compliance with official regulations and without 
compromising safe final disposal. The inspection 
programme includes assessment and monitoring of 
Posiva’s operations when constructing Onkalo, the 
procedures applied to various parts of the construc­
tion work, the management research and moni­
toring in Onkalo, the management of safety and 
quality assurance during implementation. STUK 
prepares annual plans for Onkalo inspections.
An inspection of excavation and EDZ was im­
plemented in early May. The inspection period was 
longer than normal based on a request by Posiva 
because there was plenty of new materials and 
interpretations on EDZ studies and related de­
velopment work. A requirement on updating the 
management instructions for the excavation dam­
age zone (EDZ) was issued in the inspection. In ad­
dition, Posiva was urged to study whether there is 
any need to draft separate excavation management 
instructions similar to Posiva’s other management 
instructions for issues critical for long­term safety. 
Five requirements were issued based on an inspec­
tion of seepage water and injecting in early Octo­
ber. The key requirements involved anticipating 
changes in the total salinity (total dissolved solids 
or TDS) content of the groundwater due to the 
construction of Onkalo, the impact of the observed 
exceeded action limits on the design and position of 
the repository, the development of silica injection 
and reliability of the method used when measur­
ing seepage water in the shafts. In the inspection 
of foreign materials in early December, it was 
observed that the key issue to be developed in Po­
siva’s own monitoring is still the monitoring of the 
amount of approved foreign materials used. Com­
missioning of TVO’s new logistics centre in 2015 
is expected to provide a solution to this problem. 
Three requirements were issued in this inspec­
tion. Posiva failed to follow its own instructions on 
entering environmental damage involving foreign 
materials into the KELPO system for STUK to 
view. Key definitions in the instructions on foreign 
materials must be standardised. Posiva must study 
the reference value of injection additives and pro­
vide justification for it.
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license application period of the disposal facility
In 2014, STUK continued the implementation of 
the inspection programme that was started in 
2013 for the construction license application period 
of the disposal facility. The objective of the pro­
gramme was to assess Posiva’s procedures when 
constructing a safe and high­quality encapsula­
tion plant and disposal facility. Furthermore, the 
programme was used as an aid when reviewing 
the application documentation. STUK drafted and 
submitted a bi­annual inspection plan to Posiva.
The inspection plan included nine inspections 
for 2014, which were implemented. Below are brief 
descriptions of the inspections, as well as the key 
observations made based on which STUK had 
required improvements and development actions 
from Posiva. A total of around fifty requirements 
on correcting deficiencies or further developing 
its operations were submitted to Posiva during 
the inspections. As a result of the inspection pro­
gramme, STUK has been able to get an overall 
view of Posiva’s management procedures, Posiva’s 
preparation for the construction stage, the man­
agement of design, quality assurance and Posiva’s 
safety culture, for instance. In 2014, STUK drafted 
an overall assessment of Posiva’s procedures and 
organisational preparedness as part of the process­
ing of the construction license application.
Management
The management inspection focused on Posiva’s 
management process and its practical implementa­
tion. Other inspected issues included safety culture 
in the Posiva organisation, training operations, 
personnel resources and management reviews as 
part of the assessment and continuous improve­
ment of the management system. Furthermore, the 
inspection covered the status of corrective meas­
ures of the observations made in previous inspec­
tions by STUK.
Posiva’s procedures in the handling of safety is­
sues were verified in the inspection. Safety issues 
are processed by the technology and safety com­
mittees, as well as the operative committee. The 
Posiva management team acts as the project steer­
ing group. It also regularly discusses safety issues. 
According to Posiva, the procedures used when as­
sessing the project, conducting safety assessments 
and managing safety are included in the project 
safety plan. STUK demanded that Posiva submit 
the safety plan to STUK for processing so that the 
management of safety can be assessed.
As a result of the inspection, STUK demanded 
that Posiva make sure that process indicators 
are regularly discussed in management reviews 
so that required decisions on effectiveness of the 
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Management 21–22 January 2014
Management of nuclear and radiation safety 4–5 March 2014
Management of documents and information security 25–26 March 2014
Management of design 7–8 April 2014
Safety arrangements and safeguards of nuclear materials 23–24 April 2014
Quality assurance and supervision 5–6 June 2014
Bedrock suitability analysis 17–18 June 2014
Safety culture 29–31 October 2014
Preparation for construction stage 19–20 November 2014
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management system can be made and required 
measures can be implemented. Furthermore, the 
conclusions of a management system review must 
also include a comment on suitability and effective­
ness of the system. The comment must also study 
whether the quality and safety policies are up to 
date.
Management of nuclear and radiation safety
The nuclear and radiation safety inspection focused 
on the procedures and instructions that guide Po­
siva’s operations and with which Posiva plans to 
ensure that the safety requirements are met. It was 
noted in the inspection that Posiva has hired more 
nuclear and radiation safety experts. Furthermore, 
Posiva uses the competence of external experts in 
the management of nuclear and radiation safety. 
Regardless of the improvements already made, 
STUK demanded that Posiva make sure that it has 
sufficiently many competent employees to ensure 
nuclear and radiation safety of the NPP also in the 
future. Furthermore, Posiva must make sure that it 
has sufficient competence to take into account hu­
man factors and organisational factors in the design 
of the nuclear waste facility.
Management of documents 
and information security
The document management inspection aimed at 
assessing procedures pertaining to not only docu­
ment management but also final documentation 
and information security. The inspection indicated 
that Posiva is still in the process of developing the 
structure of its management system documenta­
tion and the mutual relations of the documents. 
Based on the inspection results, it was noted that 
the development work will also require the updat­
ing of specific instructions on document manage­
ment and the archiving process. The Posiva man­
agement system determines that documents must 
be reviewed to ensure that they are up to date and 
updated as necessary at least every four years. 
It was noted during the inspection that this re­
quirement has not been met in the case of all the 
instructions. It was noted that it is apparent that 
Posiva’s monitoring system does not enable reli­
able monitoring of the review requirement, which 
is why Posiva was requested to create a procedure 
that will reliably ensure that documents are moni­
tored to ensure that they are up to date. It was 
also noted in the inspection that requirements and 
procedures for assessing and managing informa­
tion security risks have not been described in the 
Posiva management system. Due to the observed 
deficiency, STUK demanded that the system be 
updated.
Management of design
The inspection included reviewing Posiva’s proce­
dures and instructions on management of plant 
design, implementation planning and plant con­
figuration, as well as the guidance of suppliers in 
these sectors. Resources and competence of the 
Posiva design organisation were also assessed. On 
the inspection date, Posiva had not yet named the 
people in charge of the design of various sectors of 
the encapsulation plant and disposal facility, which 
is why their competence level and the adequa­
cy of resources could not be assessed. Therefore, 
STUK stated after the inspection that Posiva’s re­
cruitment process and the allocation of personnel 
resources for the project are still unfinished and 
STUK was unable to verify the resources allocated 
to the control and supervision of design (such as 
people in charge of design sectors and control of 
schedules). Thus, Posiva did not, on the inspection 
date, have sufficient resources for the control and 
supervision of detailed design or the verification of 
compliance. STUK demanded that Posiva ensure 
that the design organisation personnel resources 
will comply with the plans as soon as possible.
STUK also reviewed instructions for Posiva’s 
design operations. Some deficiencies in instruc­
tions on configuration management procedures 
were observed during the document review, such as 
undetermined responsibilities of implementation. 
Furthermore, the definition of basic configura­
tion levels did not take into account the licensing 
stages laid down in the Nuclear Energy Act or the 
level of configuration required at each stage. The 
definition must be completed for the licensee to be 
able to manage supplements to the construction 
license application before starting detailed design. 
Thus, Posiva was requested to correct the deficien­
cies and submit updated procedure instructions to 
STUK for processing. Similar deficiencies were also 
detected in Posiva’s detailed design handbook, and 
this handbook must also be updated.
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Safety arrangements and safeguards 
of nuclear materials
In this inspection, it was assessed how safety ar­
rangements (nuclear security and information se­
curity) and the safeguards of nuclear materials 
are linked to the Posiva management system and 
safety management. The inspection focused on en­
suring the effectiveness of the safety arrangements 
and the safeguards of nuclear materials, descrip­
tions of these operations in the management sys­
tem, their implementation in the job descriptions 
of key personnel, as well as safety arrangements 
and the safeguards of nuclear materials in the risk 
management process. Safety arrangements and 
the safeguards of nuclear materials as part of the 
assessment and development of the organisation’s 
safety culture were also assessed. Based on the 
inspection results, STUK demanded that Posiva 
supplement its management system in terms of 
the goals, tasks, responsibilities and procedures 
related to safety arrangements and the safeguards 
of nuclear materials.
Quality assurance and supervision
The quality assurance and supervision inspection 
aimed at assessing the readiness of Posiva to com­
plete quality assurance and related operations dur­
ing the construction project. The inspection also 
covered personnel resources of the organisational 
units in charge of the operations. The inspection 
covered both the Posiva line organisation and 
project quality assurance and supervision. A key 
observation made during the inspection was that 
Posiva’s procedures and instructions on the man­
agement of non­conformances have not yet been 
developed to a level where the management of 
non­conformances during the construction project, 
including the implementation of corrective and 
preventative measures at the right time, could be 
efficient. Thus, STUK demanded that Posiva de­
velop its non­conformance management methods 
to the level required from a party constructing a 
nuclear power plant. In terms of the organisation, 
STUK demanded that Posiva make sure that it has 
a QC inspector for electricity systems available at 
the right time in its organisation. Furthermore, 
Posiva must ensure that all the people handling 
quality assurance duties have the required quality 
competence, including competence on YVL Guides 
important to quality assurance.
Bedrock suitability analysis
The programme also included an inspection on the 
procedures Posiva applies to bedrock suitability 
analyses. Based on the observations made dur­
ing the inspection, Posiva must submit instruc­
tions on rock classification and model description 
procedures, further development plan schedules 
and panel calculator to STUK for processing. Fur­
thermore, three issues into which special attention 
must be paid were observed: deputies of employees, 
international cooperation and verifying the results 
produced by measuring methods.
Safety culture
The inspection covered Posiva’s procedures in as­
sessment and development of its organisational 
safety culture. Posiva’s safety management proce­
dures, internal communications about safety cul­
ture, safety culture of Posiva’s suppliers and safety 
culture training materials were also studied. The 
inspection included interviewing eight employees 
of Posiva. Posiva selected the interviewees to rep­
resent various parts and levels of its organisation.
Based on the inspection results, Posiva must 
describe its safety culture principles in the man­
agement handbook in compliance with the require­
ments of the YVL Guide. Another issue observed 
in the inspection was the fact that Posiva does 
not have a safety culture programme; develop­
ment of such a programme is still being planned. 
STUK demanded that Posiva draft and introduce 
a permanent safety culture programme by 30 April 
2015. The programme must describe safety culture 
assessment and monitoring methods as well as 
procedures that will be used when utilising operat­
ing experience feedback in the monitoring and de­
velopment of the safety culture. In addition, Posiva 
must ensure that the importance of safety culture 
will be regularly reasserted by means of internal 
communications. Based on observations made dur­
ing the inspection, STUK’s inspection team found 
that the management and personnel of Posiva are 
committed to ensuring a good level of safety.
Preparation for construction stage
In 2014, Posiva continued its preparations for the 
construction stage of the project. The inspection 
focused on the current status of Posiva’s prepara­
tions, the current status of the project in terms of 
organisation, personnel resources, management of 
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competence and training, as well as procedures 
used in the management of construction activities. 
It was found that Posiva has determined and de­
scribed the operating processes to the extent nec­
essary in order to proceed to the implementation 
planning stage. It was further found that the man­
agement plans for the different subprojects (qual­
ity, safety, risks and schedule) are complete. At the 
time of the inspection, implementation planning 
had been started or was being started in almost all 
of the technical sectors of the encapsulation plant.
Posiva is currently developing criteria to be 
used when assessing the readiness for a transfer 
to the construction project implementation stage. 
Posiva has launched a project on management of 
uncertainties. The assessment on the readiness to 
transfer to the implementation stage is linked to 
this management project. At the first stage of the 
management project, Posiva will draft a plan on 
the readiness to transfer to the implementation 
stage. The plan will include assessment criteria, a 
procedure to be used when assessing the meeting 
of the criteria and a description of the responsi­
bilities for the assessment. The assessment on the 
readiness to transfer to the implementation stage 
will include an assessment of the development sta­
tus of the disposal facility concept, i.e. it will cover 
Posiva’s entire project. STUK demanded in the 
inspection that the plan, which is currently being 
prepared, must be taken into use well before Po­
siva is to assess its readiness for construction. The 
plan, including safety criteria, must be submitted 
to STUK for processing by 30 June 2015.
The inspection covered Posiva’s updated in­
structions on the reporting and processing of ob­
servations. A non­conformance management pro­
cedure described in the instructions will be used 
to manage the reporting and processing of non­
conformances by all of the organisations partici­
pating in the disposal facility project. STUK ob­
served that the instructions are sophisticated and 
meet the YVL Guide requirements in terms of the 
classification and grouping of non­conformances, 
for example. Analysing and reporting of non­con­
formances were also covered in the inspection. 
STUK proposed that the reports on classification 
and grouping of non­conformances could be further 
developed to make them more visual.
It was noted that the disposal facility project 
does not possess all of the resources listed in the 
resource plan submitted to STUK and the organi­
sation presented in the project plans. Therefore, 
Posiva must make sure that there will still be suf­
ficient resources for the control and supervision of 
planning as the implementation planning scope is 
expanded. The current resources are not deemed 
sufficient for a larger volume of planning, since the 
resources do not comply with the resource plan. 
STUK demands that the disposal facility project 
resources must comply with the plans when Posiva 
assesses the transfer to the implementation stage. 
STUK will verify the resources in a separate in­
spection before construction starts.
The inspection covered the current status of 
Posiva’s management system instructions and the 
instructions from the project’s viewpoint. Posiva 
has started a survey of disposal facility project 
instructions. It aims at identifying which instruc­
tions need to be drafted and updated as well as 
planning the implementation, including related 
schedules. Posiva has already identified and listed 
in its handbooks instructions that are still missing 
from the handbooks. These instructions are not 
needed yet, but Posiva should have a clear plan 
on the schedule, i.e. by which project stage the 
instructions must be approved and taken into use. 
Based on the inspection results, STUK demanded 
that Posiva must submit to STUK a schedule 
on the drafting of the missing instructions. The 
schedule must ensure that the instructions will be 
approved and in use at the correct disposal facility 
project stage.
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APPENDIX 9 Nuclear materials in 
Finland at 31 December 2014
Location
Natural uranium 
kg
Enriched uranium 
kg
Depleted 
uranium kg
Plutonium 
kg
Torium 
kg
Loviisa plant – 635 920 – 5 752 –
Olkiluoto plant – 1 563 865 – 11 313 –
VTT / FiR 1  
research reactor
1 511 60 ~0 ~0 ~0
Other facililties 5 384 < 1 1 568 ~ 0 3.5
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APPENDIX 10 Assignments funded by STUK in 2014
Safety of nuclear power plants
Most of the assignments in the 2014 plan for tech­
nical support assignments were inspection and as­
sessment tasks regarding the regulatory oversight 
of Olkiluoto 3 as part of STUK’s decision­making. 
Due to the delays in the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
project, some of the assignments proposed for 2014 
were postponed until 2015.
Of the assignment proposals for 2014, twenty 
were related to the regulatory oversight of the con­
struction of Olkiluoto 3, ten to the operating Olki­
luoto plant units, eleven to the Loviisa plant units 
and four to new NPP projects. There were also four 
assignment proposals related to all plant units in 
general.
In 2014, total costs of the technical support as­
signments amounted to around EUR 1,255,000. The 
most important assignments pertaining to the con­
struction of Olkiluoto 3 that were completed during 
the year were:
•	 Using	the	filtered	containment	relief	train	as	an	
alternative residual heat removal system in the 
case of a severe accident
•	 Assessing	 the	 number	 of	 fuel	 rods	 that	would	
burst in the case of a class 2 postulated accident
•	 Comparison	analyses	to	be	completed	with	the	
TRAB­3D/SMABRE model for EPR plants
•	 Comparison	 analyses	 of	 the	 accident	 analyses	
to be submitted in connection with the operat­
ing license application
•	 Assessing	software-based	electric	and	I&C	com­
ponents of NPPs and their manufacturers
•	 Expert	assistance	during	the	assessment	of	sys­
tem level I&C materials
•	 Safety	culture	follow-up	study
Safety of the final disposal of nuclear waste
Regulatory oversight of nuclear fuel by the Ra­
diation and Nuclear Safety Authority involves the 
research, development and design of a repository 
for spent nuclear fuel, construction of waste facili­
ties and waste management at the NPPs. As an aid 
for its decision­making and regulatory oversight, 
STUK uses external experts and projects on special 
issues. In 2014, the technical support programme 
for the oversight of nuclear waste management 
(VATU2014) included assignments to oversee the 
construction of the underground research facility 
(ONKALO) as well as assignments related to the 
review of the construction license for the reposi­
tory to be built by Posiva. Separate framework 
contracts have been signed with several external 
experts (15 contracts in total). In 2014, total costs 
of the technical support assignments amounted to 
around EUR 1,104,000. The assignments involved 
the following subjects linked to the regulatory 
oversight of nuclear waste management:
•	 A	 consultant	 on	 rock	 construction	 to	 support	
regulatory oversight of the construction of Po­
siva’s underground research facility and reposi­
tory (ONKALO)
•	 A	safety	case
•	 Long-term	safety	analyses
•	 Engineered	barriers
•	 Chemical	and	biological	properties	of	buffer	and	
backfilling materials
•	 Physical	 and	 mechanical	 properties	 of	 buffer	
and backfilling materials
•	 Design	and	mechanical	strength	of	canisters
•	 Properties	of	spent	nuclear	fuel
•	 THMC	 modelling	 for	 the	 buffer	 material	 and	
evolution in the near field
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•	 Repository	site,	performance	of	natural	barriers
•	 Hydrogeology
•	 Hydrogeochemistry,	 geochemistry,	 paleohydro­
geochemistry
•	 Rock	mechanics
•	 Biosphere
•	 Assessment	 of	 resource	 and	 risk	management	
plan
•	 Structural	geology	and	3D	modelling
•	 Rock	 construction	 and	 rock	 construction	 pro­
jects
•	 Paleoseismology
•	 Seismic	predictions
•	 Glaciology
•	 Assessment	of	sub	project	plans	for	the	Posiva	
construction project
•	 Assessment	 of	 interaction	 between	 water	 and	
rock material, as well as retention and migra­
tion properties of the bedrock
•	 Assessment	of	Posiva’s	safety	culture,	organisa­
tion and training
•	 Assessment	of	the	fire	protection	concept	for	the	
repository for spent nuclear fuel and survey of 
required comparative analyses
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ITDB
Illicit Trafficking Data Base, an IAEA database 
to which member states deliver data on de­
viations observed as regards nuclear substances 
and radiation sources.
KYT
Finnish nuclear waste management research 
programme
LARA
I&C renewal project at the Loviisa power plant
MDEP, Multinational Design Evaluation 
Programme
A multinational cooperation programme evalu­
ating the practices and requirements of au­
thorities related to the licensing of new nuclear 
power plants
NKS (Nordisk kärnsäkerhetsforskning)
Nordic safety research programme
OECD/NEA
Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for 
Economic Co­operation and Development
OLC
Operational Limits and Conditions (previously 
Technical Specifications)
Onkalo
underground research facility for the final dis­
posal of spent nuclear fue
PRA
Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
APPENDIX 11 Glossary and abbreviations
ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)
radiation protection optimisation principle, ac­
cording to which exposure must be limited to 
being as low as reasonably achievable
BWR
boiling water reactor
CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear)
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear 
weapons or hazards, for example: ”protective 
measures taken against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”
Euratom
for nuclear material safeguards, Euratom refers 
to the European Commission units responsible 
for nuclear material safeguards: Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport, Directorates 
H and I
FSAR
Final Safety Analysis Report
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
INSAG
International Nuclear Safety Group; organisa­
tion called by the Director General of IAEA
IRS
International Reporting System for Operating 
Experience operated jointly by the IAEA and 
OECD/NEA
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PWR
pressurised water reactor
SAFIR, Safety of nuclear power plants
Finnish publicly funded national nuclear power 
plant research programme
SAGSI, Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation; 
an international team of nuclear material safe­
guard experts called by the Director General of 
the IAEA
WANO, World Association of Nuclear 
Operators
WENRA, Western European Nuclear 
Regulators’ Association
VVER (Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky 
Reactor)
Russian pressurised water reactor; Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 are VVER­440 reactors
nuclear material 
special fissionable material suitable for the 
creation of nuclear energy, such as uranium, 
thorium or plutonium
nuclear commodity (or: nuclear material)
nuclear material referred to above or another 
material referred to in Section 2, Paragraphs 4 
and 5 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (deu­
terium or graphite), device, system and infor­
mation (Section 1, paragraph 8 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree). 
nuclear material accounting and control 
manual
manual to be used by an organisation in pos­
session of nuclear commodities, describing the 
nuclear commodity safeguards and accounting 
system
nuclear non-proliferation manual
manual to be used by a future possessor of nu­
clear commodities, describing the measures to 
secure the requirements of nuclear safeguards
regulatory control of nuclear non-
proliferation
monitoring operations to prevent the prolifera­
tion of nuclear weapons; operations consist of 
nuclear safeguards and the monitoring of the 
nuclear test ban
EIA procedure
Enviromental Safety Assessment
YVL Guides
STUK guides containing detailed requirements 
set for the safety of nuclear power plants. A 
comprehensive reform of the YVL guides was 
practically completed at the end of 2013 when 
40 guides came into force on 1.12.2013 and will 
be applied as such to new nuclear facilities.
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